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Thesis Summary 
 
My thesis looks at the construction of citizenship in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts 
(BTAD, or Bodoland for short) in Western Assam, India. The BTAD is an autonomous sub-
region within the state of Assam, which in turn is part of a cluster of states in Northeast India. 
I look primarily at the everyday practices of the state in an ethnically diverse region with a 
history of separatism, armed militant struggle, and violence between different ethnic groups. 
Two related strands of difference underlie the notion of citizenship here — the territorialised 
expression of ethnicity as manifested in the Indian context; and the idea of India’s Northeast 
as being a space of exception vis-à-vis the rest of the country. As has been repeatedly 
emphasised by scholars of citizenship, creating citizens is a fundamentally exclusionary 
process contingent on the process of creating Others. There is no “us” without a “them”. 
Equally, these categories have always been nebulous and contested, never neatly fitting onto 
the reality they claim to represent. It is precisely this process of construction and negotiation 
in Bodoland to which I turn my attention.  
My understanding of citizenship is developed in the backdrop of Assam’s contemporary 
exercise of updating its own National Register of Citizens, a process designed to identify 
illegal immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh. Building on the demands of Assam’s sub-
nationalist movement in the 1980s, the present-day NRC process has also acquired religious 
overtones, with the state’s large Bengali-speaking Muslim community being singled out as 
“Bangladeshis” en masse. This has resonated across Bodoland, where the Muslim community 
has come into multiple conflicts with the state’s autochthonous group, the Bodos. It is 
primarily among these two groups that my thesis explores the conflicting practices and ideas 
of citizenship. I attempt to unpack the role of the state in the shaping of this relationship, 
including its heavily militarised presence in the region. In doing so, I adopt approaches from 
the anthropology of the state, i.e., focussing on its everyday character, looking at routine 
practices, as well as the ways in which the state represents itself in ordinary settings.  
I explore the tensions between conflicting notions of citizenship in four main ways. First, I 
look at the historical context of the region, and in particular its evolving relationship with the 
Indian state. Second, I look at the often-contentious and deeply important politics of land and 
territory, which have been central to the expression of political identities and politicised 
ethnicities in the region. Third, I examine electoral and everyday party politics, which 
provide a window into the many contradictions in the practices and representations of the 
state and corresponding ideas of citizenship. And finally, I explore the rise of a new politics 
in India and its impact in the region — the emboldening of right-wing Hindu fundamentalist 
groups in recent years, and how they challenge ideas of insiders and outsiders as they are 
understood today. In each of these themes, I look at citizenship not just as it is formalised and 
expressed in legal terms, but as it is enacted, practiced, resisted and re-appropriated for 
context. In addressing these issues, I am also exploring the question of how India’s Northeast 
shapes the national imagination, and whether its confinement to the “periphery” of Indian 
identity reveals deeper insights into the shaping of India as a nation. 
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Glossary 
AASU All Assam Students Union 
AAMSU All Assam Minority Students Union 
ABSU All Bodo Students Union 
ABMSU All BTC Minority Students Union 
AFSPA Armed Forces Special Powers Act 
AGP Asom Gana Parishad 
AIUDF All India United Democratic Front 
ALRR Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (Act) 
BJP Bhartiya Janata Party 
BLTF/BLT Bodo Liberation Tigers Front/ Bodo Liberation Tigers 
BPF Bodoland Political Front 
BSS Bodo Sahitya Sabha 
BTC Bodoland Territorial Council 
INC Indian National Congress  
MCLA Member of Council Legislative Assembly 
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly 
NDFB National Democratic Front for Bodoland 
NRC National Register of Citizens 
NSK Nagarik Seva Kendra (Citizen Service Centre) 
PTCA Plains Tribal Council of Assam 
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
ST Scheduled Tribe 
TLCC Tertiary Level Coordination Committee 
ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam 
UPP United People’s Party 
VCDC Village Council Development Committee 
VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
The seeds for this research project were sown much before I enrolled in the PhD or embarked 
on fieldwork. The main impetus that shaped this study was the year I spent in the Bodoland 
Territorial Area Districts (BTAD, or Bodoland), an autonomous sub-region within the state 
of Assam between June 2013 and June 2014 (and several follow up visits in the year that 
followed). I worked on a rehabilitation project set up in the aftermath of riots in 2012 
between two of the region’s largest groups — indigenous Bodos and Muslims. The same 
groups are the focus of the study here.  
 
In the post-conflict context, many issues were discussed and debated prominently in local and 
national media (one of the rare occasions that the region was in the national media at all): 
immigration from Bangladesh, demographic imbalance, ethnic cleansing of Muslims, the vast 
scale of displacement (nearly 500,000 people), and the inadequate compensation and 
rehabilitation that followed. For the national media in particular, the violence was reflective 
of an unruly, conflict-prone region where such instances were common, and which further 
reinforced its status as being “peripheral” to the Indian national imagination.  
 
The role of the state with regard to the conflict was mentioned in specific ways: the 
government of Assam and the central Indian government were pulled up for not controlling 
the immigration of Bangladeshis (especially Muslims) from the border; chastised for failing 
to provide adequate military and paramilitary forces as a response to the initial violence, thus 
letting it spiral out of control; and criticised for not providing adequate relief and 
rehabilitation after the violence died down, leaving many people displaced for several 
months. Over the course of a year, as life slowly went back to normal (although the violence 
would have long lasting political repercussions), it became increasingly evident that the role 
of the state in shaping the conflict had deeper roots than the specific instances that became 
news. Its ubiquitous presence (and sometimes conspicuous absence) and the form of its 
institutions shaped the contours of this conflict from much before 2012. To see the context of 
the conflict required both a step back, to understand the character of the state over 150 years, 
as well as a step forward, towards looking at the state in the ordinary, the everyday, and in the 
minutiae.  
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As much as it was the violent events of 2012 and their aftermath that prompted the initial 
thinking about this project, it is not, ultimately, a study of conflict or violence in the BTAD. 
As the BTAD is situated in Northeast India, conflict is often the theme towards which 
research about it tends to gravitate, and not without reason. Over the last six decades, the 
region has seen multiple protests and agitations, separatist movements that spawned militant 
outfits, state-sponsored violence through increasing militarisation, and ethnic tensions that 
have escalated into violent events. Many important works of scholarship have examined the 
dynamics of this violence in Northeast India, highlighting its enduring tussle with the Indian 
state (for a non-representative sample, see Baruah 1999, 2005, Hazarika 2000, Barbora 2002, 
2008, Bhaumik 2009, Kikon 2009, Vandekerckhove 2009, Goswami 2014). Such studies 
have been essential, given that the conflict is often invisible to India’s “mainland” (a term 
coined from the Northeast), and ignored by its media.  
 
Nonetheless, there have also increasingly been calls to move beyond understandings of 
violence and politicised ethnicities as the dominant framework to study Northeast India. An 
exclusive focus on conflict risks reinforcing stereotypes about the region as being inherently 
violence-prone, but it also makes invisible the other, underlying aspects of social and political 
life in the region, which deserve attention. By focussing on the everyday routines of politics 
and the state in the BTAD, this thesis attempts to shed light on these quotidian practices, and 
what they suggest about the unfolding politics of the region more generally. Nonetheless, 
violence recurs as a theme in conversations, slogans, election rallies and campaigns, political 
rhetoric of all hues, and is embedded in the landscape of daily life. Given the relatively recent 
riots of 2012 (as well as two major incidents of targeted violence that followed), it is 
impossible to be distanced from it entirely. Many people’s lives are permanently shaped by 
the riots, like residents of Makrabari, a field site in my project, where displaced Muslims 
have been living in a de facto relief camp for almost six years now. Their daily life is 
constantly informed by violence, past and present, and many ordinary decisions must factor 
in past violent events. My attempt here has been to show the mundane practices of citizenship 
and state, and violence forms a part of these narratives, even when it is not occurring.  
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1.2 Research Questions 
 
This is a thesis that centres around the constructions and contestations around citizenship in 
the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts. Going into fieldwork, the issues that I focussed on 
drew from the abovementioned questions about how the role of the state and conversations 
about the state were framed, in the context of violence, its aftermath, and everyday practices 
of the state. I began the first round of my fieldwork in March 2016 (during state-level 
elections), and the second, longer round from October 2016 onwards. This was also the 
period in which the National Register of Citizens (NRC) was in the process of being updated 
in the region. It predictably garnered much attention both in news media and in everyday 
conversations, being a long-standing political project designed to identify illegal immigrants 
from neighbouring Bangladesh. This has been claimed by many residents of Assam as a 
perennial problem since the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. While the Assam movement, 
which picked up steam in the 1980s, focussed on illegal immigrants of all religious 
backgrounds, in the last couple of decades, this conversation has come to focus increasingly 
on Bangladeshi Muslims, and threatened to implicate the many legally resident Bengali-
speaking Muslims in the region as well. The NRC process meant this conversation was at the 
forefront during my time in the field, almost everyday, and became part of the daily life of all 
those who were in Assam, as they scrambled to look for documents and evidence that proved 
they were legal residents of Assam, and citizens of India.  
 
The NRC provided a topical backdrop against which to observe questions of citizenship in 
particular, as a lens to understand practices of the state. Citizenship gained new visibility in 
the context of the NRC updating exercise, but what has been most revealing has been looking 
at citizenship practices in the everyday, in ordinary interactions between citizens, and 
between citizens and the state. The overarching research question that forms a narrative 
thread through this thesis, then asks: How do we understand the construction of citizenship as 
a process, and how do different forms of authority influence how it is experienced, practiced, 
imposed or resisted? In responding to this question, I disaggregate the lines of enquiry into 
three specific areas. 
 
Categories of citizenship, although shaped primarily by state practices, are never entirely 
congruent with them. While many ethnonationalist movements in Northeast India have gone 
on to appropriate territorialised identities as a means of challenging state boundaries and 
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demanding ethnic homelands, other, subtler practices also contest these ideas, and challenge 
them, resulting in contradictory constructions of citizenship — at different scales, times and 
places. The first research question then centres around acts of citizenship and how they differ 
from routine practices of citizenship. I look at how such acts, employed through formal 
routes and informal tactics both reinforce and disrupt existing categories of citizenship.  As 
the empirical evidence from the fieldwork goes on to show, such acts of subversion are not 
just undertaken by ordinary citizens, but also powerful groups (such as right-wing 
nationalists), and can have an impact on how citizenship is experienced.  
 
In attempting to understand the construction of citizen identities in the BTAD, the second 
research question must consider its historically territorialised nature. While there has been 
much work on how this has been enshrined in policy and law, I ask how territorialised 
citizenship in Northeast India is normalised through practice, and how the idea is re-
appropriated to create new ideas of territory by non-state actors. I look here at territorial 
identities as they are reproduced through state instruments like autonomy, as well as through 
everyday practices, as in the ownership and transfer of land.  
 
Notions of difference have always been at the heart of belonging at the Northeast, and as 
scholars have repeatedly documented, this has manifested in multiple ways — militarised 
spaces, asymmetrical federalism, autonomy arrangements (that are said to lack genuine 
autonomy), and the construction of the population as a racialised Other to the Indian 
“mainstream”. Even as greater out-migration and somewhat increased connectivity has 
rendered the region less isolated than it used to be, historical notions of difference persist in 
the way Indian nationalism continues to consider the Northeast as peripheral. The third 
research question considers this context of difference — Northeast India — and questions a 
category of Otherness within this already differentiated identity, that of Muslims from 
Northeast India. Given the historical significance of migration and ethnicity in the region, it 
is important to ask how Northeast Indian Muslim citizenship is constructed, and in particular, 
how exclusions formed through this identity differ from the way Muslim identity has been 
constructed in opposition to Indian citizenship? This last line of inquiry arose organically 
from doing fieldwork, and also through perusing the relatively narrow representations of 
Muslims in literature about Northeast India. Despite being an important category of “Other” 
in the construction of Northeast Indian identity (which, in common parlance, is often 
understood as exclusive of Muslims), territorialised representations of the region do not 
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capture the lived experience of Northeast Muslim identity, nor does the category exist in any 
significant way in scholarship. Through attempting to answer this question, I hope to make a 
contribution towards an understanding of this layered sense of differentiated identity.  
 
 
1.3 A note on terminology 
 
A few potentially contentious points of terminology arise in the reading of this thesis. The 
first is the use of the shorter “Bodoland” to refer to the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts, or 
BTAD. What appears to be a harmless shortening of a lengthy term also carries political 
connotations, however. As Chapter 4 will go on to detail, the term “Bodoland” emerged from 
the movement for separate statehood that began in 1987, a petition to carve out a separate 
state within the federal structure of India. The BTAD is a compromise agreement between the 
movement and the Indian state, while Bodoland continues to be an aspirational project of 
statehood, the movement for which, while being at varying levels intensity in different 
periods, has never entirely died down. Some Bodo political outfits — among them the 
influential All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), which initially spearheaded the movement in 
1987, have continued to campaign for statehood. This leaves the term “Bodoland” with a dual 
meaning — it is often used as a shorthand for the longer BTAD acronym, to refer to the 
existing region (both in local parlance and in academic scholarship), as well as being a 
politically charged term, used to convey a possible future project. In the latter context, the 
term also has the potential to be divisive — one of the key impediments to the statehood 
project has been the objection of non-Bodo groups (who form the majority, as against 30 
percent of Bodos) to an ethnic homeland for a dominant tribal group that nonetheless lacks 
demographic majority. Despite these contentious connotations, the term “Bodoland” is 
included in the BTAD acronym, and thus becomes convenient shorthand in ordinary 
discussion. In my usage of the term in this thesis, I use the term in this spirit (unless 
specifically speaking of the statehood project, which I have attempted to indicate clearly, 
when used in this way).  
 
The second point of terminology considers the usage of “tribal” and “indigenous” in the 
Indian context. The term “indigenous”, while often signalling historical antecedents and 
ancient lineages, is in itself a modern construct, emerging from the discourse of international 
bodies like the United Nations and International Labour Organisation in the 1950s and 1960s 
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(Niezen 2000). It is understood as referring to populations that inhabited a geographical 
region before European colonisation (Xaxa 1999). The term “tribe”, often emerging from 
early ethnographic accounts in the 19th century, refers not just to particular types of society, 
but also to a particular stage of evolution, often associated with seemingly primitive 
characteristics (Béteille 1998). 
 
In India, the term “tribe” was coined by colonial ethnographers, but relatively late — the first 
mention is in the 1901 census (Xaxa 1999, p. 3589). This is generally attributed to the fact 
that early colonial ethnographers could not distinguish between caste and tribe, often using 
the two social categories interchangeably (Béteille 1998, Xaxa 1999). As those who study 
indigenous/tribal groups in India are aware, the two are not entirely synonymous in India, in 
the way that they often have been in contexts of settler colonialism such as across Latin 
America, Australia, or North America. The multiple migrations of many groups, both tribal 
and non-tribal, have led to multiple understandings of what “tribal” means. Some argue that 
in the South Asian context, tribes refer to groups settled in the region before the arrival of the 
Aryans, in which case, the term “indigenous” finds greater resonance (Xaxa 1999). On the 
other hand, this becomes more complex when looking at some of tribes in Northeast India, 
whose settlement in what is today India occurred after many other, non-tribal groups, 
although their presence in Tibet dates back to as early as the first millennium BC (Ibid., p. 
3591). Other than habitat, markers like language, race, and to a lesser extent, religion, have 
been used to attempt to clarify distinctions between tribals and non-tribals at different periods 
of time (Béteille 1998). 
 
Of the two groups that my thesis focusses on, the Bodos are considered indigenous to the 
region, indeed the demand for an ethnic homeland is centred around this premise. The term 
“indigenous” however, is used unevenly in the Indian context, and “tribal” is in more 
frequent usage. Used in this way, the word tribal does not carry a pejorative connotation,1 and 
is also a term of self-identification. This is perhaps fuelled to a large extent by the use of the 
term “Scheduled Tribe” in the Indian constitution as an administrative category that receives 
additional constitutional protections. Many of the group nomenclatures — the All Assam 
Tribal Sangha, or the Plains Tribal Council of Assam — also use the term tribal in the 
                                                
1 Except for the overarching paternalistic view taken towards tribal groups by the Indian state, but this is less to 
do with terminology and more to do with deeper-held beliefs about tribals as backward or less civilised.  
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context of advocacy. A term that originated as a means of facilitating colonial categorisation 
today is a form of articulation and assertion of identity (Xaxa 1999, p. 3594).  
 
Despite its more recent positioning as an emancipatory term, “indigenous” has not been a 
term that has gained currency in Indian political or policy circles, although its Hindi 
equivalent, Adivasi, finds resonance, especially in reference to Central Indian tribes, in 
particular (Xaxa 1999). For Bodoland, the word “tribal” is in common usage to refer to 
Bodos and other Plains Tribes in the region, particularly as Adivasi has different connotations 
both historically and linguistically, and is used to refer to descendants of central Indian tribes 
who arrived to work on tea plantations from the late 19th century onwards. The administrative 
category of “Scheduled Tribe” also enables the use of the term tribal widely, and it is used 
often in a rights-based context in campaigning for statehood. The place-based nature of this 
administrative category further reifies the link between ethnicity and territory (Jayal 2013). 
The lack of applicability of this term to central Indian Adivasis in Assam, however, leads to a 
curious though largely unresolved question — “how widely can people move and still retain 
the entitlement of being “indigenous” for themselves and their descendants?” (Béteille 1998, 
p. 190) 
 
As Karlsson (2001) has observed, the “sons of the soil” argument of the kind pursued by 
Bodos could be looked at within the broader framework of indigenous claims, and many 
tribal groups have adopted this approach in more recent times. During my fieldwork, a high 
profile Bodo activist, Anjali Daimary, attended the United Nations Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues in New York, and presented the case of Bodoland at the assembly (The 
Telegraph 2017a). While her attendance at the forum may not have had any direct 
consequences for domestic policy, the news spread within the Bodo community, with many 
taking pride in the fact that Daimary had presented the issue in an international context. In 
doing so, Daimary also aligned Bodos with other indigenous peoples across the world, and 
adopted similar strategies of using global means to pursue local agendas (Castree 2004, p. 
152). Nonetheless, the debate is also fraught with uncertainty, as the Bodo/Adivasi question 
of indigeneity shows. In Assam, the term khilonjiya roughly translates to “indigenous”, but is 
used to refer not to tribal groups, but to what are considered the “original” inhabitants of 
Assam — both caste Hindus and Muslims. This identity is constructed in opposition to non-
Assamese groups like Bengalis, Marwaris, and even Adivasis, who immigrated to Assam 
from the late 19th century onwards, at the beginning of the colonial encounter. As a result, 
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indigenous has multiple meanings in the contexts of Assam and Bodoland, and I largely use 
the term “tribal” to refer to indigenous claims made by Bodos. 
 
A third, and final point concerns the nomenclature surrounding Muslims, the second major 
group of respondents in my fieldwork. During the 2012 riots, it was common to read and hear 
of violence as being between “Bengali Muslims” and Bodos. Yet, as my fieldwork showed, 
Bengali-speaking Muslims were not the only community affected — many Assamese 
speaking Muslims were also affected. Equally, many Bengali Muslims resented being singled 
out — either as perpetrators or victims — and felt the term akin to a kind of dog-whistle 
implying that because they were Bengali speaking, they were perhaps the illegal Bangladeshi 
immigrants, constantly vilified and demonised by right-wing groups and Assamese 
nationalists alike. While many of the respondents in my fieldwork are Bengali-speaking 
Muslims, I refer to them simply as Muslims, which is how they refer to themselves. That is 
not to say distinctions between Assamese and Bengali speaking Muslims do not exist (the 
nuances of this are detailed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7). In fact, Assamese-speaking Muslims 
refer to themselves as khilonjiya or “indigenous” Muslims. Nonetheless, specifically 
identifying Bengali Muslims, except where it is relevant to the argument, has discriminatory 
overtones, and thus I use the term only where the distinction is important to illustrate a point, 
but not, say, in describing an ordinary interaction from the field where this is irrelevant. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
 
The thesis is organised into nine chapters in total, including this introductory first chapter. 
The concepts that frame this thesis are organised in two main ways — Chapter 2, which lays 
out relevant theories and ideas from political geography, as well related social science 
interventions (especially political anthropology) that have also informed the development of 
the concepts central to this thesis; and Chapter 4, which functions both as a means of framing 
the context of Northeast India as a region, but also exploring the approaches to studying it, 
which have informed its production as a bounded space. In doing this, I locate this thesis in 
two ways — within the discipline and traditions of political geography, as well as within the 
study of Northeast India, even as the term itself is a contested one.   
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Chapter 2 begins by looking at the academic framework that underpins this project. I look at 
how political geography provides a fitting framework for the thesis, as well as the wider 
tradition in human geography to look towards cross-disciplinary perspectives within the 
social sciences. I highlight the anthropology of the everyday state perspective, from within 
the field of political anthropology, as being especially relevant to the methodology that 
guided the project. The chapter also examines the concept of citizenship in more depth, 
which form the building blocks of the analysis. Acts of citizenship, emerging from protest as 
well as informal practices, form a crucial part of this understanding, as do ideas of 
territoriality.  
 
Building off the anthropology of the state and an emphasis on everyday practices of the state 
in political geography, Chapter 3 looks at methodology, with ordinary state practices, and the 
ways in which these are appropriated and redefined by citizens, forming the backbone of my 
research. A variety of qualitative methods — participant observation, interviews, and archival 
work — were employed, over a period of ten months. Chapter 4, as mentioned above, delves 
into the study and construction of the Northeast India region (of which Bodoland is a part), 
and how this framing has shaped the region’s politics. In particular, I pay close attention to 
arrangements of federalism with the Indian state, and their use as tools of conflict 
management.  
 
Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of autonomous councils, a specific federal arrangement 
unique to Northeast India, and one that has been applied in Bodoland since 2003. The 
groundwork for these arrangements was laid by the framers of the Indian Constitution in the 
mid 20th century, but as the debates in that period show, it has always been a contentious 
instrument. The suspicions around the possible implications of autonomy have led to patchy 
implementation of the ideals behind autonomous arrangements, and uneven recognition of 
their legitimacy. Chapter 5 also continues the discussion from the previous chapter in 
highlighting the highly territorial nature of autonomy arrangements and identity claims in the 
region, linking them back to colonial policies explored in Chapter 4. The politics of land 
ownership and transfer, in particular, emerge as powerful symbolic tools to guard the 
boundaries of ethnicised territories. Equally, they emerge as ways to contest received ideas, 
and present alternative scales at which citizenship is enacted. 
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Chapter 6 looks at everyday politics and elections as another means through which political 
ethnicity is reproduced and maintained. As with practices of land, showing greater attention 
to the performance of politics shows that just as these practices can be tools of reinforcement, 
they can also be spaces to challenge existing constructions, especially boundaries around 
ethnicity. This chapter engages with work from political anthropology and political science, 
which present differing ideas of patronage and clientelism. I examine how these can be 
interpreted within the framework of citizenship, by looking at vernacular expressions of gaali 
(curse/complaint) and dhamki (threat) in the interplay between politicians and voters.  
 
Chapter 7 looks at a more recent trend in Assam and Bodoland politics — namely the rise of 
Hindu nationalism, following its upward trajectory in the rest of the country. The roots of 
Hindu nationalism are historical, originating in the early 20th century, but its recent 
emboldening and strengthening has been underway only since the 1980s, and it has seen a 
particular uptick since 2014. Hindu nationalism poses a different sort of challenge to the 
received categories of citizenship in Bodoland. I argue that it serves to realign these with its 
own categories of inclusion and exclusion, drawing on Assam’s history, but also, crucially, 
linking it more closely to India’s broader experience than its previous secessionist histories 
have allowed. This has the potential to impact many, but none more than Assam’s Muslims, 
especially Bengali-speaking Muslims, who present the ultimate “enemy” to the Hindu nation, 
as viewed from Assam (and from the majoritarian heartland). Traditionally oppressed and 
anti-state groups, like the Bodos, are pulled into this project of identification, definition and 
exclusion as well.  
 
Next, in Chapter 8, I analyse the main findings of the thesis, linking back to the conceptual 
and methodological framework in which they were put forward. I consider the contests 
around the important ideas of citizenship in Bodoland as explored in this thesis — 
territorialised ethnic identities, how they are are legitimised and the acts that contest these 
ideas, and the particular dynamics of Northeast Muslim citizenship, as being distinct both 
from Muslim citizenship in India, and Northeast Indian citizenship. A final concluding 
chapter, Chapter 9, highlights the main contributions from the thesis. It also looks at a few 
notable events that transpired in Bodoland after my own fieldwork ended, and how these 
might speak to the findings. The chapter also briefly outlines possible future directions for 
further research. 
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Map 1.1: The four districts of the BTAD: Kokrajhar, Chirang, Udalguri and Baksa. 
Kokrajhar is the focus of this study.  
Courtesy: Philip Stickler, Department of Geography, University of Cambridge. 
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CHAPTER 2. LOCATING THE POLITICAL IN BODOLAND: THEORETICAL 
EXPLORATIONS 
 
“Divide Assam 50-50!” 
- Slogan from the movement for separate statehood in Bodoland 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The succinct slogan of the Bodoland statehood movement above sums up many historical and 
political trajectories that have resulted in the creation of the Bodoland Territorial Area 
Districts, the focus of this study. This popular rallying cry, written in graffiti prominently 
across countless walls, and shouted heartily at rallies and meetings, contains within it the 
implicit territorial nature of the idea of Bodoland, centred around demands made of the state, 
and negotiations of forms of power. The movement’s symbolic currency is the bifurcation of 
an existing state — “50-50” — underlining the connections between identity, politics and 
place. The centrality of these themes are what make political geography a fitting framework 
to study the region and its politics. In particular, the relationship of these ideas to citizenship, 
within political geography and other social science disciplines, are central to this project.  
 
The following chapter looks at the concepts relevant to both the methodological and 
theoretical underpinnings of the thesis, and help frame the contributions from the research. 
These include: debates around citizenship, particularly in the field of geography, and how the 
understanding of citizenship incorporates the formal and the enacted, and its essentially 
contested nature; ideas of statehood and territory that are especially relevant to ways in which 
such citizenship is conceptualised, especially in postcolonial contexts, and with special 
relevance to Northeast India and its challenge to India federalism; the question of citizenship 
beyond its formal definitions, through formal and informal acts and practices; and finally, the 
understanding of the everyday state as a means to uncover processes of citizenship as they are 
influenced by the state, and as they are contested and enacted by citizens themselves.  
 
While the thesis is grounded in the core ideas of political geography, it borrows from across 
other social science disciplines — anthropology and political science — in attempting to 
locate the most important strands of thought in an interdisciplinary concept like citizenship. 
In particular, as the core methods of the thesis are grounded in an ethnographic analysis of 
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political and state actors, the sub-field of political anthropology, especially the anthropology 
of the state, is fundamental to frame these ideas. In doing do, I take into account Flint’s call 
for political geography to go beyond the “big P” politics of international relations and 
geopolitics, and diversify to “small p” politics, looking at more than the traditional concerns 
of political geography into issues of identity and politics at multiple scales (Flint 2003). I also 
draw from feminist engagements in political geography, focussing on the everyday and how 
politics is enacted and embodied, and paying more attention to the materialities of everyday 
life (Dowler and Sharp 2001, Hyndman 2001, 2004, Staeheli et al. 2004, Dixon and Marston 
2011). 
 
This is a thesis in political geography that is written from within Western academia, but 
speaks of and to a distinctly non-Western form of politics. Within studies about the so-called 
Global South, and studies about India, the Northeast is further marginalised in the sense of 
rarely being seen as a site of knowledge production in itself, and often becomes a container 
where other theories from and about Indian politics and state practice are applied. As Chapter 
4 will go on to show (as also the empirical chapters that follow), this is not always the case, 
and the idiom of caste politics or religious violence, for instance, cannot simply be 
transplanted into the Northeast Indian context. Instead, as van Schendel puts it, such 
transplantation can create “geographies of ignorance” as well as knowledge (van Schendel 
2002a). In the rest of this chapter, however, I focus on the core ideas that have shaped this 
thesis, drawing from a range of Western and non-Western scholarship, reflecting the much 
debated and sometimes contradictory underpinnings not just of this project, but of the region 
it studies.  
 
2.2 Citizenship and its others 
 
I did the fieldwork for this project in the backdrop of Assam’s ongoing National Register of 
Citizens (NRC) exercise, a venture that continues to be a defining issue in the politics of the 
region. Despite Bodoland’s differences with Assam and its internal polarisations, it too 
became swept up in the state-wide exercise of according legitimacy to residents. As 
elsewhere in Assam, BTAD’s Bengali Muslim residents, in particular, experienced deep 
insecurity at the prospect of being left out of this document, and being presented with an 
uncertain future. In the broadest sense, this overpowering event highlighted the constant, 
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everyday engagement with ideas of citizenship and belonging that the region’s residents 
reckoned with. Citizenship emerged as the most important lens through which to understand 
the practices of the everyday state in the BTAD, particularly the ways in which different 
ethnic groups understood and participated in these practices. Since its very inception, the area 
governed by the Bodoland Territorial Council has been tied up in questions of who belongs 
and who doesn’t. Much of its politics and governance plays out around these issues, as I go 
on to show in the following chapters. To properly unpack the contestations around 
citizenship, however, it is essential to delve deeper into this tricky, often highly contentious 
term, through examining how geographers and other social scientists have attempted to shed 
light on this nebulous concept.  
 
In line with contemporary scholarship and debates, throughout this thesis, I view citizenship 
as a constructed and contested concept, constantly being negotiated. This preliminary chapter 
examines the lines along which existing frameworks of understanding citizenship have come 
to be. First, and of critical importance is the concept of alterity, and how the idea of exclusion 
is essential to create the ideal citizen. Simultaneously, it is important to focus on the spatial 
dimensions of citizenship, in particular the continuing importance of territory and nationalism 
in legitimising citizenship, despite increased global flows and mobility challenging ideas of 
fixed borders. These ideas take on particular relevance in Northeast India, where territory 
continues to be central to the construction of identity. 
 
The next section deals with the acts and practices that constitute citizenship, beyond just a 
status, as a substantive and enacted identity. Citizenship is not merely what is implied in its 
formal status, but also acts and practices that exist in both the formal and informal spheres, 
often expanding the practice beyond the formal dimension, and sometimes reflecting a more 
diminished set of practices than what is promised by the status. Following this, I look at the 
specific context of citizenship in India and how it has been spatially framed. Strong regional 
identities and their challenge to established national citizenship identity has been a 
particularly persistent theme in its history, as has the precarious position of its minorities. In 
Northeast India, these identities have often been in contradiction with each other (as Chapter 
4 goes on to explore in more detail). To conclude this theoretical exploration, I adopt an 
anthropology of state perspective to explore these questions of citizenship, and focus on 
ordinary, everyday acts to reveal deeper insights into how citizenship is understood and 
enacted.  
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2.2.1 Identity and alterity 
 
Isin (2002) has argued that much like history, the story of citizenship is also written from the 
perspective of the victors — those who were able to “confer rights on and impose obligations 
on each other, institute rituals of belonging” (p.2). As he and other scholars of citizenship 
have pointed out repeatedly, citizenship has always been constructed in inherently 
exclusionary ways (Román 2010), identity and alterity have emerged simultaneously (Isin 
2002). In other words, citizenship is as much defined by the “constitutive outside” (Mouffe 
2000), as it is by what and who it serves to include.  
 
Citizenship’s “outsiders” have been constructed in various ways and along multiple lines of 
identities. In the Greek city-state, often a starting point in citizenship studies, exclusions 
occurred around gendered and racial lines — categories like “woman” and “slave” were 
excluded to construct the figure of the male Greek citizen (Isin 2002). Contemporary 
constructions of the citizen too create categories of outsiders along such lines, some who may 
be formally outside the purview of citizenship, and others who might possess formal 
citizenship but still be denied certain substantive rights and privileges that are essential to the 
enactment of citizenship.  
 
In the contemporary world, as definitions and laws surrounding citizenship have evolved, so 
too have the categories of inclusion and exclusion continued to shift alongside them. 
Citizenship continues to be a gendered idea, for instance, in the way that ideas of the nation 
and citizen are produced and reproduced (Walby 1994, Siim 2000, Yuval-Davis 2000). In 
Euro-American contexts, women have consistently been constructed being outside the 
membership of the nation, achieving formal citizenship status much later than men in most 
instances (Bussemaker and Voet 1998, Volpp 2017). Citizenship’s gendered nature is a 
historical relationship, where a public/private dichotomy has denied women full substantive 
citizenship, but also meant that until recently, mainstream theorising of citizenship has 
discounted the significance of the private sphere (Lister 1997, 2012).  
 
Similarly, sexuality has been another basis from which exclusions from citizenship have been 
conceived. While women are often incorporated into idealised notions of nationhood, 
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homosexual citizens are left outside of its construct altogether (Richardson 1998). The 
exclusion of gay, lesbian and transgender citizens from crucial aspects of social and civil 
rights, even where they are not denied formal or legal citizenship rights, renders them only 
partial citizens, and creates the need to articulate sexual rights as a fundamental aspect of 
citizenship (Richardson 2000, Sabsay 2014). Additionally, sexual minorities face particularly 
spatial forms of exclusion from public space (Bell 1995, Bell and Binnie 2004, Kondakov 
2017), while forms of reclamation also take on spatial strategies, particularly in urban 
contexts (Brown 2007). Lister (2003) argues that roots of the exclusions of women and 
sexual minorities, while different in form, arise from a similar place: their association with 
the body and sexuality. The body also emerges as a site of difference and exclusion for those 
who are disabled and have been excluded from the theorisation of citizenship (Meekosha and 
Dowse 1997, Carey 2009, Bezmez 2013), although a growing body of research in geography 
serves to fill this gap (Crooks et al. 2008, Imrie and Edwards 2007, Valentine and Skelton 
2007). 
 
Key to the construction of established ideas like Marshallian “civil citizenship” was its 
neglect of the assumed subjectivity of its citizen as white, male and working class, to the 
disregard of gender and race as key axes of inequality (Fraser and Gordon 1992). A feminist 
challenging of the neglected gendered ideas that underlie citizenship took into account not 
just the exclusion of women, however, but a broader invisibilisation of marginalised groups, 
where multiple exclusions of a variety of “differences” have shaped normative 
understandings of citizenship (Lister 1991, 1997). Moreover, particular kinds of exclusions 
faced by women must also draw from local contexts — a “universal” approach may prove 
counter-productive (Grewal 1999).   
 
From its earliest inception, race and ethnicity have been fundamental to the conception of 
citizenship — both in ways that impact legal status through the granting and withdrawal of 
citizenship status, as well as in substantive terms (FitzGerald 2017). Thus, numerous studies 
have documented how fundamental racial and ethnic identification have been to the 
construction of citizens and aliens (Benhabib 2004), as well as insiders and outsiders in the 
nation state, both in Western (Collins 2001, Harder 2010, Topinka 2016, Barreto and Lozano 
2017) and non-Western contexts (Levy 2005, Jamal 2007, Hosein 2012, Kashiwazaki 2013, 
Chee et al. 2014). Such influences have been especially crucial to the way postcolonial 
citizenship has been conceptualised and experienced (Mamdani 2005, Aminzade 2013).  
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2.2.2 Space, scale and territory 
 
Geographers in particular have identified space as one of the key dimensions for the basis of 
citizenship construction and exclusion (Staeheli 2010, Yarwood 2014). This connection 
would appear intuitive, given that territorial expressions of sovereignty have been central to 
the formation of the citizen. This territorialised form of sovereignty, peculiar to the modern 
state, is associated with the rise of the Westphalian state from the 17th century onwards 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2005a, Rudolph 2005). From subjecthood under the monarchic 
regimes that formed Westphalian states, citizenship is understood to have emerged with 
popular sovereignty, as conceived of in the nation state (Rudolph, 2005). In T.H. Marshall’s 
classic formulation, the three key aspects of citizenship — civil, political and social — 
emerged in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries respectively, each facilitating the emergence of 
the next (Marshall 1950). This construct has been questioned since, prominently by feminist 
scholars (see above), as well as by scholars who critique the chronology of rights, arguing 
that the social construction of the citizen, and the entrenchment of spaces of inclusion and 
exclusion, precede the access to civic and political rights (Isin 2008a). 
 
In spatial terms, the idea of (formal) citizenship continues to be inextricably linked to the 
nation state — identification with a cohesive political unit often forms the basis of how 
citizenship is conventionally understood, and evolved in tandem with the modern state 
(Painter and Jeffrey 2009, p. 79). The modern nation state, like citizenship, is also a 
construct, a process as opposed to a fixed entity (Abrams 1988). The nation state and its 
constitutive category of citizenship are produced through constant processes of reproduction 
and representation through banal acts (Billig 1995), like administrative categories and map-
making that make the nation state “legible” (Scott 1998), and the spread of print capitalism 
(Anderson 2006) and education (Gellner 2008). Such processes of reproduction are 
undertaken by both “elite” (Brass 1991) and “ordinary” members of the nation (Jones 2008), 
slippery as those categories are in themselves. The nation as a construct implies that it is 
always an incomplete project (Shapiro 2003), never quite fully coming into being, or ever 
fully being achieved (Connor 1990). A persistent “state effect” (Mitchell 1991), drawing on 
representational practices, nonetheless presents it as a coherent, fixed entity.  
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Seeing the nation state as collectively imagined (Anderson 2006) challenges the 
“primordialist” view of nation states as “natural” formations (Smith 1986), and of the 
inherently territorial rights of some groups as citizens over others. Such ideas may now have 
been widely discredited in academic scholarship, but Penrose (2002, p. 287) rightly argues 
that they continue to be embedded in “‘common sense’ understandings of the world”. 
Notions of territorial belonging continue to underpin these “common sense” ideas of 
citizenship — many contemporary struggles and debates around identity, migration, 
belonging and difference have territorialised ideas of statehood and sovereignty at their core. 
Belonging in the world of nations is conceived of as distinct partitioning of territories 
(Malkki 1992). Through botanic metaphors such as “roots” and “soils”, the nation becomes 
inherently territorial, as does membership of it (Ibid.). Sovereignty assumes a pre-existing 
territorial state as its basis, but as Kuus and Agnew (2008) argue, both the concepts of 
territory and state are constituted through practices. Territory remains an enduring framework 
for the way sovereignty, statehood and citizenship are practiced and commonly understood.  
 
Territoriality has the somewhat contradictory position of being both omnipresent and 
undertheorised in geography (see for instance Sack 1983, 1986, Penrose 2002, Paasi 2003, 
Elden 2005, Antonsich 2009). Its meaning is often assumed to be self-evident, such that the 
concept of territory is rarely investigated in itself (Elden 2010, p. 800). While Antonsich 
(2009) contends this is because of the use of the concept as a tool of control and containment 
by the state, Penrose (2002) suggests it is also to do with the discipline’s own complicity in 
allowing territory to be used as a justification for exclusionary projects such as imperialism 
and Nazism (Nayak and Jeffrey 2013). 
 
The relationship between territoriality and statehood is only as old as the Westphalian state 
system. The practice of sovereignty under empires privileged less the control of boundaries 
than the control of people (Sack 1986, p. 114). Sack would argue that in the modern state 
system, controlling boundaries is itself a way of controlling people. Sovereign power is 
conventionally understood as having control over territory, but effective sovereignty need not 
necessarily be “defined by the strict and fixed territorial boundaries of individual states” 
(Agnew 2005, p. 438, emphasis added). Agnew contests the view of sovereignty being 
inherently territorial, and instead argues that political authority is neither explicitly tied to 
states, nor only territorial (Ibid., p. 441).  
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Territory is both a strategic tool in order to control and dominate in the hands of state (Ibid.), 
as well as a social process, primarily defined in relation to its boundaries (Paasi 2003a). If 
territory is a social process, the nation too is a “category of practice”, particularly established 
through border practices that reify its territoriality (Shapiro 2003). The rise of nationalism 
firmed up the link between nations, boundaries and territories (Ibid.). Not only did the post-
Westphalian state adopt a territorialised idea of sovereignty, but national identity itself took 
on territorialised forms of representation (Billig 1995, Paasi 1998, Anderson 2006).  
 
Since the late 20th century, increased global flows and mobility have called into question the 
authority of the nation state to define the boundaries of citizenship. Nonetheless, it remains 
central to the production of sovereignty and citizenship (Rudolph 2005), particularly by 
expanding the idea of borders from markers of physical territories to practices that include 
new forms of surveillance (Amoore 2006, Sparke 2006, Salter 2008), and locating national 
sovereignty in the bodies of citizens performing “borderwork” (Rumford 2008, Vaughan-
Williams 2008). Global flows have, nonetheless, given rise to new and often “flexible” forms 
of citizenship (Ong 1999) for a section of mobile actors propelled to move for economic 
reasons. The global “cosmopolitanism” (Archibugi and Held 1995), however, only benefits a 
small global elite population, leaving other transnational subjects, such as migrants and 
refugees, out of its imagination (Kofman 2005). For these disempowered groups, full 
citizenship can often remain elusive, as they are confined instead to forms of 
“noncitizenship” (Tonkiss and Bloom 2015) and “bare life” (Agamben, 1998; Das and Poole, 
2004). This reinforces the continuing importance of the state in granting and depriving 
citizenship status, and the continuing relevance of national sovereignty even as it is 
negotiated (Rudolph 2005) in “graduated sovereignty zones” (Ong 1999) in a transnational 
world.  
 
Understanding citizenship as both a status and a set of relations (Staeheli 2010) exposes this 
multi-scalar nature. It is not just the conventionally understood membership of a nation state, 
or a set of transnational relationships, as above, but also distinctly regional and local in 
practice (Painter and Philo 1995, Painter and Jeffrey 2009). Without undermining the 
importance of national citizenship, there is a renewed understanding in political geography 
about a “rescaling downwards of the performance of citizenship” (Desforges et al., 2005, 
440), and the need to take into account local expressions of citizenship as being just as crucial 
as national or transnational ones. Multiple scales, and especially a focus on grassroots 
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movements, can also expand the potential for emancipation and expansion of citizenship 
rights (Holston 2008). Local solidarities can expand the idea of citizenship beyond what is 
conceived at the national level, with rights for non-citizen residents and migrants being a key 
illustration of this (Spiro 2010, Villazor 2010). Nonetheless, “local” or “grassroots” 
citizenship may not necessarily only be emancipatory, and can also be reflective of local 
elitist tendencies (Smart and Lin 2007). A “multi-level” idea of citizenship (Yuval-Davis 
1999) has been viewed also as having the potential to be disempowering, as the neoliberal 
state retreats and finds itself “supplemented” by privileged actors in civil society (Fyfe and 
Milligan 2003, Harriss 2006). Scale becomes especially relevant when discussing the 
construction of citizenship through actors who function as the “shadow state”, especially in a 
neoliberal context, where the state willingly outsources social regulation and control to non-
state actors (Trudeau 2008, 2012). 
 
2.3 Beyond status — Citizenship as practice  
2.3.1 Citizenship and informality 
 
An emphasis on formal rights and duties or categories of inclusion and exclusion does not 
account for the many variations and nuances that make up the substantive experience of 
citizenship. In non-Western contexts especially, citizen-state relationships have to be 
understood contextually, and not merely as derivatives of Western forms of democracy and 
statehood. Informal forms of politics, while not always transparent, are nonetheless 
alternative ways to channel political agency. Although much of the literature on informality 
emerges from studying non-Western contexts, informal tactics of negotiating with “formal” 
citizenship categories are as relevant in the Global North (Verloo 2017). As has been seen 
from research contexts in the Global South, informality is not an anomaly within or counter 
to formal citizenship regimes, but part of and integral to their functioning (Ibid., p. 170). 
 
Instead of focussing solely on narrow definitions of rights and duties in understanding 
citizenship, it is useful to consider elements of informality, such as patronage or clientelism 
as forms of expression of political agency, rather than deviations from set norms (Berenschot 
and van Klinken 2018). Incorporating forms of informality in the scope of doing politics 
acknowledges different social relations that mediate interactions between citizens and the 
state, and shed light on the fragmentation of state authority (Ibid.). This is in contrast to other 
approaches, especially certain strands within political science, that have seen clientelism as 
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an inherently unequal relationship, a form of “negotiated authoritarianism” (Taylor 2004, p. 
214) that contradicts citizenship, or as a purely transactional relationship where voters 
support patrons in exchange for material benefits (Chandra 2004; 2007).  
 
Patron-client relations, instead, can reveal themselves as a form of accessing political agency, 
which Lazar (2004, p. 228) contends is the “crucial aspect of citizenship”, more so than the 
ideal of equality. Forms of patronage may contain within them inherently unequal structures 
of power, but focussing solely on their negative impacts obscures the ways in which they can 
be a means to access the state (in the form of benefits, for instance), especially in the absence 
of such provisions by the state through formal channels. In this scenario, accessing such 
provisions may be viewed as rights rather than favours (Baghdasaryan 2017, 1038), and 
become a form of empowerment. In addition to filling in for a missing state, informal 
practices also help facilitate access to it, through benefits or official recognition for particular 
groups (van der Muur 2018).  
 
Often the “vacuum” created by the absence of the state is instead filled with other actors of 
the patronage system — just as important as patrons themselves are political fixers or brokers 
who “lubricate” democracy (Berenschot 2011b). Political fixers illustrate the blurred 
boundaries of the state by highlighting the ways in which state sovereignty is fragmented, and 
brokers are one representation of this porous interface between state and society (Berenschot 
2011a). For poorer citizens, brokers are often indispensable in accessing state services (Ibid.), 
forming a key node in the network of “political society” that Partha Chatterjee (2004) argues 
is the means by which marginalised citizens hold the state accountable. Such fixers are not 
only necessary for citizens to access the state through politicians, but also for political actors 
to access citizens, as Berenschot demonstrates in the case of Hindu nationalist actors in the 
Indian state of Gujarat (Berenschot 2011b). Nonetheless, it is important not to disregard that 
such relationships can also take on exploitative forms, as Berenschot’s example of right-wing 
brokers demonstrates. Informal networks of patronage can also exacerbate existing 
inequalities and discrimination, making it harder for disadvantaged groups to access the 
protections and rights of formal citizenship (Soedirgo 2018). 
  
Viewing informality as a set of practices and networks rather than as a form of organisation 
outside of the realm of law, specific to certain places or groups of people, illustrates the way 
in which informal practices fold into the sphere of formality (McFarlane 2012). Practices of 
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informality, such as those of the poor claiming space in the city, are enabled by formal 
policies that designate some activities and spaces as authorised and others as unauthorised 
(Roy 2009). Certain groups are pushed, through acts of policy and law, into informal, 
entrepreneurial acts of survival, and away from the “formal” sphere of law and planning 
(McFarlane 2012). Informality, rather than being the “habitus of the dispossessed” is instead 
a device which uncovers relationships between what is legitimate and illegitimate (Roy 
2011). Roy shows, similar to Sundar (2011, below), that while the informal acts of the elite 
are legitimised, those of the poor are criminalised.  
 
This raises an important aspect of informality that Ledeneva (2018) points out in the 
introduction of an exhaustive volume on the subject — its inherent ambivalence. Informality 
can both be a means of levelling playing fields and subverting the constraints of formality for 
those at the margins, as well as a way for the powerful to consolidate their influence through 
illicit means (Ibid., p. 7). Informal politics can be seen as deviations from formal institutions 
(as some political science approaches mentioned above do), but closer examination reveals 
informality has a more complex relationship with the state — weakening it, substituting for 
it, and sometimes working in parallel with it (Radnitz 2011, 352). Paying attention to the 
nuances helps unpack the idea of a unitary modern state, and shows that particularistic social 
bonds are very much part of the character of the modern state, rather than anomalies within it 
(Ibid., p. 367). Recognising both the ambivalence of informality, as well as the ways in which 
it is embedded in state practice is a critical element in examining the role between informality 
and citizenship. In this project, I do this through looking at certain practices of informality in 
everyday encounters with the state, and recognising within them acts of citizenship that are 
distinct from the routine practices of citizenship.  
 
2.3.2 Acts of citizenship 
 
A key tension in citizenship studies is the distinction between de jure and de facto citizenship 
— that of citizenship as a conferred status, versus substantive citizenship that represents the 
actual realisation of rights. Recent literature has focussed on “acts of citizenship” (Isin and 
Nielsen 2008) and new forms of claims to citizenship from below. What distinguishes an “act 
of citizenship” from ordinary actions, or routinised practices of citizenship? Isin (2008b) 
identifies rupture or disruption as a key element of acts of citizenship, that break a given 
order or habitus. In addition, he points out three identifying principles of such acts — first, 
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they are interpreted in the particular contexts that transform subjects into citizens (i.e., they 
produce the values of citizenship); second, they create activist citizens that become 
answerable to justice as against injustices; and third, they need not necessarily be founded in 
law or enacted in the name of law (Ibid.).  
 
Acts of citizenship, then, do not just enact existing or recognised principles of formal 
citizenship, but have the capacity to expand the very definition of citizenship itself, often 
through the struggles and protests of those who are excluded from citizenship, or from certain 
rights entailed in citizenship (Barbero 2012). Building on this concept, Andrijasevic (2013, p. 
56) argues that much as feminist epistemology argues for commencing research from the 
perspective of oppressed groups, so too must the study of citizenship begin from looking at 
these acts of citizenship, carried out by those outside the purview of formal citizenship. In 
doing so, the definition of citizenship is broadened from just membership of a nation state, or 
even seeing sites or scales (the national, transnational, or local) as containers within which 
citizenship is performed. Instead sites, scales and citizenship itself emerge as fluid and 
dynamic entities that are constituted through contests and struggles (Isin 2009). Among these 
are not only the routine practices and actions of citizenship, such as voting or paying taxes, 
but also the more disruptive, order-breaking acts of citizenship (Ibid., p. 379).  
 
The experiences of migrants and refugees have been used particularly effectively to illustrate 
this argument (Barbero 2012a, Isin 2009). Those effectively stripped of citizenship evoke 
Foucauldian forms of “international citizenship” in humanitarian contexts (Isin 2012) and 
resist rigid notions of citizenship that deny rights to migrants (Ataç et al. 2016, Stierl 2016). 
In other, urban contexts, related concepts of “insurgent citizenship” (Holston 2008) and 
“active citizenship” (Miraftab and Wills 2005) speak of claims to citizenship that come from 
the margins of urban society, through using the language of rights, but in ways that are 
disruptive to the existing order. Holston (2009) distinguishes such forms of citizenship as 
being fundamentally a manifestation of peripheral spaces, even where they utilise or occupy 
the spaces of the “civic centre”. 
 
Acts of citizenship are often realised in the form of protests (Butler 2011, Hardt and Negri 
2011, Harvey 2012), where the disruption is made most visible. What is equally relevant, and 
of particular interest for this thesis, are also ways in which the disruptions to order come 
about subtly, flying under the radar, not always within the clear jurisdiction of “rights”, but 
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often in the more ambivalent sphere of informality. In the postcolonial world especially, 
questions of active or activist citizenship have been tied up with notions of political 
patronage, and the sometimes blurry lines between them. Chatterjee’s (2004) distinction 
between political society and civil society argued that the most marginalised citizens find 
creative ways to articulate demands in the realm of political society. For most citizens in 
postcolonial societies, rights are only tenuously held. Instead they are forced to mobilise 
politically to be recognised, sometimes using corrupt or “irrational practices of unreformed 
popular culture” (Ibid., p. 47). Only a small, relatively empowered section is able to act as 
citizens, and able to access the state legitimately through rules and laws, claiming rights in 
the bourgeois sphere of civil society. In Holston’s (2008, 2009) work on insurgent citizenship 
in Brazil, he argues against this understanding, as does Sundar (2011) in her work on 
Adivasis in India. Both contend that it is marginalised populations who take recourse to the 
law, and demand its just application using the language of rights, while private companies 
and middle class citizens attempt to subvert it for their own ends.   
 
While Holston (2008, p. 229) contrasts the rights-based language of insurgent citizenship 
with jeitinhos — the practice of bending or circumventing the law using forms of clientelism 
— he distinguishes this form of insurgent citizenship from Chatterjee’s ideas of political 
society (Chatterjee 2004). Similarly, Chatterjee sees political society as the site of emerging 
political modernity and also a space of negotiation and contestation, but distinct from that of 
civil society, which consists of citizens as opposed to populations, but is available only to the 
elite (Ibid.). Instead, in the thesis I adopt a more hybrid approach, similar to Veena Das’s 
(2011) work on a squatter colony outside Delhi on articulations of citizenship within claims 
made to the state. In this instance, the concepts of civil society and political society blur into 
each other, “to produce the capacity to make claims on the state as a way of claiming 
citizenship” (Ibid., p. 320). Neither the understanding of a rights-based “insurgent 
citizenship” in Sao Paulo, nor confining informal acts to the messy sphere of “political 
society” can fully capture the exercise of political agency seen in Bodoland. Instead, I refer 
back to the inherent ambivalence of informal politics, and the potential for the expansion of 
citizenship in its practice.  
 
These debates show that studying the complex interactions between informality and acts of 
citizenship must take context into account. Claiming rights enshrined in law may be one 
means to reclaim space in citizenship, yet in another context might prove ineffective, or even 
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impossible given the constraints. To properly consider the present-day locus of political 
agency, the historical context of citizenship in India as a postcolonial state is key, and its 
implications for the practice of citizenship in Bodoland. 
 
2.4 Postcolonial citizenship  
 
Imperialism has been fundamental to the creation of nation states, its effects felt profoundly 
both in the colonies as by the coloniser (Mitchell 1998). In the postcolony, however, the 
imagined nation did not necessarily follow the template of European nationalism, and instead 
created new political cultures of the state (Nandy 1989, Chatterjee 1993). Chatterjee 
separates postcolonial nationalism into two realms, the material and the spiritual, and argues 
that while the former may have been imitative, the latter aspect of national identity was 
fashioned in contrast to, and distinct from the Western model. Those in the postcolonial state 
were not merely “consumers of modernity” (Ibid., p. 5) that was imported from the West.  
 
Given the intimate connections between Europe and its colonies, citizenship in the colonies 
was instrumental to the understanding of European citizenship. FitzGerald (2017) argues that 
while racialised citizenship was not invented by European colonialism, its use of race as a 
basis to justify military and economic conquests did generate many features of modern 
racism. The socio-cultural context of Victorian England, for instance, impacted the way the 
gendered and racialised exclusions were framed in the British Empire — both in the colonies 
and at “home” (McClintock 1995). Just as gender was one axis of neglect in the 
conceptualisation of Marshall’s influential theory of citizenship, race was another (Fraser and 
Gordon 1992). Moreover, Marshall’s theory neglected the importance of the project of 
citizenship being undertaken in the Empire, and the lasting impact this had both on 
citizenship as formed “at home”, and in the colonies (Kabeer 2006, Sadiq 2017). This created 
a dual form of citizenship — organised around differences of race, culture and civilisation 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2005a).  
 
The reification of such differences have led to fixed categories of “native” and “settler” 
(Mamdani 2001) being instrumental in creating contested ideas of belonging, resource 
sharing, and power imbalances between different groups in the postcolony. Many of these 
categories, originating in the colonial experience, have persisted into the present day. 
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Powerful ideas and movements, such as of indigeneity, have found resonance across the 
world in claims for citizenship rights, especially in Latin America (Hooker 2005, Postero 
2007, Latta 2009, Canessa 2012). In a different colonial context, parts of Africa too have seen 
a contest for citizenship between “indigenous” or “autochthonous” groups as opposed to 
more recent “settlers” (Mamdani 2001, Geschiere and Jackson 2006, Adebanwi 2009, 
Geschiere 2011). Wood (2010) argues in an introduction to a special issue of Citizenship 
Studies on indigenous citizenship (see also Cairns, 2010; Christie, 2010; Elbourne, 2010; 
Mercer, 2010; Ramos, 2010; Siddle, 2010; Wood, 2010 in this issue) that studying 
indigenous citizenship must necessarily raise issues of history (especially colonial history), 
and of relation to place.   
 
Forms of “direct” and “indirect” rule (Mamdani 1996) impacted postcolonial states in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America that emerged after independence struggles. The bifurcation of the 
colonial state into an urban “civilised” sphere and an unruly rural space (Ibid.) has persisted 
into the practices of citizenship in postcolonial states today, exemplified, for instance in 
Partha Chatterjee’s influential distinction between “civil society” and “political society” 
(Chatterjee 2004). A key component of this colonial logic was the fixing of identity to 
territory (Mamdani 2001). The fixing of ethnicity to place is an important facet of what has 
led to an “ethnicization of citizenship laws” (Sadiq 2017, p. 7) in postcolonial states. Colonial 
logic of governing territorially defined groups was aimed at preventing the collective action 
of shared identity (Kabeer 2006), even as it has led to forms of “internal dual citizenship” 
(Sadiq 2017, p. 8), where religious and ethnic groups are given regional claims to autonomy, 
and economy. Despite the efforts of elite leaders of nationalist movements to create shared 
national identities that cut across these categories in postcolonial states, the notion of group-
differentiated citizenship (Young 1989) has emerged in postcolonial states as a means of 
managing sub-national identities. It is within the context of these debates of managing 
religious, ethnic and territorial divisions that the concept of citizenship in the postcolonial 
Indian state must be understood. 
 
2.4.1 Constructing the Indian citizen 
 
The emergence of the term India is in itself a geographical expression (Bose and Jalal 1998, 
p. 3), a colonially produced space defined to create governable subjects and zones of rule 
(Cons and Sanyal 2013, p. 6). The politics of maintaining national borders has been 
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especially relevant in the context of South Asian states like India, and borderlands provide for 
a productive space in which to engage with the dynamics of citizenship, belonging and 
nationalism (Ibid.). 
 
The contested nature of citizenship has always been evident in India. Roy (2010) has 
identified three key legislations as defining these shifts in formal citizenship status — the 
Citizenship Act of 1955 that established the basis of citizenship in India, the amendment in 
1986 that pertained particularly to immigration in Assam (discussed below), and a further 
amendment in 2003 that created a new category of Overseas Indian Citizenship. Crucially, 
Roy identifies migration (in the context of Partition from Pakistan, migration from 
Bangladesh from Assam, and Indians migrating abroad) as the key to determining the 
political and territorial boundaries of citizenship in India (Ibid.).  
 
The emergence of the postcolonial Indian state saw political authority shift from being vested 
in caste-based hierarchical communities (though not everywhere in India) to being located in 
a sovereign central state (Khilnani 2012), although the latter did not completely displace the 
former. Indian political identity was envisioned as being “layered” to accommodate this 
disjuncture — being Indian was mediated through regional and local identities that were 
reinforced by the strong federal character of the state and the Congress party2 immediately 
after Independence (Ibid.). Increasing centralisation of both the Congress and the state 
machinery in the decades following Independence eventually caused a weakening of the 
central state apparatus, and growing conflict between the centre and various regional blocs 
(Kohli 1994 and others, discussed below in Section 2.4.2).  
 
As with Western societies, the nation-building project in India was established on the 
marginalisation of some groups over others. The violence of Partition that accompanied the 
creation of the Indian (and Pakistani) nation state, far from being an aberration, was central to 
the creation of nationhood (Pandey 2001). The Indian state is not experienced evenly by all, 
especially at the margins, where it is experienced “most frequently and intimately” (Williams 
et al. 2011, p. 15), even if this is often in violent or oppressive ways. Mahasweta Devi has 
highlighted how the postcolonial Indian nation continued to exploit tribal women in 
                                                
2 At that point the most widespread political organisation in the country, spearheading the movement for 
independence. 
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particular, who were never part of the decolonisation of India (Devi cited in Shapiro 2003). 
The surfacing of the grievances of some of these neglected communities as forms of 
separatism has also constituted a further challenge to the idea of the Indian state, as we see 
later, in Chapter 4, with Bodoland, Assam, and many parts of Northeast India. A further 
challenge to idea of a plural Indian nationalism has been the resurgence of the idea of Hindu 
nationalism in the 1990s (Van der Veer 1994, Nandy 1998, Hansen 1999, Corbridge and 
Harriss 2000, Jaffrelot 2007), and again since 2014 with the election of a Hindu nationalist 
government. 
 
Indian citizenship has been marked, above all, by fundamental disagreements — on its legal 
status, on the rights enshrined within it, and on the forms of identity that it confers (Jayal 
2014). Following independence from the colonial empire and partition from Pakistan in 1947, 
citizenship in India was established on the principle of jus soli (by birth in a territory). While 
conceived of on the civic principle of birth within the territory of India regardless of religious 
or racial background, it has been argued that the way citizenship was practiced in the decades 
that followed nonetheless moved the concept towards the direction of jus sanguinis (by 
ancestry or “blood”) (Chatterji 2012, Jayal 2013). Post-partition migration movements across 
the India–Pakistan border challenged the Indian concept of equal citizenship for all, as 
Hindus migrating from across the border were considered “natural” citizens (van Schendel 
2002b), whereas Muslims were required to prove their status through arbitrary processes such 
as courts determining their “state of mind” (Chatterji 2012, p. 1065). Drawing on colonial 
legacies of linking ethnicity to place, an important paradox of citizenship in the Indian 
context has been the notion of group-differentiated citizenship. Creating strategies of 
inclusion involved creating categories of exception as a means of tackling inequality (Jayal 
2013), but with the qualifier that the group in question was only “backward” in a specific 
area.  
Indian citizenship has not had a defining character or disposition. Instead, liberal, republican, 
ethno-nationalist and non-state-based ideas of belonging have co-existed alongside one 
another, with one gaining prominence over the other at different times, but none being the 
entirely dominant force (Shani 2010). Jayal notes that while Indian citizenship at 
independence guaranteed negative rights (protections against violations of civil and political 
liberties) as well as fundamental ones, positive rights, like socio-economic ones, could not be 
enshrined as fundamental, instead serving as directives for state policy (Jayal 2014). This has 
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also translated into an inability to guarantee group-based rights to protected classes, like 
indigenous groups, despite the provisions enshrined in the constitution (Xaxa 2005). 
For Sundar, the essence of Indian citizenship is in understanding the rule of law, and how 
laws are made and enacted in service of these substantive or positive understandings of 
citizenship (Sundar 2011). In instances such as the acquisition of land (often belonging to 
marginalised groups, Scheduled Tribes like the Bodos), she upturns Partha Chatterjee’s 
(2004) political/civil society distinction to show that it is often oppressed, subaltern subjects 
who try to uphold lawful practices (relating to protections on land), and powerful actors like 
private companies or upper middle class citizens who who resort to extra-legal measures of 
political society. Veena Das’s analysis of citizenship in a squatter colony outside Delhi also 
challenges binary understandings, instead arguing that as the concepts of legal/illegal, 
governed/government blend into each other, these hybrid forms of citizenship are brought to 
light by paying attention to everyday practices (Das 2011). For many citizens on India’s 
margins, struggle and protest are the primary mode through which citizenship is claimed 
(Chopra et al. 2011), along with informal practices.   
2.4.2 Regional pulls, national identities 
 
At the time of Independence in 1947, the Congress party saw freedom from colonial rule as a 
triumph of nationalism and centrism, while the breaking away of Pakistan underlined the 
partial success of the forces of regionalism (Bose and Jalal 1998, p. 202). While the initial 
success of India in holding together diverse regional pulls was attributed to ideas of secular 
nationalism, increasing regional and local demands from the mid-1970s onwards, and 
subsequent pressure on the centre showed that it was not the case (Ibid.). The modern Indian 
state subsumed regional and cultural allegiances at the time of independence in ways that 
could coexist with national identity (Khilnani 2010). In later decades, the central government 
saw these identity-based impetuses as dangerous to national integration, and majoritarian 
ideas, such as Hindu nationalism, began to gain force (Jayal and Mehta 2010). Regional 
allegiances may have been enveloped in the larger discourse of nationalism, but they never 
completely disappeared. In later decades, regions that were marginalised (like Assam) began 
to question their membership in an Indian nation-state, and whose interests the state 
represented (Kaviraj 2010). 
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Regions, like nations, are territorial projects, and like nations, are constructed and contested, 
even where discourse would project them as being “natural” or apolitical (Baruah 2010a). A 
“state-nation” framework allows us to look beyond a unitary nation-state model at the co-
existence and management of multiple political identities, believed to be implicit in the very 
idea of India forged at its inception (Stepan et al. 2011). State-nation practices are themselves 
subject to other conditions of diversity management — cases of separatist militancy in 
Kashmir, Punjab, and states in Northeast India are examples of a challenge to the Indian 
state-nation project (Ibid., pp. 89–115).  
 
While caste and religion are more dispersed across India, tribe and language are two 
categories across which groups are concentrated territorially (Varshney 2014). In the period 
following Indian independence, in the 1950s, states were reorganised principally on the basis 
of language, which was meant to improve administrative efficiency, as well as maintain a 
semblance of cohesion in a country that was already ravaged by religious violence during 
partition from Pakistan (Mawdsley 2002). Over the course of time, the creation of the state of 
Punjab was a tacit acceptance of a religious demand (though ostensibly granted on the basis 
of language), while the creation of states in Northeastern India in the 1970s and later has been 
an acknowledgement of ethnicity as a legitimate basis for state creation (Ibid.), which has 
also been instrumental in fuelling the demand for Bodoland today. The demand for and 
constant creation of new states represent a “politics of compromise”, where state boundaries 
themselves act as institutions that shape which groups compete, and over what resources 
(Tillin 2013). Such an understanding, of administrative borders as devices of state power, is 
crucial to the understanding of federalism in Northeast India.  
 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, increasing centralisation of the Indian state was accompanied by its 
increasing powerlessness (Brass 1991, Kohli 1994). As the state became more oppressive, 
identities that coalesced around religion, caste and region asserted themselves more strongly 
(Hasan 2000), posing a challenge to the idea of a unified Indian citizenship. The Indian state 
reacted to different regional pulls with various degrees of accommodation and suppression. 
Secessionist demands, like those of Khalistan, or Tamil separatism were violently 
suppressed, while Kashmir remains an ongoing, continuous contestation (Chadda 1997).3 
                                                
3 On 5 August 2019, the Indian government revoked Kashmir’s statehood and status as an autonomously 
governed region, in efforts to force it to more completely become part of the Indian state.  
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Other separatist struggles persist in Northeast India, particularly Nagaland, which while less 
at the receiving end of overt state violence today than Kashmir, nonetheless remain highly 
militarised environments (Baruah 2010b).  
 
In the case of Assam (and Northeast India more generally), the state maintains a policy of 
“durable disorder”, where the response to insurgency and secessionism has been increasing 
militarisation (Baruah 2005). In this region, particularly, this is achieved through the 
continuous implementation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which gives 
military forces greater authority in the region, with far less accountability (Gaikwad 2009, 
Kikon 2009, McDuie-Ra 2009, Saikia 2014). Similar processes are seen in other parts of 
India that are heavily militarised, where the state, in the name of counter-insurgency, is able 
to evade legal accountability (Shah 2010). As Alpa Shah’s work in one such region, 
Jharkhand, shows, the insurgent and the state exist in a symbiotic relationship, allowing the 
existence of one to justify the existence of the other (Ibid.). 
 
For Northeast India, increasing militarisation is accompanied by a developmentalist paradigm 
that aims to nationalise space through development projects and military presence. Thus, 
federalism in the Northeast is “cosmetic”, the primary driving factor is not constitutional or 
fiscal, but national security (Baruah 2005, pp. 33–41). While state-building in the region was 
undertaken swiftly after Independence in 1947, nation-building was not. The Northeast’s 
importance as a frontier region, as well as the threat of instability from internal turmoil 
resulted in the penetration of the state, but without the emphasis on its inclusion in the 
national sphere of India (Guyot-Réchard 2013). 
 
Assam’s history has been particularly important to the discussion of citizenship in India. The 
Illegal Migrants (Determinations by Tribunals) (IMDT) Act passed in 1985, known as the 
“Assam exception” to India’s citizenship laws was formulated in response to growing unrest, 
particularly during the Assam movement in the 1980s, against the presence of Bangladeshi 
immigrants in Assam (Baruah 2009, Jayal 2013). The Act set up tribunals to identify illegal 
Bangladeshi immigrants, placing the burden of proof on accusers. It was ultimately deemed 
unconstitutional and scrapped by the Supreme Court of India in 2005. The Assam movement 
has also prompted the current exercise of the updating of the National Register of Citizens, 
aimed at identifying illegal immigrants based on identity documents proving long-term 
residence in Assam. Discourses of migration have also seeped into the debate around 
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citizenship in BTAD, in particular with regard to the legitimacy of Bengali Muslim 
inhabitants. The politics of ethnic homelands effectively create two categories of citizenship 
— what Baruah has termed “citizens and denizens” (Baruah 2005). Non-tribal populations in 
ethnic homelands like the BTAD are denied formal access to land ownership, as well as 
political representation, but these non-tribal groups are, nonetheless, part of the economy and 
networks of land ownership, and forced to participate in these relationships informally, 
through flouting legal norms (Baruah 2003a).  
While much of the theorising about citizenship and belonging in Northeast India has focussed 
on the ways in which the region has pulled away from associations with India, particularly 
through focussing on cross-border allegiances (this is explored further in Chapter 4), 
McDuie-Ra (2013) uses studies of Northeast migration to show that there is a corresponding 
“inward pull” of citizenship towards the Indian state as well. This is exemplified especially 
through his examples of Northeastern migrants in Delhi. 
In more recent times, the fault lines between Northeast India and the central government have 
been exposed through the introduction of the Citizenship Amendment Bill in 2016, which has 
raised issues of ethnicity, immigration, and a new Hindu right-wing politics in Northeast 
India. The Bill is in some ways a continuity of the move towards jus sanguinis in Indian 
citizenship — it seeks to allow select “persecuted minorities” (Hindus, Christians, Parsis, 
Sikhs, Buddhist and Jains) from the neighbouring countries of Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan citizenship status in India after six years of residency. In the north-eastern states, 
the fear is that this amendment will legitimise migration of Hindus from neighbouring 
Bangladesh in particular (PRS 2016), an explicit agenda of India’s current government. The 
proposition has sparked much protest in Northeast India, in the form of rallies and strikes 
(Scroll.in 2019a), returned national awards (Scroll.in 2019b), renewed threats of 
secessionism (Scroll.in 2019c), and even rap videos (Scroll.in 2019d). It stands at the 
intersection of several contemporary currents in Indian (and particularly Northeast Indian) 
citizenship — the legitimisation of ethnicity or religion as a basis for citizenship (Sharma 
2018a), the role of an increasingly strengthened politics of Hindu chauvinism in shaping 
Indian identity, and how Northeast India has responded to these changing currents. 
 
 
 
	   44	  
2.5 Everyday practices of the state — an approach 
 
Turning the focus to the everyday, mundane practices of the citizenship has been the central 
axis along which this thesis on citizenship, statehood and politics in Bodoland is framed, 
drawing on important work in the anthropology of the state tradition that adopts ethnographic 
approaches towards routine practices of bureaucracy and politics (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 
2002, Hansen and Stepputat 2001, Das and Poole 2004b, Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 2005, 
Sharma and Gupta 2006a, Mathur 2015). In doing so, I follow the pluralist traditions of 
human and political geography, engaging with other social sciences in “intellectual trading 
zones” (Barnes and Sheppard 2010) that lead to exciting new forms of knowledge. In 
particular, I draw on ideas of the anthropology of the state, from within the sub-field of 
political anthropology. While the overall theoretical underpinnings of the anthropology of the 
state are important to the formulation of this project, they have been particularly relevant in 
the research design and methodology. In particular, focussing on everyday negotiations and 
practices is important to unpack the the idea of the state/citizen boundary as fixed, and 
instead focus on the less formal acts of citizenship that nonetheless represent claims to 
political agency.   
 
The anthropology of the state is a vast and rich field, one which saw a revival from the 1990s 
onwards (Spencer 1997), with a view to understanding how modern forms of authority and 
sovereignty come to exist. Classical anthropological work on kingship as a form of 
sovereignty in “primitive” societies gave way to a more nuanced understanding of modern 
forms of power, influenced by Foucauldian discourses of the way power is dispersed in 
society (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). Hansen and Stepputat stress the importance of the 
ethnographic approach in understanding sovereignty and forms of statehood that account for 
the persisting idea of the state as a locus of power and authority, even with the ever-growing 
importance of the market forces as wielding “the most decisive form of citizenship within 
states” (Ibid., p. 309). Such ideas of dispersed power allow for broader understandings of the 
practices of citizenship, including through the lens of informality (as seen above), and 
through questioning the state/society boundary.  
 
In observing the role of the state in effecting transformations, social scientists from across 
disciplines have drawn a great deal from the Weberian concept of a state as being fixed, 
autonomous, and with extraordinary power to dominate (Migdal 2001). In the Weberian 
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tradition, the state is one that successfully claims monopoly over the legitimate use of 
violence within a given territory, but Migdal has argued that while Weber himself qualified 
the idea of an authoritative entity with the use of the word “successfully”, subsequent authors 
who have used his ideas have focussed more on the concept of an entity that can legitimately 
use force (Ibid., pp.13–14), and thus exercise power.  
 
Recent literature on theorising the state through everyday practice has questioned the notion 
of the state as a fixed, authoritative, well-defined entity. Instead, such scholarship focusses on 
looking at the state as constantly under construction, while emphasising the importance of 
studying how it is constructed (Mitchell 1990, Sharma and Gupta 2006a). In a related way, 
Billig has shown that nationalism and belonging (though he focusses on a Western context) 
are created through banal practices like the waving of flags, sports, and ways of representing 
national identity in the media (Billig 1995). Studying the state ethnographically at the 
“margins”, in particular, reveals how state practices do not merely reflect regional or cultural 
specificities of a universal state form, but transform the very nature of the state itself (Das 
and Poole 2004a). 
 
Looking at the state through its construction prompts questions about the nature of its 
boundaries — where does the state begin or end? Mundane practices help create the idea of 
the state as a coherent entity, which is distinct from society. What is important is not to find 
the boundary between state and society or economy, but to study the processes that make 
these distinctions appear natural (Mitchell 2006). Questioning the state also means 
questioning state power, as Scott has done through his examination of why seemingly well-
intended state-initiated schemes fail (Scott 1998). But where Scott looks at the modern state 
as an exercise in legibility and simplification, Mathur argues in her ethnography in the Indian 
state of Uttarakhand that state officials themselves are often befuddled, and find the state 
illegible and unreadable (Mathur 2016). The state’s representations of its intents may appear 
well-meaning and progressive at one level, but begin to lose coherence as these schemes 
approach implementation at another (Ibid.). 
 
The image that the state presents of itself may be one of coherence and dominance, but in 
practice it not only has multiple (and sometimes conflicting) parts, but also pressure (and 
sometimes support) from groups outside the state, which may wield considerable influence 
over it (Migdal 2001). The state-society boundary, accepted as somewhat common sense, is 
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in fact broken down in encounters at the lowest level of the bureaucratic apparatus (Gupta 
1995). State authority rests on ideas of verticality, or the idea of state as above family, 
community, and civil society; and encompassment, of the state as encompassing ever 
widening units such as localities, regions, and so on (Gupta and Ferguson 2002). These 
notions are embedded in the everyday practices and representations of the state, particularly 
through spatial practices that emphasise hierarchies within the governance structure. Rather 
than looking at space as fundamentally shaping national identities (Kaplan and Herb 2011), 
this formulation looks at the state itself as shaping and producing spatial hierarchies (Gupta 
and Ferguson 2002).  
 
Studying the state ethnographically through ordinary practices and interactions is a vital tool 
in deconstructing states and state effect, especially to understand postcolonial states, and 
seeing them not just as an imitation of the Western form, but as emerging from their own 
contexts, and with their own features (Hansen and Stepputat 2001). The postcolonial state has 
been shaped through particular practices, such as the exercise of state power through the use 
of spatial techniques like cartography (Radcliffe 2001), or through surveillance, enacted 
through routine processes of inspection and enumeration (Gupta 2001). Each practice, studied 
in its unique context, sheds light on how the state is perceived, and its relationship with 
citizens. 
 
Studying prosaic processes is an ideal method to understand stateness and state effect, and 
how they are reproduced in everyday life (Painter 2006). Many studies in political geography 
have also focussed on ethnography and the everyday as a lens from which to understand and 
critique practices like state violence (Megoran 2006) and state categorisation (Mountz 2003). 
Ethnographic approaches to the state have been especially crucial in understanding the 
interactions between culture and state (Marston 2004). Studying everyday practices reveals 
many nuances about state and nation, including the contradictions between what is sometimes 
envisioned by the state as a practice of citizenship, how it transpires on the ground, and how 
it is reinforced or challenged by non-state actors.  
 
From within this field of the anthropology of the state, the most pertinent questions for this 
project emerge from works dealing with the intersection of state and citizenship, and how 
studying the everyday state can reveal ideologies of inclusion, exclusion and belonging. 
Recent work in political anthropology has also turned towards citizenship as an important 
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lens from which to frame the anthropology of politics, moving beyond understanding 
citizenship as a legal right, and considering political belonging more expansively (Lazar 
2013, Lazar and Nuijten 2013). Much of the work from the tradition of political anthropology 
look at forms of insurgent and activist citizenship (Holston 2008, 2009, Das 2011), how 
forms of insurgency and activism question the very basis of citizenship, especially in heavily 
militarised contexts (Kikon 2009, Shah 2013), and meaning-making and construction of 
citizenship through political processes (Banerjee 2014, Mitchell 2014, Piliavsky 2014a). This 
focus, on informality and acts of citizenship as being key drivers through which spaces of 
citizenship are claimed, is an important focus of this project. 
 
In this thesis I examine everyday practices of citizenship primarily through state actors who 
mediate access to the state for citizens, through ordinary acts of engaging with the state (for 
instance, transfers of land, voting, and welfare projects). In looking at encounters at the 
lowest levels of governance, where the state is often most viscerally felt, the focus in this 
study is on state actors at the village level. In Bodoland’s case, this includes political actors 
that blur into the state apparatus. A growing focus on the everyday state, and the daily 
negotiations between citizens and the state has enabled the “messy yet vibrant sphere” 
(Berenschot and van Klinken 2018 p. 96) of the informal politics of citizenship, with its 
brokers, fixers, and informal networks to truly emerge in scholarship. In Bodoland, this 
informality is folded into the formal structure through these hybrid political/government 
appointments. Ad-hoc schedules, irregular meetings, and the lack of “official” government 
spaces or structures at this level give new meaning to the “everydayness” of local politics, 
while also providing rich opportunities to understand it in greater detail.   
 
2.6 Conclusion: Approaches and the way forward 
 
In focussing on citizenship in Bodoland, I consider its inherently exclusionary nature, and the 
ways in which alterity is essential to the construction of citizen identity. I emphasise the 
primarily constructed nature of citizenship, including both the ways in which it is reiterated 
through routine practices by and of the state, as well the more disruptive acts of citizenship 
that challenge the existing order. Questions of informality also become central to the context, 
as expressions of citizenship go beyond the obvious routine practices of votes and taxes, into 
the more ambivalent territory of informal practices. I look at the intersection of these 
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concepts throughout the thesis — how disruptive acts can be couched within seemingly 
routine practices like voting, or more informal strategies of patronage politics. Such strategies 
are not a guarantee for the granting of rights or equal citizenship status, but are nonetheless 
important practices through which the status quo is questioned.  Equally, this must be studied 
against the backdrop of the enduring relevance of citizenship as a status. As the NRC process 
in Assam shows, identity documents and official categories have critical relevance for the 
continued practice of citizenship. 
 
In examining the exclusionary nature of citizenship, I focus on its spatial character, questions 
of scale, but most importantly for Bodoland, the relationship of citizenship to territorialised 
sovereignty. The territorial construction of the nation state, as well as the territorialised 
identities in Northeast India more broadly both play important roles in the way citizenship is 
practised in Bodoland. Such practices are not just confined to those of the state, but also “acts 
of citizenship”, and “insurgent” ways of reclaiming citizenship by those at the margins. 
Moving forward, I look at the multiple contestations around defining and claiming citizenship 
— from those in power, and those without — using an ethnographic lens on state practices in 
Bodoland as my primary tool. In the following section, on methodology, I delve deeper into 
how I approach the concept of the “everyday” in the context of politics in Bodoland, and how 
the practice of politics shaped my methodological approach. 
 
 
  
	   49	  
 
 
3.  ENGAGING THE FIELD 
  
	   50	  
CHAPTER 3. ENGAGING THE FIELD: METHODOLOGY 
 
“In the second half of 1982 I was living in a sprawling rural settlement in central Sri Lanka, 
alternating between anxiety and boredom in a mood familiar to most fieldworkers.” 
 
-   Jonathan Spencer (2007), Post-Colonialism and Political Imagination 
 
3.1 Research objectives 
 
The Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD), comprising the four districts of Kokrajhar, 
Chirang, Baksa, and Udalguri, are located in a sub-region of Assam referred to as Lower or 
Western Assam. In July 2012, two of the four districts — Kokrajhar and Chirang — 
witnessed an unprecedented scale of violence and displacement, when riots between two 
ethnic groups, the Bodos and the Muslims, displaced nearly 500,000 people, and saw 
enormous losses of homes and property. It was in this post-conflict context, as part of a team 
from an NGO involved in rehabilitation efforts, that I became familiar with the region and its 
politics. Everyone from illegal Bangladeshi immigrants (often conflated with the Bengali 
Muslim community, which was also affected by the violence), Bodo insurgents, cross-border 
terrorist outfits, were blamed for the violence. The only time the state made its way into 
popular discourse about the violence, however, was during the discussion of the distribution 
of relief materials to affected persons, and the provision of security, given the highly 
militarised context of Assam. What was rarely discussed was the impact the state may have 
had, historically, and in contemporary times, on shaping the conflict, and the politics of the 
region more broadly. It was this missing link in the narrative that gave rise to the research 
project I undertook for my PhD. 
 
The main question to arise from this line of thinking, and with which I went into fieldwork, is 
of the nature of the everyday state in Bodoland, its practices and representations, and 
people’s experiences of these interactions with the state. How do everyday state practices 
affect relationships between communities, whether these are of conflict, cooperation, 
indifference, or a constantly adapting, dynamic combination?  
 
A second — and eventually more central — question that emerged during the course of my 
fieldwork, was that of citizenship. This had both to do with the timing of political events, as 
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well as the daily concerns of the research participants. The first factor to influence this 
framing of the project was the updating of the National Register of Citizens in Assam, a long-
standing political demand that was finally underway in the region, including the BTAD. My 
fieldwork occurred between the collection and verification of identity documents, and the 
publication of the draft report, a limbo that elicited many conversations about the possibilities 
of the NRC. This, in addition to the many everyday questions of belonging, inclusion and 
exclusion that dominated many conversations I had over this year, led to the framing of the 
project as looking more critically and closely at what citizenship meant in this region. 
 
3.2 Research design  
 
The people at the centre of this study belong largely to two major communities of the BTAD 
— Bodos and Muslims. While these are two of several groups present in the region (as also 
outlined in the introduction), for the present study on citizenship, focussing on these two 
groups was particularly relevant. Recent incidents of violence (such as in 2012, 2014), as 
well as the political consequences of the NRC exercise for Muslims in particular makes them 
an especially vulnerable group in Bodoland. This vulnerability is often pitted against that of 
the Bodos, the group that dominated political representation in the region. Focussing the 
study on Bodos and Muslims provided the most relevant lens to examine ideas of citizenship. 
 
To undertake this research, I made use largely of ethnographic methods, deriving from an 
anthropology of the state approach that looks at the everyday functioning of the state as a 
starting point from which to understand its functioning. As Sharma and Gupta (2006b) argue 
in the introduction to their edited volume, what anthropology brings to the study of the state 
is a divergence from the idea that the state is a fixed, coherent unit. Instead daily practices 
and representations allow us to see how the idea of the state is constructed, negotiated, and 
contested. In addition, anthropology allows for an examination of the cultural ideas behind 
formation of states, allowing us to see state actors and institutions as part of their cultural 
contexts, and not separate from them (Ibid., p. 10).  
 
Despite the origins of the idea in the discipline of anthropology, ethnographic methods are 
now widely used in human geography research. In a paper now almost two decades old, 
political geographer Steve Herbert called for a greater use of ethnography as a method in 
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human geography, arguing that it was a “uniquely useful method for uncovering the 
processes and meanings that undergird sociospatial life” (Herbert, 2000, p. 550, emphasis in 
the original). Nick Megoran reiterated this idea as especially useful for political geographers, 
who could employ the underused method of ethnography to bring forth people’s 
understandings of political phenomena, which are often neglected (Megoran 2006).  
 
In light of this, I chose ethnographic fieldwork methods such as participant observation and 
in-depth interviews (often repeated interviews with the same people), although I ultimately 
relied more on the latter for reasons I explain further in the methods section. Admittedly, this 
veers away from the conventional notion of an ethnography, as I not only rely on more than 
just participant observation, but also do so with a range of participants across two field sites, 
for varying lengths of time based on circumstances. However, the nature of ethnographic 
fieldwork is increasingly contested and no longer confines itself only to the practice of a lone 
researcher immersed in a cut-off, unfamiliar place for extended periods of time (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997), and Vered Amit argues that the transgressions of this model are “as much an 
anthropological tradition as the model itself” (Amit, 2000, p. 6).  
 
A key question of access to the field site and the forms of ethnographic fieldwork conducted 
is linked here to the particular context of preceding conflict and violence, and the need to 
balance risk with rigorous research. As a result of the potential for violence, I chose to stay 
not in either of my field sites, but in an NGO within the BTAD from which I could access 
both sites. This was as much to avoid being seen as taking “sides” with particular political or 
ethnic groups as for personal safety. Being seen as a spy or working undercover for political 
groups (or the state) is one of the greatest dangers in ethnography, particularly when the 
research covers political themes, as others have also documented (Jacobs 2006, Sluka 2007). 
Allegations of spying and intelligence gathering can be particularly rife in politically unstable 
or conflict-prone environments, and must be continuously managed (Sluka 1990). While such 
hazards must be taken into account, Hoffman (2003) argues for the need to continue working 
in zones of conflict and violence, and foster greater reliance on gatekeepers like NGOs or less 
conventional avenues of access, to enable research as well as to build trust. 
 
In addition, the peculiarly ad-hoc nature of local village governance (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6), made a classic state ethnography located in particular official or governance 
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spaces nearly impossible. Instead, I took to “chasing the state”,4 following local political and 
state operatives to various meetings and government engagements, which followed neither 
fixed timetables, nor occurred in specific “official” spaces. It is akin to what Carolyn 
Nordstrom termed “runway anthropology” while studying warzones in Mozambique 
(Nordstrom 2007, p. 252). Instead of studying the war in specific locales, she chose to follow 
“the ebb and flow of the war from urban centres to rural outposts” (Ibid.). 
 
In addition to the interviews and participant observation, I looked at archives to get a better 
sense of the BTAD’s (and Assam’s) colonial and post-independence political trajectory. 
Many scholars of Northeast India argue that colonial policy, especially around tribal groups, 
land rights, and the encouragement of immigration, shaped independent India’s approach as 
well — it is important to the construction of citizenship in Assam and the BTAD today. To 
this end, I spent short periods in two archives — one national and one state-level. Given that 
my main focus was on the fieldwork, these stints were short, although they did enable me to 
collect material that helped strengthen my argument, particularly in building the historical 
context of the region I was studying, and its land policies, in particular.  
 
3.2.1 Timeline of fieldwork  
 
August 
2016 
March–
April 2016 October 2016–July 2017 
September 
2017 
October 
2017 
onwards 
Archival 
research at 
the Nehru 
Memorial 
Museum and 
Library, 
New Delhi 
Pilot study 
and election 
fieldwork 
during the 
2016 election 
campaign 
Main round of fieldwork, 
involving participant 
observation ad interviews 
with local government 
officials and political 
operatives  
Archival 
research at 
the Assam 
State 
Archives, 
Guwahati 
Data analysis 
and writing 
up 
Table 3.1: Timeline of data collection and analysis  
 
My fieldwork can roughly be categorised in three phases, a month-long intensive period of 
fieldwork centred around election campaigning, the main period of ethnographic fieldwork, 
and finally two short stints at the archives — one preceding and one after the main period of 
fieldwork. 
                                                
4 Credit is due to Professor Bengt Karlsson for suggesting this term. 
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March–April 2016: In March–April 2016, I went for four weeks of fieldwork to Kokrajhar 
district in Assam. This served as an important component of my PhD — it was timed to 
coincide with the election campaigning in the run-up to state-level Assembly elections in 
Assam. It was an important glimpse into the politics of the region, and I made it a point to 
attend large electoral rallies attended by hundreds, as well as smaller, “pocket” meetings that 
were attended by 30 or 40 people, and served as more intimate spaces of connections. I also 
spent some time following and traveling with the two main campaigning parties — the 
Bodoland Political Front (BPF), and the United People’s Party (UPP). It also served the 
purpose of helping me finalise field sites for the longer stint of fieldwork, and identify 
potential informants. 
 
October 2016–July 2017: During this period, I was conducing participant observation and 
interviews in the two field sites in Kokrajhar, barring a six week break in February-March 
2017 when I returned to Cambridge to reflect on my existing data and approaches and 
attempt to re-focus them according to emerging themes. This period of fieldwork threw up 
many challenges, which are discussed in the methods section. 
 
August 2016 & September 2017: In August 2016, I spent a month at the Nehru Memorial 
Museum and Library archives, and in September 2017, I spent four weeks at the Assam State 
Archives in the capital of Dispur. While these phases were too short to base any analysis 
entirely on archival material, they elicited useful insights nonetheless. 
 
3.2.2 Field sites 
 
I planned my fieldwork to take place in two main sites, and some spaces and networks that 
served to connect them to the wider governmental and political structure that I was studying. 
Both the sites I chose were in Kokrajhar district, chosen partly for their proximity to the hub 
of state activity in Kokrajhar town (in its capacity as de facto capital of the BTAD), partly for 
the diversity of ethnic groups that they represented, and partly due to familiarity from my 
previous engagement through the NGO. In the course of the fieldwork, as I go on to 
elaborate, the “sites” expanded beyond just these two contained spaces, as people and 
networks proved themselves to be mobile. 
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The first site is a cluster of four small villages on the border of Kokrajhar and Dhubri 
districts, with a mixed population of Bodos and Muslims (here named Uzanpara). The second 
is a resettlement of a former displaced relief camp of Muslims who fled their original village 
after the 2012 riots, which I have called Makrabari. This is not a formal resettlement, but a 
makeshift (and in their minds, temporary) one, which continues to resemble a relief camp in 
many ways — the housing structures are temporary, and they are not formally integrated into 
the village on the edges of which this settlement has been constructed.  
Some reflections in this thesis draw not only on fieldwork I conducted for my PhD, but also 
previous interviews conducted after the 2012 riots in Kokrajhar and Chirang districts, as part 
of my work in the rehabilitation project. While the interviews conducted in the post-riot 
period consist of many villages and camp sites across both districts, I focus here mostly on 
areas that eventually became part of my PhD research.  
In the primary fieldwork conducted during this election, I draw on interviews and participant 
observation conducted across different campaigns and pocket meetings, all within the two 
constituencies of Kokrajhar East and Bilasipara East. Both constituencies have their own 
unique dynamics, and each contains one field site that I worked in for the PhD project. This is 
covered in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
In addition to the field sites themselves, many offices at the block and district level, that had 
jurisdiction over these villages, were also part of my research. These were concentrated 
largely in Kokrajhar town, which contains the legislative assembly of the Bodoland 
Territorial Council, as well as the secretariat, where the highest administrative officers of the 
department have offices. District-level offices were usually in or near Kokrajhar town, block 
levels were either in Gossaigaon (another small town, near the Makrabari village), or Chapar 
(technically in the neighbouring district of Dhubri, but with jurisdiction over Uzanpara). 
Party-level offices, events and homes (largely from the ruling Bodoland Political Front, but 
also some from the main opposition, the United People’s Party) spanned across the region, as 
did the meetings and hubs of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu right-wing 
organisation that eventually became part of my research. 
3.2.3 Participants  
 
Many of my participants were those who worked in the village-level governance structure 
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and the hierarchy that engaged with it in Uzanpara. In the Bodoland Territorial Council, 
unlike in most other parts of India, village level representatives are not elected. Instead, 
because of its unique status in the Indian constitution under the Sixth Schedule, the BTC can 
choose its own means of providing village level government. The BTC has chosen to 
nominate representatives across villages in what is known as the Village Council 
Development Committee or VCDC. One or two representatives are nominated from each 
village (depending on its size), and a cluster of about 8-10 villages forms one VCDC 
committee, with a chairperson (always called “chairman”, regardless of gender) at its head. 
Given the discretion in appointments, in the 15 years that the BTC has been in power, the 
ruling Bodoland Political Front (BPF) generally nominates its own party workers in these 
posts. Above the VCDC is also the TLC — the Tertiary Level Committee, which is also 
aligned with the party structure. The person who heads this generally is a powerful person 
and connected intimately with the dealings of the VCDC members. Above the TLC chairman 
is the MCLA — Member of Council Legislative Assembly in the BTC. In Uzanpara, this 
MCLA was not only extremely accessible from a research standpoint, but also, like the TLC 
chairman, extremely engaged with the VCDC.  
In addition to this core network of operatives in the village, other administrative posts (not 
controlled by the party structure) occupied by bureaucrats were also connected to the 
everyday dealings of the state, and some of these were also participants in the research. 
Additionally, student leaders, who wield immense political influence, were also informants in 
the process.  
Apart from officials, observing and following everyday state practices also involved 
respondents who were at the receiving end of these practices — voters in elections, persons 
in village level meetings called by politicians or administrators, and ordinary people in 
contact with law through daily processes like policing, buying and selling land, and so on. In 
the case of Makrabari, respondents were also displaced men and women who experienced 
many post-conflict bureaucratic processes, often at the receiving end of their negligence. 
Leaders and newly joined members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and other right-
wing organisations, and leaders from other political and cultural organisations that are 
intertwined with them, were also among the respondents. As the network of the RSS was still 
in its nascent stages when I conducted the fieldwork, the actors’ involvement in their 
activities was sometimes fuzzy and cross-cutting — a major leader from one district was 
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likely to be involved in activities all over the BTAD, while the organisation was growing. I 
did not restrict myself and followed them across district lines, and beyond my field sites as 
well, in an attempt to understand how the organisation functioned.   
A major challenge of this research project was being able to adequately represent the gender 
dynamics that inform the politics of the region. Partly this is visible in the lack of gender 
balance in the respondents — while I actively looked out for women involved with the 
politics and governance of the region, they proved to be few and far between. This was not 
the case during the election portion of the fieldwork, where unusually, both candidates were 
women. In the course of everyday politics, however, women were usually marginalised, and 
this in itself has emerged as an important finding. Where I could identify women 
respondents, they often held very little power, and sometimes appeared to have been 
represented in a tokenistic fashion. Nonetheless, some of these women proved to be very 
interesting informants, and I explore this in the thesis. The shortage of women participants 
leaves me and the PhD project with a different sort of gendered analysis — that of 
masculinity and its many representations in the politics of the region, and of women as 
symbols of cultural purity.   
In total, over the course of the election period, as well as the main fieldwork, I interacted with 
a total of 113 respondents. Among these were about 25-30 people that I interacted with more 
often, who were generally involved in the “hanging out” portion of the fieldwork, while the 
rest were all people that I interviewed either once or twice. In addition to interviews and 
casual conversations and meetings, I also attended election rallies, meetings, political 
“picnics”, party meetings, village meetings, as well the Budget session of the Bodoland 
Territorial Council assembly. There were, of course, many other people present at these 
events, with whom in some sense I shared the experience — the numbers mentioned above 
refer to the people I interacted with directly and for some length of time.  
 
3.3 Research methods  
3.3.1 Participant observation 
 
Vered Amit points out that participant observation, perhaps more so than any other form of 
research, is unique in that the relationships formed by the researcher are the “primary 
vehicles for eliciting findings and insight” (Amit, 2000, p. 2). This was especially relevant to 
the phase of fieldwork before the elections, where the multiple meetings, rallies, politicians 
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on the election trail, and speculation about voting behaviour at every tea shop lent itself 
easily to this method. My intent was to conduct participant observation in a variety of 
different settings, shaped by the access I was able to get at local village-level committees and 
political parties. During the elections it was fairly straightforward to secure contacts, and 
through gatekeepers, gain access to the political parties in campaign mode. On multiple 
occasions, the gatekeepers in particular made it a point to take me around on the campaign 
trail, introduce me to candidates, and keep me posted about election-related events, thus 
enabling a series of spaces and events at which I was able to undertake participant 
observation.  
 
During the main fieldwork, however, doing participant observation proved more challenging 
than I had anticipated, particularly as the traditional “spaces” to observe interactions between 
different street level bureaucrats and political operatives proved harder to pin down than I 
had thought. Most village level operatives, for instance, did not have formal office spaces in 
which they all congregated, functioning instead out of hybrid home-office spaces that were 
reserved for purposeful interactions such as one-on-one meetings. While many of my 
conversations did take place in these spaces, often the presence of others ended up combining 
interviews and participant observation in a hybrid form of conducting research, driven by the 
situation of the participants themselves. Amit is also right in pointing out the contradictions 
of participant observation as a method, in the way that it presumes the “field” as it already 
exists, whereas it is in fact constructed through the process of fieldwork itself. Challenging 
these notions of fieldwork also leads to a re-examination of what constitutes the method of 
participant observation in the first place, and whether it too must become more flexible as the 
notion of a localised, collective field dissipates (Amit 2000). 
 
The main party office, in Kokrajhar, was the occasional site of some meetings, but never 
anything regular or predictable. Some constituency-level events were sometimes organised 
by the party and took place in external venues, such as in a park or by the lake in the form of 
picnics, and I attended many of these, where I was largely an observer, though I did 
participate in the informal conversations and networking. The fluidity of these structures 
meant that I relied more on direct interviews and conversations than on classical participant 
observation. However, while it led to me adapting my research methods, learning about these 
ever-shifting locales and roles also provided invaluable insight into the working of this 
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system on the ground, the spaces they chose to exist (or not) in, and the actors that drove 
these choices. These insights are explored in more detail in the empirical chapters that follow. 
 
As Li observed during her covert and overt research with female gamblers, participant 
observation is fraught with ethical concerns, about how to represent oneself and one’s work, 
and where to strike the balance between participating and observing (Li 2008). As she finally 
decided, however, being open about her identity as a researcher, while alienating some 
participants, nonetheless struck the right ethical balance, and also placed her in a position 
where she did not need to “participate” intensively (as a gambler) to be able to gain insight. 
Despite the potentially sensitive nature of material that could emerge in an exploration of the 
relationship between conflict and governance, I too chose to be candid about my status as a 
researcher at all times.  
 
3.3.2 Interviews 
 
The primary means of data collection that I employed were semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews. Especially as questions of governance and state practice were at stake, it was the 
best route to engaging key informants such as higher ranking officials in the Bodoland 
Territorial Council, administrative officials in the various departments, as well as politicians 
and members of the Territorial Council or Legislative Assembly. In addition, given the 
constraints to participant observation outlined above, purposeful conversations in the form of 
interviews served as an important source of data.  
 
Unstructured interviews allow participants a greater degree of control over the narrative, 
especially where the topics discussed are sensitive in nature (Corbin and Morse 2003). This 
does not imply, however, that the researcher has no power in this situation. As Rapley has 
pointed out, interviews are inherently social encounters — they are produced as much by the 
interviewer as the interviewee (Rapley 2001). Even open-ended interviews, seemingly guided 
more by what participants reveal voluntarily, can also be prompted by the ways in which the 
interviewer appears to practise neutrality, or maintain silences, for instance, which prompt 
respondents to go into detail. My main objective in using unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews as a method was to allow issues like citizenship, state practice, and the access that 
different communities had to various aspects of governance to emerge as much as possible 
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from the context itself. Rapley is correct to argue that all knowledge produced during an 
interview is specific to the context of the interview, and that analysis of such data must 
consider the idea that what is available is only one version (Ibid.). Far from arguing that this 
is a reason to abandon the method, however, he argues that it is in fact a reason to make the 
analysis more transparent in its context, and produced by a specific interaction (Ibid., p. 319).  
 
3.3.3 Archival work 
 
I worked in two archives in India during my fieldwork — the Nehru Memorial Museum and 
Library in Delhi, for one month in August 2016, and the Assam State Archives in Guwahati, 
for a month in September 2017. While Delhi is also home to the National Archives of India, 
conversations with other scholars of Assam seemed to suggest that Nehru Memorial is a 
better source of material for the Northeast. It hosts “one of the largest collections of private 
and institutional papers of leading Indian nationalists, industrialists, politicians, political 
parties, and associations in the country”, to quote a scholar on an archive review website 
(Dissertation Reviews 2013). On the Assam State Archives, scholars of Assam have noted 
that the archives have recently been revamped and are now extremely well-organised and 
easy to use. Scholars have “access to 266,000 government files reaching back all the way to 
the earliest phase of colonial rule in north-eastern India, in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century” (Dissertation Reviews 2014). In both archives, I was looking at papers and 
collections from pre- and post-Independence India. Interesting material emerged particularly 
on aspects of immigrant labour from erstwhile East Bengal, policing of unrest in Assam, 
anxieties about Indian federalism, the status of Plains Tribes (like the Bodos) in the 1960s, 
and issues around the governance of tribal land.  
 
The short periods I spent at these archives (with most of the time being dedicated to 
fieldwork) meant that these documents paint only a partial picture, and mostly add to 
supplement arguments I make otherwise. Francesca Moore has written about the partial 
nature of archives themselves, and how they represent only selective aspects of history, from 
which the researcher must be as attuned to silences and absences as to the material at hand 
(Moore 2009). In this way, the archive itself it representative of a certain power dynamic. I 
found this to be the case in my search in the archives. So for instance, while documents about 
immigration and the panic around refugee influx in the wake of India’s partition abound, very 
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few documents are available about the Plains Tribal Council of Assam, an organisation of 
tribal leaders campaigning for separate statehood in Assam. In some ways, their relative 
absence in the archives of this period (the 1950s and 1960s), goes on to mirror their 
complaints about being erased from the Assam movement of the 1980s, and the emergence of 
another rebellion, in the form of the Bodoland movement, in the late 1980s as a response to 
this, among other things.  
 
3.4 Positionality  
 
In Kokrajhar, I was a woman, a non-tribal with a Hindu name, and an outsider from Delhi, a 
place that itself has a complex and often antagonistic centre-periphery relationship with 
Northeastern India (Baruah 2005b, 2007). Each of these aspects of my identity had an impact 
on the fieldwork, often contradictory in nature. Being a woman and a researcher had the dual 
effect of closing off access to certain people and places, while opening up others (Cerwonka 
and Malkki 2007). While it added some additional uncertainty about safety in the field, it also 
made me less seem threatening, and thus more likely to access official spaces, as the 
anthropologist Nayanika Mathur also found in her ethnography of bureaucrats in the state of 
Uttarakhand, India (Mathur 2015). Being an outsider and a woman simultaneously sometimes 
placed me in odd situations with the women in the field. On some occasions, my “outsider”, 
and probably differential class status made me one of the “men”, I could sit and eat or drink 
tea with them, while very often women were the ones preparing the tea or food, a fact which 
made me deeply uncomfortable. On other occasions, it also gave me access to women in the 
community, the ability to sit down and have a discussion with just women members in a 
particular group (with a woman other than my research assistants serving as a translator, if 
needed). Sultana observes that other markers of class difference — watches, notebooks, one’s 
style of dressing, and so on can also set one apart from others in the field, and place oneself 
in specific categories of hierarchy (Sultana 2007). 
 
There has been an increasing self-awareness among geographers about how the politics of 
research is affected by the institutional and geographical positionality of academics, 
particularly in instances of researchers based in the North studying the South (Sidaway 1992, 
1993, Madge 1993, Potter 1993), and the knowledge production that results from these 
uneven power relations (Jazeel and McFarlane 2010, Jazeel 2014). My location as a scholar 
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studying abroad also added to my classification in the hierarchy of participants, and allowed 
me access to high-level officials and politicians with relative ease. An interesting spillover 
effect of this was also on my research assistant colleagues, who were pleased about being 
affiliated with foreign research (both still wear their Cambridge t-shirts, or so they tell me).  
 
In addition to this, I was also returning to a region and a set of people whom I had previously 
encountered in a different role — that of a development worker. During fieldwork, it my 
previous, more engaged role in the NGO that I found myself referring back to as a way to 
justify my present role as a researcher.5 Both with respect to participants as well as 
colleagues, I was confronted with their changing (and unchanging) expectations, along with 
my own. Having been used to being perceived as fairly benign (given my previous 
development worker status), I often referenced this role when my intentions were being 
questioned by participants. I do not imply here that my role as a development worker was 
somehow less problematic or without its own complex power dynamics. Indeed, an 
exhaustive literature (too vast to be done any justice here) questions precisely this assumption 
of viewing NGOs uncritically (Bebbington and Thiele 1993, Edwards and Hulme 1996, 
Kamat 2004, Choudry and Kapoor 2013, Banks et al. 2015). Nonetheless, NGOs proliferate 
in fields like post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian relief (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 
2006). Post-conflict Kokrajhar was also a place often weary of the many international and 
national NGOs that descended upon it to undertake humanitarian relief work following the 
violence in 2012. The inadequate response of government agencies to the displacement crisis 
precipitated by the riots nonetheless meant that NGOs became an important source of support 
for basic services needed in the aftermath of the conflict. 
 
As the fieldwork showed me, and has also been observed by Mandiyanike (2009), being 
detached from a previous, work-related identity could be seen as threatening, as well as 
unproductive. Many researchers return to places they have previously experienced in other 
ways, to people that have known them in other roles, while being conscious of the fact that 
they will choose to represent themselves differently. Other geographers and anthropologists 
have also written about existing familiarity with a place that may be seen as “home”, which 
creates its own dilemmas of changing relationships and categories of understanding, and 
                                                
5 A reflection on this in the form of a research paper is also published in the journal Area (Sharma 2018b). 
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being both an insider and outsider (Narayan 1993, Ite 1997, Sultana 2007, Mandiyanike 
2009, Zhao 2017). 
 
An important consideration for me while doing the research was how to deal with 
disagreeable characters and views. Researching certain kinds of groups means treading with 
extra caution, negotiating the balance between understanding how they represent themselves, 
as well as distancing oneself from ideas that might be disagreeable (Gallaher 2009). I was 
frequently faced with views of prejudice and bigotry, and faced with the choice of either 
disagreeing, or continuing to present as a “neutral” observer, even though the idea of 
objectivity in field research has long been challenged by anthropologists and geographers 
alike. In general, I adopted the latter approach despite recognising its contradictions — I was 
more interested in understanding why these views existed and how they emerged, rather than 
imposing a set of views (my own) which did not arise neutrally either. With some of the most 
abhorrent (again, classified as “most” by me) views — I was careful to never assent or agree, 
though I admit that silence may have occasionally made me complicit. During a conversation 
with the top Hindu right-wing operative in Kokrajhar towards the end of my stay, however, I 
was glad to have made this choice also from the standpoint of safety. His repeated questions 
about where I was from and to whom I was feeding the information (he had learnt that one of 
my hosts at the NGO was Christian, which made him suspicious) suggested a degree of 
hostility that made me uncomfortable, especially as I insisted on standing up for my host at 
that stage. As other field researchers have also observed, in the context of potentially 
dangerous or unpredictable fieldwork, silence or noncommittal answers can be useful 
strategies for a researcher to employ from the perspective of safety (Kovats-Bernat 2002, 
Naveed et al. 2017). 
 
3.5 Risk factors 
 
The BTAD has been and remains a conflict-prone region, which saw major violence break 
out in 2012 and 2014. Since December 2014, the major insurgent group active in the region, 
the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), has been actively targeted, and thus 
lying low. The region had been relatively peaceful in this period, and the recent elections 
were also conducted without incident, despite being a time during which violence is usually 
anticipated. In comparison to when I worked there in June 2013–2014, just after the violence 
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of 2012, in recent years the BTAD remained relatively peaceful, as also acknowledged by 
most who live there. While insurgency can be a problem in BTAD, it was not a major factor 
in the field areas I visited, and its immediate impact is negligible in Kokrajhar town.  
 
I prepared the risk assessment for this project with the understanding that the area had a 
history of conflict and violence, and took plenty of precaution to ensure safe living conditions 
on the campus of a trusted NGO in the region. In addition, I took safe modes of transport like 
public transport, known private taxis, and the vehicles of people that I trusted. The most 
important source of security for me was relying on the advice of people who lived there, and 
who understood the threat perceptions in a nuanced way. On some days, for instance, various 
political outfits would declare a bandh, a strike that shut down transport, shops, and 
movement in general. In this period, I did not venture out for fieldwork, in accordance with 
local practice. The trickiest part of maintaining this was keeping track of bandh 
announcements in advance — on many occasions I arrived at the bus stop only to walk back 
home with no luck! 
 
Being accompanied by research assistants, both of whom were male, while sometimes 
challenging from a research point of view, was a boon from the point of view of safety. 
Traveling alone as a woman in India can often expose oneself to various kinds of harassment, 
and even assault, although I was careful to do most of my traveling in the day, unless I had 
prior arrangements. The somewhat unpredictable nature of the region also would have made 
me a bit more vulnerable had I only been on my own, and I credit the presence of my 
colleagues with allowing me to expand the research in almost any direction without worrying 
about safety.   
 
Some time before I was due to arrive there, on 5 August 2016, after a period of relative calm 
(including during the elections), there was a gun attack at a local market in Kokrajhar district 
in the BTAD. While this did not directly affect my planned fieldwork with village level 
governance committees, it was important to take into account any potential increase in risk 
also in terms of transport, and the perceived nature of my research, as well as my role there. 
As the FCO travel guidelines for India recommended only vigilance, and did not ban travel, I 
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decided to proceed with my research as before, but with some updated safety protocols.6 This 
included greater vigilance in crowded places. I took care in terms of making contacts, and in 
the initial part of the fieldwork, went easy on asking very sensitive questions. It also involved 
staying in regular touch with and giving fortnightly updates to my PhD supervisor, Prof 
Bhaskar Vira. I also decided to stick with the people and field sites that I was somewhat 
familiar with, where I knew at least a few people from before. Inevitably, the precautions and 
actions I took affected my methodology, and have impacted the data I present here, and as in 
all research, the conditions in the field affect the final outcome (Kovats-Bernat 2002). 
 
3.6 Ethical considerations 
3.6.1 Access and informed consent  
 
Having been in the region before, as a development worker, I was familiar with many of the 
actors that I interacted with, although given the constantly changing nature of India’s civil 
service, many officials in the administration and the police were different from the ones I’d 
encountered previously. Given the interconnected nexus of political parties and village-level 
governance in the BTAD, party networks formed an important node of access, snowballing 
from one person to another, and also as a means to receive information about meetings, 
upcoming programmes, and general goings on in the party-cum-governance structure. 
 
In general, I did not compensate for interviews and research time through direct payment of 
money. With some participants, this seemed the obvious choice, as many of my participants 
were in local government, and thus to some degree in a position of power, and not among the 
most marginalised. In many instances, where we met in a tea shop or something similar, I 
paid for refreshments, as a way of acknowledging the time they spent with me on my 
research. In some cases, it was the officials who hosted me, either in their homes or offices, 
especially those at senior levels. 
 
As Hammett and Sporton point out, choosing to pay or not, and in what form (cash, kind, 
investing in a community project) is a context-specific choice, and no one model fits all 
                                                
6 The FCO travel advisory following the incident was as follows: "On 5 August 2016, there was a gun attack by 
suspected militants on civilians in a local market in Kokrajhar, state of Assam. If you’re travelling in or through 
Kokrajhar you should monitor local media, be vigilant, avoid protests or large gatherings and follow the advice 
of the local authorities and your travel company." 
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fieldwork situations (Hammett and Sporton 2012). This is especially the case with 
marginalised communities, where the power differential between the researcher and the 
participants is more stark (Ibid., p. 498). I was conscious of this while spending time with 
participants from the displaced community in Makrabari, many of whom had lost regular 
livelihood because of the displacement from their village. Each time I visited them I took 
something for their households, usually in the form of food or small gifts for children. A few 
times while traveling with them to another part of the district, I paid for their transport, and 
for any meals we ate outside. In some instances, there was embarrassment about this on their 
part, although I did insist that they take the compensation. It did, however, make clear to me 
that directly paying for each interview or day spent would have probably come off as 
patronising and overly transactional.  
 
3.6.2 Sensitive information, anonymity and confidentiality 
 
The element of violence as part of the narrative in the region, especially incidents in the 
recent past, also called for a need to be sensitive while probing these issues. Despite being 
nearly five years in the past, the violence of 2012 was a recurring theme that emerged in 
many conversations. It continued to have a lasting impact on the way people experienced 
governance and state protection, but also security and relations with their neighbours. On 
more than one occasion, someone speaking about the violence would become upset or angry 
while remembering a phone call to the police that went unanswered, or spending six months 
at a relief camp. In some instances, people also briefly cried remembering something 
distressing. These very personal revelations stemmed from otherwise seemingly mundane 
conversations about elections, votes, and political parties, hinting again at the intimate ways 
in which the state (or its absence) can make itself felt in the everyday lives of people. More 
importantly, it reinforced the need for sensitivity when speaking of violence and conflict. In 
instances where people became sad or distressed, I stopped asking questions about violence, 
and typically we would return to some more mundane or ordinary topic of discussion. If they 
were reluctant to speak after this, I would offer to terminate the interview. In the cases where 
people were most distressed, however, they usually chose to go on speaking, often returning 
to the theme of violence.  
 
	   67	  
In some instances, a government official or political representative shared something 
privately with me, and then asked me not to write it down or use it. I have naturally honoured 
those requests and these insights do not appear in the thesis.  
 
All participants were made fully aware of the purpose of my research. In addition, I also 
ensured that before I began interacting with them, they knew that their names would not be 
used, and to the best of my ability I would ensure that they would not be identifiable in other 
ways. In many cases, people seemed not to be bothered by this, and higher level officials 
particularly, were also happy to let me use their names. 
 
Anonymity was also extended to the actual names of the villages and places, as I believe it 
would be easy to identify the actors if these were revealed (since the VCDC members, 
chairpersons, and MCLAs are fairly easy to track down). I have also anonymised even 
government officials and the MCLA in question, even where research ethics might have 
allowed me to use their names as associated with their official designations. This is to protect 
the anonymity of the people connected to them (lower level VCDC members, other village-
level figures, residents of the relief camp), who could be identifiable if the officials 
themselves were, given the context.  
 
3.6.3 Research assistants 
 
During the fieldwork, I was able to ask two of my former colleagues, one Bodo and one 
Muslim, to help out, mostly at separate times, and occasionally together. They were 
important interlocutors and served also as gatekeepers in many instances, as well as 
translators in situations where language became a barrier. Part of the rationale for asking 
both, and not just one of them to help out was precisely because ethnicity often made a 
difference when asking questions, something I learned through previous experience, and has 
also been pointed out in other reflections on fieldwork (Anwar and Viqar 2016). For instance, 
after a particularly charged discussion about politics at among the Muslims in Makrabari, 
both my Muslim colleague and I agreed that had our Bodo colleague been present, people 
may have been more reluctant to open up. Bodos, given their perceived status as a relatively 
dominant group in the BTAD area, wield a certain power over other groups, for which they 
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are often resented. Equally, within the Bodos, there is often resentment against other non-
Bodo groups, especially the Muslims.  
 
Being “accompanied” affects the way researchers are perceived, and their positionality 
(Cupples and Kindon 2003), and the idea of the “lone researcher” has been challenged in 
literature reflecting on fieldwork (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, Amit 2000, Middleton and Cons 
2014). Research assistants have their own lenses and biases, whether with regard to class, 
ethnicity, and so on, which can play a role in interpretation and translation (Turner 2010). 
The additional lens of research assistants’ and translators’ subjectivities also make them 
active producers of knowledge in the research process (Temple and Edwards 2002, Scott et 
al. 2006, Caretta 2014, Anwar and Viqar 2016). This was also my experience, and I found 
that it enriched, rather than compromised the research process. Many research directions and 
themes emerged through conversations with them, and would not have been possible without 
their extensive local knowledge of the area’s politics. Occasionally these filters were causes 
of friction — most notably from the point of view of a gendered analysis, where both being 
male held certain pre-conceived ideas about women’s views and roles. Equally, the friction 
also allowed me to explore that dynamic amongst other participants, who often shared these 
views. 
 
3.7 Data analysis  
3.7.1 Recording data  
 
On a more practical issue of methodology, I did not end up recording most interviews (except 
a few with key informants). Given the context, the use of a recorder could have signalled a 
degree of formality that would make easy flowing conversation trickier. Particularly with 
regard to government practice and corruption, which is fairly prevalent in the BTAD, or with 
regard to sensitive information about violent events, or militant activities, I didn’t want my 
role to seem at all investigative, or as that of a journalist. In line with other field researchers 
who have avoided audio and video recordings in dangerous or unstable contexts (Kovats-
Bernat 2002), I chose not to use recordings as a way to build trust with my informants in a 
potentially volatile context. During the election campaigning, for instance, I was frequently 
asked if I was a reporter, but more worryingly, whether I was from one of the political parties 
and reporting back to them on voter preferences. I vehemently and meticulously denied this 
	   69	  
everywhere, and tried to be as clear as possible about my role, but I believe the presence of a 
recorder would have amplified the degree of suspicion. I did, however, visibly take notes, so 
that people were aware that what they said was being recorded in some form, and there was 
no sense of deception. It was ultimately quicker, and perhaps more useful, to take detailed 
notes during interviews, and transcribe immediately afterwards (on the same day). I was able 
to do this, either on computer or by hand, for nearly every set of field notes that I have. While 
I might have missed out on some verbatim quotes, I do not regret not recording the data, as I 
believe it helped me build trust. On one occasion, for instance, someone with a last name 
similar to mine, a journalist going undercover, tried to catch a VCDC chairman giving a bribe 
on the record. For a few days, this created some panic about my role (the last name similarity 
didn’t help — some of the participants thought it had been me going undercover), and I had 
to re-establish trust (some of it via research assistants). Not having a recorder made this case 
stronger. Over the course of ten months of fieldwork, I do not believe the data was severely 
compromised by the lack of recordings.   
 
3.7.2 Organising and analysing data 
 
Once I returned from fieldwork for good, I began the process of organising and analysing my 
data. I did this by first reading through my notes and extracting what I thought were some 
emerging themes, and then further categorising and re-organising the data into sections that I 
thought were relevant to the chapters I wanted to write. I did this without using any data 
analysis software, but by hand, using colour coded notes, highlighters, and pen and paper. 
Despite the volume of data, I found this method useful as it allowed me to thoroughly engage 
with all the data, and assured me that I had not left anything out.   
 
In accordance with department and disciplinary research ethics, I was also careful to separate 
the actual names and anonyms using two different word processing programmes, and have 
employed these throughout the thesis.  
 
3.8 Representing the research 
 
In geography, debates have arisen on the responsibility of academics to engage more actively 
with policy and politics (Massey 2000, 2002, Dorling and Shaw 2002, Martin 2002), and the 
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need for ethical and political engagement in research, fieldwork and teaching (Katz 1994, 
Valentine 2005). A strand of scholarship in anthropological fieldwork asserts that being 
politically engaged while doing fieldwork, taking an explicitly activist approach, and 
choosing to identify with marginalised groups makes for richer understanding of 
ethnographic material (Scheper-Hughes 1995, Speed 2001, Kunnath 2013). Adopting a 
neutral or disengaged stance may become ethically indefensible, but other fieldwork 
experiences show that engagement too can be fraught with dilemmas of how far to take that 
involvement, and whether one is “purchasing narratives” through acts of engagement (Smith 
and Kleinman 2010). Moreover, defining the nature of the most ethical engagement is not 
always an obvious choice, and privileging the researcher’s morality and decision on how to 
engage also casts ethics in terms of the researcher’s subjectivity alone.7 Katz problematises 
the notion of engaged academic research further, pointing out that academic projects that 
yield the most “tangible” benefits to participants are often seen as ambiguous in terms of their 
scholarly worth (Katz 1994). Moreover, she asserts, regardless of the possible benefits to 
participants, ultimately it is the researcher that gains the most from the encounter, raising 
further questions of just how much the power balance can ultimately be tipped. 
 
Many of my informants said that while they were sceptical about the outcome of my 
research, it was important for them to have their story told in the outside world. This was 
especially true of the Makrabari residents, whose story was that of negligence and being 
made invisible, time and time again. For many of those who were representatives of the 
administration, the research served as a look into the governance of an area and 
administrative structure that was not much represented in academia. Whether they will feel 
the same on reading a synopsis of my thesis is another matter. An early experience in sharing 
these findings was at a conference of Northeast Indian scholars in Tezpur, Assam in January 
2018. My presentation drew from insights in Chapter 7, where I highlighted the growing 
networks of Hindu nationalism, and their effects on both Bodo and Muslim respondents. The 
talk generated mixed reactions — while some feedback suggested that studying Hindu 
nationalists in the Northeast was an important, a Bodo student was upset at my focussing on 
Muslims, linking it to unchecked migration, which “tribals had accommodated for a long 
time”. Her feedback did make me more sensitive to how I myself framed the issues in my 
                                                
7 See comments and responses to Nancy Scheper-Hughes, as well as Roy D’Andrade in the same volume 
against the moral model in anthropology (D’Andrade 1995, Scheper-Hughes 1995). 
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thesis, and the importance of being mindful of language. Ultimately, I’ve found it important 
to highlight that both Bodos and Muslims are communities that have been failed by the 
Indian state in Bodoland, and picking sides (or appearing to) is counterproductive to this 
analysis.  
 
I believe my best contribution to the region is to write about it honestly and without the use 
of the tropes of violence and barbarism that are usually used to define it. In writing about 
Kokrajhar, and Bodoland, I am interested in the everyday precisely because it illustrates that 
there is more to it than gun violence, insurgent groups, or “illegal immigrants”. Instead, it is a 
complex, vibrant region where both hardship and opportunity exist, and where people have 
found ways to resist and co-opt the contradictions of the Indian state, with the means 
available to them.   
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CHAPTER 4. IMAGINING BODOLAND: PLACING NORTHEAST INDIA IN 
CONTEXT 
 
“If you allow them to rule us or run the administration … it will be something like anarchy.” 
- Kuladhar Chaliha, Constituent Assembly Debates, 1949 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
How does one study Northeast India? More specifically, where do we locate the study of this 
complex, often under or misrepresented region? How should we locate the understanding of 
its politics — in which we choose to understand the Northeast either as a place of difference, 
or as part of a broader Indian/South Asian political development. Scholars studying Northeast 
India have often (correctly) prefaced their studies with the observation that it has been 
neglected in academic studies, both within and about India. In the last couple of decades, 
there has been a slow reversal of this trend, especially with more scholars from the region 
writing insightful and critical narratives of how to understand the region’s politics, and 
moving away from a defence and security-driven perspective that has moulded much of 
Northeast India’s image in popular perception — as a place of violence and volatility. Today, 
it is routinely characterised as backward, remote, and “cut off”, but as Sanjib Baruah 
evocatively described in India Against Itself, it was, in the colonial period, at the forefront of 
modernity, a key hub of capitalist extraction in the British Raj (Baruah 1999, pp. xix–xx). A 
new book on archaeology in Northeast India argues that contrary to its current image as 
remote and backward, it was not an isolated backwater even in prehistoric times, connected 
to important trade routes, and an early model of state formation and novel agricultural 
practices (Hazarika 2017). The growing scholarship around the region, however, has not 
reversed its sense of otherness in “mainland” India, and raises the question of whether this 
difference persists in academic studies as well as popular perception. The introduction to a 
special issue on the Northeast in the journal South Asia (the result of the first in a series of 
international conferences that focussed on Northeast India) makes the point that (as late as 
2007) this is still very much the case. The study of the Northeast remains as marginalised 
from South Asian studies as has the region from mainstream Indian politics and media (De 
Maaker and Joshi 2007). 
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For instance, a new addition to Oxford University Press’s accessible A Very Short 
Introduction series is an introduction to Modern India (Jeffrey 2017). While such a volume, 
aiming for brevity and crispness, must necessarily omit some details, it leaves Northeast India 
out altogether, a puzzling choice for a place that is, as Saikia and Baishya put it in A Place of 
Relations, “the original locus of sovereign power… in the postcolonial Indian context” 
(Saikia and Baishya 2017a, p. 8). Similarly, while elections are now common practice 
throughout the region, rarely do they feature in “comparative” studies about Indian electoral 
studies. Most recently, Why India Votes, Mukulika Banerjee’s important contribution to 
understanding meaning-making during elections, cites ethnographic research from nine 
different states, but none from Northeast India (Banerjee 2014), as also pointed out by others 
who study the region (Das 2016). While some of this could be attributed to a fundamental 
difference in meaning, and therefore lack of comparability (as with Nagaland, for instance), 
Northeastern states have similar electoral practices as elsewhere in India, as Cornelia 
Guenauer's (2017) study on Meghalaya shows. The point is not, of course, to call for 
tokenistic representations from the Northeast, but to examine its fundamental, often 
contradictory place in the construction of Indian nationalism. Even a volume on ethnicity and 
separatism in India, seemingly concerned with the issues that are most studied about 
Northeast India, fails to take a single case study from the Northeast as a reference point, a 
surprising outcome given the region’s long history with separatism (Chadda 1997). Hausing 
also points to the relative absence of the Northeast in the tradition of Indian political science, 
where inter-state comparative studies have been prominent, but the states in the Northeast 
have not (Hausing 2015). Equally, no major central universities outside of Northeast India, 
with two exceptions in Delhi, offer specialised courses on Northeast India (Ibid.) 
 
Much of the scholarly work that is influential about Northeast India, especially from scholars 
from the region or with long engagements with it, studies the Northeast as a category in itself. 
This has not only gone a long way in filling an important (though still wide) gap in the dearth 
of scholarship about Northeast India, but has also enabled a better understanding of what is 
different about Northeast Indian politics and political history, and why a simple comparative 
perspective with another Indian state is not necessarily straightforward, or honest analysis. In 
many ways, the application of the same categories to the Northeast have often resulted in the 
paternalistic, often security-oriented texts about the region (Bhaumik, 2009; Kotwal, 2000; 
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Singh, 2008; many Northeast-focussed contributions in defense-oriented journals like 
Strategic Analysis; see also Saikia and Baishya's introduction in A Place of Relations, p. 7).8  
 
The study of India’s Northeast being peripheral within the study of India in some ways 
reflects the peripheral status of the region itself — both in the spatial imagination (countless 
references to the “chicken’s neck” corridor that connects India’s Northeast to the rest of the 
country in many scholarly, journalistic, and other descriptions reinforce the point), and in the 
political process (Saikia and Baishya 2017b). The Northeast is seen as a zone of war, conflict, 
unrest, and in parallel, the mainland Indian tourist’s exotic Other. This is at least partly owed 
to the colonial project of categorisation, fixing people (and ethnicity) to place, and seeing 
Northeast India’s tribes as anthropological specimens. Post-Independence India continued 
this protectionist/paternalistic framing of the region’s inhabitants, viewing with suspicion 
their challenges to the Indian national formation in the form of many separatist rebellions and 
movements for autonomy. 
 
I begin this chapter by looking at the historical construction of this region and its inhabitants, 
particularly colonial administrative categories. The following section looks at the 
politicisation of some of these categories in the recent past, with special attention to 
Bodoland. More specifically, it looks at the construction of indigenous or tribal identity (the 
Bodos), and the figure of the outsider Muslim. Both these categories are important constructs 
affecting the politics of Bodoland today, and are also the categories through which most of 
this study’s participants negotiate their ideas of belonging in Bodoland. Movements for 
autonomy have made specific uses of these politicised ethnicities, and equally, posed a 
challenge to Indian federalism. Finally, the last section of the chapter looks at the possible 
ways in which the study of the Northeast can be reimagined, and how my own project, and 
the empirical work that follows this context-setting piece, locates itself within these trends. 
 
4.2 Constructing the region 
 
The region that is Northeast India today comprises eight states — Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, 
Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, and Sikkim. Four of these states, i.e., 
Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, were part of Assam as it stood in 1947 at India’s 
                                                
8 Strategic Analysis, available from: https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rsan20/current [Accessed 8 Feb 2019]. 
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independence, but over the 1960s and 1970s, emerged as separate states. Administratively, 
the Indian government has reinforced the sense of difference of the Northeast from the rest of 
India by creating special governance and administrative structures specific to the region — 
the North Eastern Council has existed since 1971 (and also marks the beginning of the 
administrative usage of the term “Northeast”) (Hausing 2015), and a separate Ministry 
(Ministry for Development of North East Region) oversees the affairs of its region today. 
Since India’s “Look East” policy was adopted in the 1990s, and a deeper alliance with 
Southeast Asia was to be forged, the region has been of even greater geopolitical interest to 
India (Baruah 2004, Das 2010, Haokip 2015).  
 
In understanding the origins of the region’s politics, it is important to see the links between 
the present category and its historical origins, particularly colonial ones. Colonial policy was 
to segregate the “savage” “hill tribes” (such as the Nagas and Mizos) from the “plains” 
people, through the introduction of the Inner Line System in 1873, which effectively 
cordoned off and restricted entry into the hill areas that these tribes inhabited. Ostensibly, this 
was done for the “protection” of the hill tribes, although it replaced a fluid system of 
exchange and interaction between inhabitants of the plains and the hills with rigid racial and 
territorial boundaries (Baruah 1999). “Plains tribes” like the Bodos were not seen as needing 
protection, as they were considered better integrated with plains people since they lived 
alongside them. With its earliest policies, therefore, the colonial administration emphasised a 
link between territory and ethnicity. This idea persisted post India’s independence in 1947, 
and drives much of how protection measures towards tribal groups, which today include the 
Bodos, are conceptualised. It has also been argued that this legacy of territorialising identities 
has contributed to the more recent disputes over ethnic homelands, including in the case of 
the Bodos (Vandekerckhove 2009). 
 
4.2.1 Assam: The frontier and its inhabitants 
 
Assam is characterised by the many diverse ethnic groups that inhabit it. “Ethnic” Assamese 
Hindus and Muslims, while not considering themselves “indigenous” or “tribal” nonetheless 
consider themselves Assam’s original inhabitants. Assamese Muslims in particular, are 
considered ethnically and culturally distinct from the Bengali-speaking “New Assamese” 
Muslims, and trace their lineage to various Islamic preachers and Persian elite warriors who 
	   77	  
travelled in the Ahom kingdom.9 Assamese Hindus, meanwhile, trace their lineage to an 
Indo-Aryan heritage. Both of these claims, it has been argued, were means employed by these 
groups as a way of trying to distance themselves from autochthones (Sharma 2011). Both 
Assamese Hindus and Muslims identify themselves as Assamese speakers, while the speakers 
of other languages such as Bodo, Mising, Karbi, Garo and Rabha are considered “tribal”, and 
indigenous to the region.  
 
Assam’s ethnic diversity is made up not only by its native groups, but also by the many 
communities that immigrated to the region at different periods of time, often driven by the 
colonial state’s need for labour. Baruah argues that the immigration of different communities 
at various points was driven by the colonial administration’s decision to develop it as a land 
frontier (Baruah 1999). Reacting sharply to an editorial in the New Republic in 1983 that 
characterised an episode of violence against Muslims in Assam as a result of a failure of 
modernity, he pointed out that Assam had in fact been “modernised” rather early, through its 
inclusion systems of global capitalism as it became part of the British Empire (Ibid.). After 
the Anglo-Burmese war of 1826, Assam, previously the Ahom kingdom,10 became a part of 
the British empire. Thus a formerly sparsely populated region became a frontier that was 
integrated into the colonial economy, and which needed to be populated. British notions 
about how densely populated the region of Assam should be as a land frontier played an 
important role in their designating certain areas as “wastelands” which could be leased out 
for tea plantations, or to peasant settlers (Ibid., p. 47). Tea plantations, in particular, formed a 
major component of the British doctrine for “agrarian improvement” (Sharma 2011) that 
encouraged immigration, but so also did the development of coal fields, as well as the felling 
of forests for timber and the building of roads and railways to transport these materials to the 
ports, and the “core” regions of the Empire (Baruah 1999).  
 
The first wave of migrants encouraged by the colonial administration were the “coolies” of 
central India brought to work on tea plantations from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. As 
various attempts to recruit local peasants into the harsh working conditions of tea plantations 
failed, it was the dispossessed and displaced tribal peasants from central India who were 
                                                
9 The Ahom Kingdom came into existence in the thirteenth century, and existed until Assam became part of the 
colonial empire in 1826, after the first Anglo-Burmese war (see Sharma 2011).  
10 Although neither present-day Assam nor the British province of Assam are completely contiguous with the 
Ahom kingdom, it nonetheless represents what Baruah has called the “cultural heartland of modern Assam” 
(Baruah 1999).  
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brought over to Assam as indentured labourers, much as others from the same groups were 
shipped off to destinations like the Caribbean islands and Fiji (Sharma 2011). Today, the 
descendants of this group are known as the “tea tribes” or Adivasis, who have assimilated 
linguistically, but continue to have have social, cultural and political groups that organise 
around this identity. These collective identities are drawn from links to their tribal identities 
from central India, and in recent times they have also campaigned to have the Scheduled 
Tribe status accorded to them in Assam.11 
 
Another major group is Bengali Muslim peasants from East Bengal, who began to migrate in 
the early 20th century after Assam became linked by the railways. Known as Na-Asomiya 
(New Assamese) or Charua Musalmans, they introduced permanent cultivation in the 
previously uncultivated riverine char areas, which are prone to seasonal flooding, and thus 
considered uninhabitable. While they played an important role in Assam’s agricultural 
economy, as they started to move away from the char areas in search of better lands, local 
residents began to resent their presence, a resentment that later went on to become a core 
issue in future political agitations (Sharma 2011). Also migrating from pre-Independence 
Bengal were Bengali Hindus, educated Bengalis who moved to Assam largely to work in the 
colonial administration from the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly as the 
colonial government doubted the ability of natives from Assam to carry out these roles 
(Weiner, 1978, 92). Further immigration, of both Bengali Muslims and Hindus, followed 
after the creation of East Pakistan in 1947, as well as the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. 
 
Other major groups to migrate include Nepali Gorkha soldiers and cattle graziers, and 
Marwaris who were traders from Rajasthan that came to control much of the trading of goods 
and crops in the region, and also played the role of moneylenders. In the context of the 
BTAD, another important ethnic group is the Koch Rajbongshis, inhabitants of an earlier 
Koch kingdom, which, prior to Assam’s inclusion in the British Empire, had close ties with 
the Ahom kingdom, which it bordered (Baruah 1999).12 While today this group speaks 
Assamese and largely practices Hinduism, ethnically and politically they identify as distinct 
                                                
11 As recently as 8 Feb 2019, the All Adivasi Students Association held a rally in Kokrajhar, reiterating this 
demand (The Sentinel 2019). 
12 In the 16th century the Koch kingdom covered parts of what is today eastern Assam, as well as parts of 
present-day West Bengal and Bangladesh. Following a split in the kingdom, the western part became a vassal of 
the Mughal Empire in 1609, followed by the eastern part in 1613, and some of what is the BTAD region today 
was also included (see Baruah 1999, p. 24). 
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from Assamese Hindus. They are also among the groups in Assam today campaigning for 
Scheduled Tribe status, as well as leading their own movement (though with far less clout 
than the movement for Bodoland) for separate statehood. 
 
4.2.2 Politicising ethnicity  
 
As the theoretical explorations of citizenship in Chapter 2 established, and as the following 
empirical chapters will go on to show, key to the process of defining citizenship is 
understanding the terms of inclusion and exclusion, and who is termed an insider, or an 
outsider. The notion of who “outsiders” were in Assam was fuzzy before the colonial project 
of categorisation began, deriving more from social practice than ethnicity or place (Sharma 
2011). The term “Bangal”, for instance, is a term used to denote outsiders (today mostly in a 
pejorative sense), but in its pre-colonial usage, as observed by Sharma, it is not a fixed 
signifier. A person from the Naga hills, for instance, would stop being a “Bangal” once they 
settled down and became part of life in the plains, this status being conferred not by their 
fixed ethnicity or origin, but rather by practice (Ibid.). As Jayal (2013) shows, colonial ideas 
of fixing people to place meant that citizen identities from this period onwards became far 
more rooted in concepts of ethnicity and territory.  
 
The work of scholars of the region in the early 20th century, such as anthropologist Christoph 
von Furer-Haimendorf, whose work is as contentious as it is cited, went a long way in 
establishing the fixed cultural identities we see today. Much as he reinforced cultural 
stereotypes of barbaric and uncivilised tribes in Northeast India, he also served as one of the 
earliest chroniclers of the region (Baruah 2017b). For the Bodos, this figure is represented by 
Sidney Endle, an English reverend who wrote “the Kacharis”, published in 1911, describing 
the lives and cultural practices of the Bodos in the classical anthropological style of the 
period — ascribing moral value to lived practices (Endle 1911). Driven largely by evangelist 
intent, the book is (not unlike Furer-Haimendorf’s work on the Nagas), both an intimate 
portrait, as well as a troubling read in the 21st century with its often derogatory 
characterisations and essentialist ideas. Nonetheless, my copy of his book was purchased 
from a bookstore in Kokrajhar town, in the heart of Bodoland, and is pitched as an important 
early monograph about the Bodos. From an academic point of view, the book is problematic, 
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but from the perspective of establishing Bodo identity (among other things, as a means to 
justify political mobilisation), it is, as the book jacket describes it, “a milestone”.  
 
With the multiple waves of migration in the late 19th and early 20th century, however, 
ethnicity became a key axis along which political mobilisation occurred in Assam, and the 
Northeast more widely. In particular, the hostility was against Bengali Hindus and other non-
Assamese groups in administrative positions and public employment (often favoured over the 
Assamese, even after Independence in 1947). Not surprisingly, “non-Assamese quit Assam” 
campaigns were launched by Assamese youth organisations protesting unemployment 
(Assam State Archives 1970). The continuing use of Bengali in higher education institutes in 
parts of Assam led to language riots from 1972 onwards, with the All Assam Students Union 
(AASU) campaigning for a state-wide recognition of Assamese as the medium of instruction 
(Weiner 1978, pp. 117–120). The announcement of this policy made many non-Assamese 
groups, Plains Tribals like the Bodos, for instance, nervous about the “Assamization policy” 
of the government, leading them to warn that they too, would launch a movement (Ibid., p. 
120). Weiner contends that in the two decades following Independence, the increasing 
assertion of Assamese as the primary language in Assam as it existed in 1947, alienated not 
just the Bodos, but also other tribal communities like the Nagas, Mizos, Khasis and Garos, 
who pressed for separate political structures in the form of new states (Ibid., p. 122). 
 
The Assam Movement, as it came to be known, was launched primarily in opposition to the 
hegemony of Bengali Hindu dominance in educational institutions and jobs, and the relative 
neglect of Assamese language and culture, and intensified in 1979. While the movement 
initially targeted the Indian state, it evolved over time to be centred around an “anti-
foreigner” agitation, with one of its primary demands being the removal of “illegal 
immigrants”, particularly those who had arrived after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, 
which, the movement’s leaders pointed out, represented a burden borne disproportionately by 
Assam in contrast to the rest of India. Notwithstanding what Weiner wrote in 1978 (shortly 
before the movement picked up), Bengali Muslims, despite their assimilation and adoption of 
Assamese language, did not remain unthreatening to the Assamese majority (Ibid., p. 110). 
Instead, the issue of rising migration from neighbouring Bangladesh altered the dynamics of 
the Assamese agitation.  
 
The agitation was finally quelled after many years of unrest, marked by the signing of the 
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Assam Accord in 1985 between the Assam movement’s leaders and the Government of India. 
The main points of the Accord promised to deal with foreigners who had entered Assam in 
the preceding few decades, deporting those who had entered the country after the cut-off date 
of March 24, 1971. Important to note here is that the “anti-foreigner” movement in Assam in 
the 1980s never made a distinction between Hindu and Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh 
— it was equally opposed to both. If anything, the movement arose in response to the tacit 
acceptance in India that it was morally bound to accept Hindu refugees as “natural” citizens 
of India (Chatterji 2012), while placing an unequal burden on Assam to accommodate them 
(Baruah 1999, pp. 12–16). Cons and Sanyal's (2013) observation about the relevance of 
borders in South Asia takes on a particularly visceral quality in the Assam Accord — an 
important clause in the agreement is the creation of a border fence between India and 
Bangladesh, along with increased border patrolling and security (Government of Assam 
2012). 
4.2.3 Migrants and Muslims — Othering Assam 
 
Colonial and postcolonial legacies have, over time, served to marginalise and draw 
boundaries around the Northeast’s most vilified inhabitants — its Muslims. Yasmin Saikia 
(2017) describes Muslim history in Assam rightly as present/absent history. It is virtually 
obliterated in school textbooks, save for the presence of Muslims either as invaders and 
producers of violence, or as a humbled, defeated group. In each case, war and violence are 
sites of the production of this identity, and any other histories of cooperation, friendship, or 
xanmiholi (Saikia describes this as a form of tolerant coexistence) are lost (Ibid.). Their 
reduction to a political category, and the obliteration of Muslim contribution to Assamese 
architecture, agricultural practice, warfare or local cultural norms shape their representation 
in present-day Assam. Assam’s subsequent recognition as a Hindu-majority state has also 
paved the way for the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and similar Hindu fundamentalist 
organisations in gaining influence in the region today. This is emerging as a new dimension 
of politics in the Northeast, and is now beginning to be studied in its own right (Longkumer 
2017). It exposes yet again the contradictory nature of the inclusion of the Northeast in Indian 
nationalism. On the one hand, the spread of the RSS brings forth a (far more chauvinistic) 
dimension of “inclusion” in India’s politics, through the spread of right-wing Hindu 
fundamentalism. And yet, as Longkumer’s study in Nagaland and empirical evidence from 
Chapter 7 show, the means of this propaganda is different in Northeastern India. 
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Muslims in Assam are not, of course, a homogenous category. As seen above, they are 
primarily divided along lines of language and the time at which they immigrated into Assam 
(Hussain 1987, Sharma 2011). What separates them as a minority in Assam (in comparison to 
Muslims in other parts of India), Hussain argues, is that they are better integrated into 
Assamese society, and do not have the issues of language politics, as with Muslims in North 
India, for instance (Hussain 1987, p. 400). While classically-oriented anthropological 
scholarship on kinship, religious practices and folk customs considers the socio-cultural 
dimensions of their assimilation (Ahmed 2010), their framing in political discourse tends to 
focus on their status as perpetual migrants.  
 
Muslims have been represented in parliamentary politics in Assam from before 
Independence, with Muhammad Saadulla, then head of the Muslim League in Assam, even 
acquiring premiership of Assam between 1937 and 1938 (Kar 1997, p. xii). Other Muslim 
leaders, such as Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani and Abdul Matin Choudhury also commanded 
much popular support in different parts of Assam (Ibid., p. xi). Where ordinary Muslims 
appear in the political narrative, they often appear as villains (in the form of “illegal 
immigrants”) or as victims of violent massacres or ethnic conflict (which are also, ultimately, 
linked back to being an effect of migration). Their pre- and post-Independence political 
formations are understood largely from the perspective of their migration and its impact on 
Assam (Dev and Lahiri 1985), and their growing population as a threat to Assamese politics 
(Kar 1997). From the Partition of India onwards, anxiety about the influx of refugees was 
high, particularly Muslim immigrants, whose loyalty was suspect. From the perspective of 
the Indian state, enumeration was the key variable around which this population was 
understood and to be dealt with. Complex calculations were done in confidential Home 
Department files in order to determine the number of illegal Muslim immigrants, and how 
they could be distinguished from the local population (Assam State Archives 1962).  
 
Around the time that Bangladesh was created, in 1971, this panic was especially heightened 
in Assam, and in the decade that led up to and during the Assam movement, many editorials 
were written on the subject in Assamese newspapers. Figures like “15,000 Bangladeshis 
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settled on the Aie river” did the rounds,13 while the government investigated whether new 
settlers were from across the border or neighbouring districts of Assam. A Superintendent of 
Police expressed his frustration that the government order of not evicting settlers 
“encroaching” on government land from before a specific cut-off date made it harder to 
identify “illegal settlers”, as they blended in with local Muslims (Assam State Archives 
1980). The vilification of the “Miyan”, and the crude labelling of Bengali-speaking Muslims 
as illegal continues, more so with the ascent of the anti-Muslim Bhartiya Janata Party 
(Hazarika, 2018). The passage of the Citizenship Amendment Bill (discussed in Chapter 2) 
through the lower house of the Indian parliament in 2019, also serves to reinforce the 
inherent “outsider” quality of the Muslim citizen, and the “natural” citizenship of Hindus in 
India (Sharma 2018a).  
 
While discourses from the Assam movement and present-day Hindu nationalism have served 
to sideline Muslims from politics, in parallel, political and social organisations continue to 
represent their interests. The All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF), led by Baddruddin 
Ajmal, is widely seen as a party responsive to the political aspirations of Muslims in Assam, 
while student outfits, like the All Assam Minority Students Union (AAMSU), and in 
Bodoland, the All BTC Minority Students Union (ABMSU) serve important roles in a region 
where student outfits (rarely comprised only of students) are crucial to politics.  
 
The more recent process of the updating of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) — a 
long-standing exercise of identifying and deporting illegal entrants from Bangladesh — is 
also increasingly enmeshed with a xenophobic rhetoric that threatens to undermine the 
process entirely. This is the second such exercise to be undertaken in Assam — the first NRC 
was conducted in 1951. Following the partition of India and Pakistan, the Government of 
India passed the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act in 1950,14 in an effort to curb the 
numbers of refugees and migrants entering from East Pakistan. This was followed up by a 
census and the creation of a National Register of Citizens in 1951, an effort to document 
residents of all the villages in Assam (Government of Assam 2012). Subsequently, 
foreigners’ tribunals were set up in the aftermath of the Assam Accord (what political 
scientist Sanjib Baruah termed the “Assam exception” to citizenship (Baruah 2009), 
                                                
13 Editorial in the newspaper Dainik Asom, 18 July 1980 (Assam State Archives 1980). The Aie river lies in 
what is today Chirang district in the BTAD. 
14 See Appendix B for the full text of the Act. 
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producing a class of “Doubtful” or “D” voters (mostly of Bengali Hindu or Bengali Muslim 
origin) in the electoral rolls, who were forbidden from voting until their citizenship was 
proved. Such “D” voters continue to be marked out today, with a few, who have the 
resources, being able to bribe their way out of the limbo (Begum 2011). Finally, the 
undertaking of a new National Register of Citizens, as promised in the Assam Accord, and 
monitored by the Supreme Court of India, began in 2015 (The Telegraph 2018a). The “cut-
off” date for inclusion in the new NRC is 24 March, 1971 — proving residence in Assam 
before this date is essential to being included in the document.  
 
The current exercise is enabled by the presence of Nagarik Seva Kendras (NSKs or Citizen 
Service Centres) across Assam — in Kokrajhar alone there are 97 NSKs, collecting and 
digitising documents.15 Applicants must first provide identity documents from a list of 
acceptable documents — evidence of ancestors in the first NRC of 1951, land deeds, 
certificates from local village headmen or village councils certifying residence or migration 
to another village, school certificates, voter lists up to the cut-off date, among others. The 
NRC then verifies these documents as genuine — many poorer residents who don’t have 
documents have been known to forge them in desperation, and land themselves in jail if 
caught, as a project officer of the NRC in Kokrajhar told me.16 After verification, the 
documents are digitised and digital family trees constructed, which are then counter-checked 
against family lineages provided in applications, again, to eliminate forgeries. At the NSK 
that handles paperwork from Uzanpara, one of my field sites, the officer in charge told me 
that he received many forged certificates from the Uzanpara area, although he is sympathetic 
to the reasons that people resort to this. He also mentioned the term “shadow villages”, used 
to refer to hamlets with people who have settled from outside, usually around 30–40 years 
ago, where finding lineage documents proves the hardest. Many of Uzanpara’s Muslim 
residents have settled there only within the last 40 years.   
 
At the time that I left Kokrajhar in mid-2017, NRC officers were verifying family trees, and 
the draft NRC had been delayed for publication multiple times. A court order finally forced 
the state government to publish a partial draft on 31 December 2017, which caused much 
controversy as it left out the names of 4 million residents (with 19 million on the list), while a 
                                                
15 Interview with the District Project Supervisor of the NRC in Kokrajhar, 19 October 2016. 
16 Interviewed 18 November 2016. 
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second draft published in July 2018 had more names added to the list (a total of 29 million) 
although the government insisted this was not a final draft and no action would follow (The 
Economic Times 2018). One scholar of Assam has called the NRC a “truth machine”, 
reminiscent of 19th century “handprint” techniques used by the East India Company in 
colonial Bengal; another form of bordering, on par with the barbed wire fences between India 
and Bangladesh (Ahmed 2018).  
 
4.3 Uneasy federalism in post-independence India 
 
One seminal text that often frames the study of this region is the aforementioned India 
Against Itself, a landmark book that, while dealing largely with the recent political history of 
Assam, nonetheless helped illustrate what plagued India’s Northeast (and its scholarly 
representations, among others), illuminating the link its present status as a “troubled 
periphery” had to its colonial past (Baruah 1999). The text emphasises the Northeast’s sense 
of difference about itself, and its ambivalence about being a part of the Indian national 
formation.  Many of the region’s communities rose up in rebellious, separatist agitations, 
most (though not all) of which have been quelled in the seven decades following India’s 
independence. Most often, these insurgencies were managed through a style of militarised 
governance in the region, often with former army Generals at the helm, creating a form of 
“cosmetic federalism” that undermines the civilian government (Baruah 2005). The link 
between the state and the present condition of Northeast India is reinforced by the Indian 
state’s developmentalist approach in the Northeast as a form of conflict resolution (Baruah 
2017c). The role of the state is crucial not just in promoting a development agenda, but also 
in constructing “natural” disasters like the floods that ravage the Brahmaputra valley in 
Assam each year. State-led projects, like the construction of embankments, and the 
determination of what goes inside or outside the embankment, alter the conditions of flooding 
and their effects (Baruah 2017a). In persisting with colonial ideas of boundaries, the 
postcolonial state arbitrarily creates insiders and outsiders, and new geographies through 
hydraulic infrastructure. 
 
Fears of secessionist and separatist tendencies in the Northeast post-independence were 
rampant, and came to guide the way federal agreements were carved out in these areas. 
During the Constituent Assembly Debates that took place at the time of the drafting of the 
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Indian Constitution (from 1947–1949), for instance, the provision for autonomy 
arrangements in this region was framed a means to secure “willing cooperation” where 
people were “already fully suffused with ideas of isolation and separation” (Constituent 
Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.32). Colonial era ideas of “primitive” and “savage” tribal 
groups nevertheless led some members, like Kuladhar Chaliha, to wonder what would 
happen in these zones of autonomy:  
 
“The Nagas are a very primitive and simple people and they have not forgotten their 
old ways of doing summary justice when they have a grievance against anyone. If you 
allow them to rule us or run the administration it will be a negation of justice or 
administration and it will be something like anarchy.” (Constituent Assembly Debates 
1949a, 133.9) 
 
Two decades later, a Member of Parliament from Assam delivered a speech in the Lok Sabha 
stressing the importance of good centre-state relations in the country, arguing that Assam, “a 
frontier state”, felt neglected, and needed to be attended to, or matters might escalate (Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library 1969a, p. 4). The carving out of new states in India continued 
even after the major organisation of states along linguistic lines in the 1960s, and the re-
drawing of boundaries in Northeast India in the later half of the decade. This was not without 
its detractors, with a group of tribal Members of Parliament warning that the separation of the 
hills (largely tribal populations) and plains in Assam would brew and “strengthen anti-
national forces” (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library 1967, p. 6).  
 
The 1970s and 1980s saw many crises of federalism across India, and Assam was an 
important marker of separatist rebellion in this period. Many scholars of the Indian state also 
see this as correlated with the increasing centralisation of the Indian state in the 1970s and 
80s, accompanied by an increasing powerlessness (Brass 1991). As the state became more 
oppressive, identities that coalesced around religion, caste and region asserted themselves 
more strongly (Hasan 2000). Karlsson argues that while some scholars saw federal 
arrangements as a way of successfully processing ethnic demands, more critical voices from 
the region saw the central government’s strategy of creating new states in response to these 
demands as instigating yet more insurgency (Karlsson 2001, p. 20). Tillin has argued that 
India has no genuinely asymmetrical federalism arrangements except for tribal communities 
the Northeast, where group rights have been recognised along ethno-territorial lines, and 
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statehood has been granted (Tillin, 2007). As Corbridge noted in the case of Jharkhand’s 
tribals, this has often been due to lingering misconceptions about “tribalness”, a perception 
that is often used to advantage by tribal elites (Corbridge 2000).  
 
In this way, asymmetrical federalism became a tool of internal conflict management (Puri 
1998). It has been argued that while such asymmetrical arrangements fulfil diversity claims, 
they fall short on addressing inequality and poverty, as the majority of people in these “mini 
ethnocracies” do not benefit, while a few tribal elites do (Bhattacharyya 2015, p. 219). Still 
other scholars of the region, like Sanjib Baruah and Myron Weiner, have argued that the 
constitutional asymmetry in Assam, for instance, has not gone far enough, and had it been 
granted more authority, it may have been able to negotiate a subnational identity in less 
exclusivist ways (paraphrased in Tillin 2007, p. 57). While different states in the Northeast 
were granted different forms of federalism, Nagaland got by far the most autonomous deal 
after rejecting the Sixth Schedule, which has been used to devolve autonomy to other tribal 
groups in the Northeast, as an operating framework. Under Article 371A of the Indian 
constitution, Nagaland was granted a form of negotiated sovereignty in order to quell an 
armed secessionist movement, and continues to see itself as separate from the Indian union. 
Even so, in practice such agreements remain contested, as Nagaland’s attempt to take control 
of its own oil resources in 2010 led to a power struggle with India’s central government 
(Hausing 2014). Even as Nagaland continues to hold a degree of autonomy under 
constitutional arrangements, the incident showed that the central government could intervene 
to erode this autonomy, as has also happened in the case of Kashmir (Ibid., p. 106).  
 
Most recently in India, the state of Telengana was created in 2013, after a long agitation, and 
at least partly in response to electoral pressures. Such developments continue to fuel the 
movement for separate statehood in places like Bodoland. The leaders of this movement are, 
however, pragmatic about this solution, recognising that it will only arrive when the electoral 
math makes sense to one of the two major national parties (both have promised full statehood 
at different points). The borders of states are more “sticky” in India than they might appear, 
and new state boundaries, while beginning as challenges to existing power structures, often 
are finally a result of compromise between the many interest groups that compete for power 
(Tillin, 2013). In this, Tillin’s argument goes, state borders are a form of institution, which 
shape access to resources and power. In addition, the Indian state has always been less 
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responsive to statehood demands at the “periphery”, anxious about their separatist intent 
(Ibid., p. 16).     
 
4.4 Reimagining the Northeast 
 
Among the scholarly responses questioning the construction of the Northeast as a frontier 
region have been those that attempt to re-imagine its geography. In recent years, a text that 
has been finding increasing relevance in many Northeast Indian studies is The Art of Not 
Being Governed by James Scott (2009). This anarchist treatise of people in upland Southeast 
Asia (what Scott calls “Zomia”, which includes large parts of Northeastern India), who 
seemingly find ways to escape oppressive state control, has at its core a new geographical 
imaginary (Scott 2009). Many scholars of the Northeast, drawing on this, are questioning the 
model of studying the Northeast as a frontier of India, as a borderland or periphery of the 
Indian nation state. Instead, it is suggested, it could be more fruitful to look at the more 
contiguous histories of these regions and the areas they border in Myanmar and Bangladesh, 
even as borderland markets and insurgent training camps across borders prove the enduring 
nature of these cross-border links (van Schendel, 2017). Sanjib Baruah also suggests that the 
idea that South Asia is a discrete geographical region separate from Southeast Asia is a 
fiction. Instead, there are multiple historical links between the Northeast and its neighbouring 
countries towards the east, including a historical connection to the Silk Road, a point 
conceded even by Indian defence analysts (Baruah 2004). Baruah suggests that India must go 
beyond its security anxieties to develop deeper connections with Southeast Asia, even 
suggesting a form of multi-level citizenship for its Northeastern citizens, that would enable 
them to reclaim their transnational identities (Ibid., p. 18). 
 
Drawing on James Scott’s ideas, Willem van Schendel (2017) has called for a “de-
partitioning” of Northeast India studies. As a region, the Northeast did not exist before the 
end of the British Raj in 1947 — he refers to it as a “freak child of Partition” (Ibid., p. 273). 
Its existence at one corner of the Indian political formation now renders it territorially and 
politically isolated, its former connections and networks with neighbouring areas lost to the 
solidification of international (and sometimes hostile) borders. Not all these spatial 
imaginations are lost, of course — calls for a greater Nagalim, greater Mizoram and 
Kamatapur all feature spatial formations that transcend national borders, though as other 
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authors (like Hazarika 2018) point out, there is ambiguity about whether these political 
projects can be realised. Nonetheless, they challenge the idea of the Northeast as a fixed 
space, and it is here that van Schendel underlines the importance of scholars rejecting the 
idea of the Northeast as a self-enclosed geographical unit, and instead placing greater 
importance on the connections across borders and between regions. Efforts towards this 
approach have already been undertaken — for instance, by the Asian Borderlands Research 
Network, of which many scholars of the Northeast, including van Schendel, are a part. In a 
somewhat different vein, historian Indrani Chatterjee has also examined a historiography of 
monastic traditions, in particular, that goes beyond what she sees as the work of both colonial 
and postcolonial historians and interlocutors in erasing a contiguous history, and instead 
conforming to the categories we see in the region till date (Chatterjee 2013; Chatterjee 2018). 
Scott’s approach is not without its critics, however, who argue that his framing of plains/hills 
reinforces a colonial binary that poses these two as distinct categories, whereas reality is (and 
has historically been) less fixed (Jilangamba 2015).  
 
Part of the challenge in Northeast studies has been to deconstruct the idea of the Northeast as 
a single entity in itself. Thus, for instance, inter-state boundaries in the region remind us of 
the role of lived experiences in constructing boundaries around a place. In a place like the 
foothills of the Assam-Nagaland border, these interactions remind us that despite the 
historiography that has constructed it as such, the Northeast is not a monolithic entity (Kikon 
2017a, 2017b). Equally, there has also been an emphasis through questioning the category of 
the Northeast not only in its spatial imagination, but through re-examining how it is studied, 
and the importance of focussing on Northeast India because it remains, in many ways, a 
periphery, backwater, and frontier (Karlsson 2017a). With ethnicity and territorial 
nationalism being the main themes around which Northeast India is studied, Karlsson urges a 
move towards more diverse themes — mobility, class, ambition, aspiration, and themes 
around nature and environment, to name a few. Some of the work that has emerged about 
Northeast India, especially in the last decade, already investigates questions of ecology, for 
instance, on the central role of forest and land regulations in the history of the region (Saikia 
2008, 2011), and Karlsson’s own work on environment and politics in Meghalaya (Karlsson, 
2011). More and more of the recent work on Northeast India looks to delve deeper into the 
region’s more “fluid” attachments, moving beyond the received ideas of the region as a 
frontier, and a zone of difference, instead looking at the way multiple identities are a way of 
life in the region, and even every village in the region has its own identity (Vandenhelsken 
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and Karlsson 2016). As Vandenhelsken and Karlsson caution, however, fluidity does not 
equal a “smooth and seamless movement between different subject positions” (Ibid., p. 332), 
and having multiple subjectivities can be a fraught, and even violent process. 
 
Many of the more recent contributions in Northeastern research have stepped outside of the 
traditional study of conflict, militarisation, and ethnicity to study other dynamics that reveal 
lesser known facets of what makes the Northeast. One important lens has been a scrutiny of 
the migration of a generation of educated, aspirational young people from Northeast India 
who are migrating out of the region into different parts of the country, in search of education, 
jobs, opportunities, and crucially, recognition. Even as an older generation of “rebels” in 
Northeast India still see themselves as outside of India, their children fight for space as 
Indians, within the nation state instead (Karlsson 2017b). As the furore around the death of a 
young man from Arunachal Pradesh, Nido Tania, in Delhi and the ensuing protests made 
clear, young Northeasterners were not just furious about being treated differently (this has 
been the fate of the region’s inhabitants this the British Empire). Indeed, it is the terms of the 
protest that mark a new narrative — it is as Indians that they claim the right to equal 
treatment, and freedom from discrimination. Hazarika (2018) terms them the “new Indians”, 
well versed in the functioning of the law and constitution, and staking a claim from within, 
rather than outside of that framework.  Such journeys complicate the idea of what “the 
Northeast” really represents, and whether it holds any value to those who are categorised as 
such. 
 
McDuie-Ra asserts that migration demonstrates the capacity of the “Northeast” category not 
just to be one of oppression, but also of solidarity (McDuie-Ra 2017). Much as the category 
is problematic and homogenizing of a diverse set of cultural and social practice, its 
persistence can be attributed to the lack of alternative categories. In particular, in continuation 
with his previous detailed ethnography of young Northeastern migrants in Delhi (McDuie-Ra 
2012), he notes that experiences of racism especially serve as catalysts in binding together 
migrants from different regions, even in a “Northeastern” city like Guwahati. In contrast to 
Hazarika’s optimistic framing of Northeastern migrants as the “new Indians” following Nido 
Tania’s death, McDuie-Ra notes that the media coverage framed “Indian” and “Northeastern” 
as oppositional categories. The coverage around the safety of Delhi took precedence, the 
protests in the Northeast itself went largely ignored, reinforcing an ignorance of the politics 
of the Northeast. 
	   91	  
 
Another more recent focus has been on a closer examination of gender dynamics in the 
Northeastern landscape. The gendering of politics in Northeast India has often occurred in 
paradoxical ways in which women are cast as agents or victims (Bora 2017). For instance, 
their victimhood, especially with regard to sexual violations, is seen as a proxy for the 
violation of cultural nationalism. It is on their bodies, through ideas of honour and 
defilement, that culture is inscribed (Ibid.). While women’s groups have been central in 
resisting militarisation in Northeast India, their symbolic power has often come from being 
cast as mothers. The legitimacy of rebellion is grounded in the identity of the protestors as 
mothers, where motherhood marks the safe containment a woman’s sexuality — as with the 
famous nude protest in 2004, following the rape and murder of a young Manipuri woman by 
the Indian army (Haripriya 2017). When not framed as victims, ideas abound of Northeastern 
women (especially from tribal communities) as having more equal status, in comparison with 
the rest of India. Bora notes that for Naga nationalism, in particular, this is a means of 
distinguishing the Northeast from the rest of India — Naga civilisation emerges as better 
because of its superior treatment of women (Bora 2017). Yet, as Kikon (2017c) argues, this 
nationalism remains patriarchal at its core, willing to accept Naga women as administrators, 
entrepreneurs or doctors, but not as political representatives with decision-making power. 
 
4.5 The Many betrayals of Bodoland: A brief history 
 
Politicised ethnicities have been at the centre of debates about movements for autonomy and 
ethnic violence in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts. Bodo identity, in particular, has 
been politically mobilised, primarily to demand a separate state of Bodoland, but also to 
demand, at various stages, greater autonomy from Assam, linguistic rights, rights to control 
resources, and greater access to development for the Bodos. Most of these these movements 
have been oriented towards the Indian state, though the nature of the state’s response to the 
conflict has also led to the involvement and politicisation of other ethnicities — Muslims, 
Adivasis, Bengalis and Rajbongshis. 
 
The Bodos are considered part of a wider group of the Bodo-Kachari ethnic groups, who 
speak Tibeto-Burman languages. In defining the boundaries of their group, to demand an 
ethnic homeland, the Bodos use 19th century colonial texts that draw definitive inks between 
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“language families” and race (Baruah 1999, p. 178), while other linguists contend that the 
relationship between current day Bodos and Bengalis or Assamese is far more fluid (Ibid., p. 
179). At the end of the 19th century, Assamese historian Edward Gait noted that Bodos were 
gradually being assimilated into the Assamese fold, with fewer and fewer Bodo speakers 
remaining (Ibid., p. 181). This dire prediction of extinction, however, was reversed in post-
Independence India, where a renewed push to identify Bodos as distinct from the Assamese 
led to a revival of the use of the Bodo language, with it now being the official language of the 
Bodoland Territorial Area Districts, and one of 22 officially recognised languages in India.  
 
Bodos themselves are not a homogenous group, and do not have a common religion, with 
many having converted to Christianity during the colonial period, some joining the “Brahma” 
Hindu sect from the early 20th century, and yet others practicing the traditional animist 
“Bathou” faith, often alongside Hinduism. Despite the potential for cleavages however, 
politically the group has aligned around a “Bodo” identity, which is not itself without factions 
that compete to represent the group. Despite language being a key marker (and also how they 
are officially counted in the Census of India), other colloquial understandings of who is 
“Bodo” relate to particular forms of dressing (especially for women), certain kinds of food or 
drink (pork in particular), and seasonal festivals and celebrations which are drawn from 
Bathou faith, but are celebrated culturally by Hindus, Christians, and those who practice 
Bathou alike. 
 
Bodo demands for community rights existed as far back as the early 20th century, when these 
were submitted to the Simon Commission by the All Assam Tribal League in 1933 (Dasgupta 
1998, p. 199). The failure of the Commission to take cognisance of these demands for the 
protection of Bodos is what former Member of Parliament from Kokrajhar S. K. Basumatary 
terms as the first of several “betrayals” Bodos have suffered at the hands of the Indian state 
and its actors.17 The first betrayal was, in his view, Bodos (and Plains Tribals) being left out 
of the ambit of the Sixth Schedule by Gopinath Bordoloi, the man whose contributions to the 
Constituent Assembly debates led to the crafting of the Sixth Schedule. As the consequent 
history would go on to show, Bodo assertion of difference and autonomy from the Assamese 
would mirror Assamese agitation against Bengali hegemony, centring around issues of 
language, territory, and resources.  
                                                
17 Interviewed at his house on 15 May 2017. 
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In the period immediately after Indian independence, Bodo demands centred around 
linguistic recognition, led initially by the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS, the Bodo Literary 
Society), which was formed in 1952. The BSS successfully campaigned for the use of the 
Bodo language as a medium of instruction in schools first at the primary level, in 1963, and 
then at the secondary level, in 1968, against the hegemony of Assamese (Choudhury 2007). 
In the 1970s, the BSS took up the issue of the script in which the Bodo language was to be 
written. In an effort to separate it from Assamese, the BSS rejected the use of the Assamese 
script, opting instead for the Roman script (though this was not unanimous or without 
controversy) (Ibid.). The tussle between Bodo and Assamese groups led to the intervention of 
the central government, which finally pushed for the adoption of the Devnagari script, which 
was adopted by the BSS in 1975 (Ibid., p. 132).  
 
In parallel, building on the momentum of the language issue, as well as of land insecurity, 
Bodo groups joined with other Plains Tribal communities (comprising the tribes of Bodo, 
Deori, Hejai, Kachari, Lelung, Medh, Miri and Rabha) (Assam State Archives 1952a, p. 6), 
to form the Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) in 1967 (Choudhury 2007, p. 113). The 
PTCA consolidated its demands towards the autonomous region of Udayachal, a demand that 
was then updated to separate statehood in 1973 (Ibid., p. 134). In S.K. Basumatary’s 
recollection, a delegation of Bodos submitted a memorandum for autonomy to Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi when she visited Shillong (then capital of Assam) in 1967, towards 
which she expressed some sympathy, but which ultimately did not lead to any concrete 
action, thus betraying the community yet again. While the PTCA experienced some success 
in terms of participation and visibility, organising election boycotts (Assam State Archives 
1968a, 1968b), bandhs and other protests, their decision not to challenge the Indian state 
directly meant that from 1975–1977, when a state of Emergency was declared throughout 
India, and all political activity was banned, they too decided to pause their movement (Ibid., 
p. 135). At the end of 1977, the leaders of the PTCA announced that they were formally 
withdrawing the demand for Udayachal, sowing the seeds of resentment among Bodos (Ibid., 
p. 136) 
 
On 14 April 1977, according to Basumatary, the youth wing of the PTCA was dissolved, and 
over the next few years, resentment began to build among the Bodos in the PTCA, who 
increasingly saw it as an ineffective organisation to address the demands of Plains Tribals. 
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The All Bodo Students Union (ABSU, which like the PTCA, was also formed in 1967), 
which had thus far supported the PTCA, decided in its annual conference of 1986 to agitate 
under its own umbrella, beginning a movement for autonomy for the Bodos in 1987. This 
coincided with the disaffection of Bodo leadership with its role in the Assam movement, the 
second major factor to affect a new form of Bodo politics. It has been argued that the 
movement represented the thwarting of potential plural political identities in the region, as a 
pan-tribal formation (the PTCA) was replaced with the demand for an ethnic homeland for 
the Bodos (Barbora 2015), although others have pointed out that the movement for 
Udayachal, while occasionally incorporating other tribal groups, still did so largely under a 
Bodo middle-class leadership (Misra 1989).  
 
Though the Assam movement of the 1980s was successful in getting the Indian state’s 
attention, it was not without its internal disputes. While the Assam movement emphasised a 
distinct Assamese identity, it perhaps failed to take into account the diverse ethnic groups that 
comprised this composite identity. The perceived dominance of ethnic Assamese Hindu 
identity became a contributing factor in the rise of the Bodoland movement of the late 1980s, 
an agitation that mirrored many of the tactics and symbolic gestures of the Assam movement, 
but sought to assert Bodo identity (Baruah 1999). The indigenous Bodos wanted autonomy 
from an Assamese Hindu hegemony which they alleged had subsumed tribal identity in the 
Assam movement, as well as denied them access to resources such as land, educational 
opportunities and political representation. Led by the All Bodo Students Union, the 
movement for separate statehood of Bodoland built both on the previous demands for Plains 
Tribal recognition and autonomy, and a growing distance from the Assam movement. Yet, 
the presence of other ethnic groups in the Bodoland area, such as Bengali and Assamese 
Muslims, Adivasis or tea tribes, Koch Rajbongshis, Nepalis and Bengali Hindus, complicates 
the notion of Bodo identity being defined territorially, through Bodoland.  
 
In 1993, the central government struck an interim agreement with the All Bodo Students 
Union, and the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) was created. The agreement fell 
through, however, and gave rise, in the 1990s, to insurgent groups like the Bodoland 
Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF), the Bodoland Army, and later the National Democratic Front 
of Bodoland (NDFB), all of which violently campaigned for a separate state, Bodoland 
(Misra 2012). This led to violence and chaos in the form of bomb blasts, general strikes, 
extortion, but also civil disobedience from by then more moderate groups like the All Bodo 
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Students Union. Insurgent outfits also targeted ethnic groups like the Adivasis in 1996, and 
Bengali Muslims in 1993, 1994, 1998, and 2008, episodes that are remembered by these 
groups as significant markers in their history in the BTAD (Misra 2012, Goswami 2014).  
 
Finally, in 2003, the central government signed the Bodo Accord with the Bodo Liberation 
Tigers (BLT).18 This led to the creation of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), which 
does not provide statehood, but a degree of autonomy to the Bodos to govern the BTAD, 
comprised of the four districts of Kokrajhar, Chirang, Udalguri and Baksa (the latter three 
having been newly carved out). The Council consists of 46 seats in total, 40 members of 
which are elected, and 6 are nominated by the ruling party. Of the 40 elected seats, 30 are 
reserved for Scheduled Tribes, which in the BTAD effectively means Bodos. The Territorial 
Council model is not without its critics, who see it as a way for the state to diffuse tribal 
dissent without granting real autonomy (Barbora 2008, 2015), and for minority groups within 
these structures to become “entrapped” by its ethno-centric policies (Vandekerckhove and 
Suykens 2008). Tensions have always existed between Bodos, who constitute only about 30 
percent of the population, and other groups like the Muslims (20 percent) and Adivasis (not 
disaggregated in the Census) (Census of India 2011, Table C-01, Table A-11), who are also 
present in large numbers. The question of who belongs in the BTAD is persistent, particularly 
as non-Bodo groups resent the inadequate political representation the BTC provides them, 
while Bodos continue to feel outnumbered and unable to protect the resources and 
development opportunities they have struggled for over many decades. 
 
Since the signing of the Accord, the transition has been anything but smooth. The first 
elections for the Bodoland Territorial Council, held in 2005, were marked by violent clashes, 
as Bodo political leadership was split between the Bodoland Political Front (BPF, led by ex-
militants from the BLT), and the Bodoland Progressive Political Front (BPPF) led by a 
former student leader (Saikia 2015). As Mainao Basumatary, a former movement leader who 
now lives locally near Uzanpara says, the split occurred just before the first election, as the 
BLT leader, Hagrama Mohilary, took the decision fearing the BLT would be sidelined by the 
more intellectual and established ABSU leaders. Those first elections, he concedes, were held 
largely at gunpoint, with the BLT using its sizeable leftover ammunition from the movement. 
So far, each subsequent Council election has returned the BPF to power, though in 2015 this 
                                                
18 Full text of the Accord in Appendix A. 
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was with an extremely narrow majority. Elections, whether at the Council, state or national 
level, have also proved a source of tension and conflict, as well as represented an arena where 
inter- and intra-ethnic cleavages were played out. 
 
Despite the creation of the the BTAD, the movement for a separate state of Bodoland 
continues, still led primarily by the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), reflecting the 
continuing disaffection of many Bodos with the solution. The demand experiences ebbs and 
flows but remains persistent, with ABSU leadership occasionally meeting with state and 
central governments on the issue, and organising protests and strikes on a regular basis in the 
BTAD. The movement adds another layer of uncertainty to BTAD’s non-Bodo inhabitants, 
who question their place and rights they would have in a prospective Bodoland. According to 
Mainao’s account, the agreement signed between the BLT and the central government in 
2003 was underwritten by the support of many non-Bodo organisations, all of whom 
submitted written pledges confirming they had no objection the creation of an autonomous 
council. As many Muslim respondents in interviews and informal conversations repeated, 
they too felt betrayed by the BTC solution, which many supported during the Bodoland 
agitation, although they resent that their support was made invisible by the ethno-political 
character of the movement. Despite their support to the movement, in which they were 
assured of their place in a future Bodoland, many feel inadequately represented in the new 
formation. 
 
Such questions are answered in ambiguous terms by the movement’s leadership. For 
instance, the president of the ABSU, Pramod Boro simply says, “we want them to be part of a 
future Bodoland, we have reached out to other community leaders”, but does not specifically 
address the concerns.19 Other, local-level leaders are also savvy about the geopolitical 
importance of the Northeast, and in one Kokrajhar rally, local leader Hemon threatened a 
renewal of violent measures, the blowing up of bridges, and occupation of the strip of land 
that connects the Northeast to the rest of India.20 Instead, he said, the Bodos will support the 
Chinese (even though he later acknowledged in private that this was more rhetoric than 
policy). 
 
                                                
19 Interviewed in January 2014, in Chirang district, BTAD. 
20 Kokrajhar is geographically located at the most strategic point of this strip, literally forming a “gateway” to 
the region. 
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It is important to emphasise the enduring role of the state in shaping ethnic conflict in what is 
seen as one of the most volatile areas of the region. Administrative practices and laws 
themselves emerged as tools of conflict management on the part of the state, with poor results 
(Deka 2017). The Sixth Schedule, in particular, is a problematic framework within which 
conflicts such as Bodoland have been managed (this is explored further in the next chapter). 
It has also been argued that while these factors cannot be underplayed, other issues, such as 
of agrarian change, rural impoverishment, and the impact of large-scale engineering projects 
in flood-prone areas have also contributed, with many of these tensions being factors in 
ethnic conflict (Barbora 2017). 
 
4.6 Conclusion: Contextualising my approach 
 
These multiple framings of the Northeast in general, and Bodoland in particular, are 
important in my own contextualising of the PhD project. Like many others studying the 
region, I also begin with looking at how colonial era administrative categories defined 
communities, and how these categories have strong links to the politicised ethnicities of 
today. Much of this is well documented, and I scrutinise the literature most closely connected 
with the Bodoland area. In this, I look at the inhabitants of the frontier in Assam and the 
Northeast, and groups that were included and left out of this imagination. Following that, I 
examine the historical trajectory that brought Bodoland to the point it is at today — the 
political developments that frame its current context. In doing so, I also explore the more 
fluid nature of identity, especially in the interactions of local politics. 
 
Violence and conflict in Bodoland are well documented and commented upon. Instead, in this 
thesis, I shift the gaze to everyday politics, and the daily negotiations of political identities, 
laws and regulations, election campaigns, all of which speak to broader ideas of belonging 
and citizenship. These draw both from recent feminist and postcolonial turns in political 
geography, and equally, from new approaches in the study of Northeast India, with closer 
attention being paid to the minutiae of everyday life. I attempt to step away from the meta-
narrative about causes of violence and genesis of conflict (which are important in 
themselves), instead looking at local politics which are sometimes divorced from these 
narratives, and sometimes co-opt or are co-opted by them. The themes in Northeast Indian 
studies explored here engage the nature of Northeast Indian citizenship, and the status of 
	   98	  
Northeast Indian Muslims, in particular. I explore some of the newer themes alluded to 
above; the place of the “Northeastern” subject in the wider field of Indian politics (and how 
political actors locate themselves in the project of Indian nationalism); the tensions between 
autonomy and representative politics; the persistent paradoxical position of Muslims in the 
imaginary of a tribal homeland; and the many contradictions that play out in everyday 
politics when the political rhetoric is stripped away.   
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Map 4.1: The Indian Empire, 1892. Assam, Bengal and Manipur are highlighted. Until 1873, 
Assam was governed under the Bengal Presidency, but became a separate province from 
1874–1906. 
Courtesy: Philip Stickler, Department of Geography, University of Cambridge. 
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Map 4.2: Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1908. Between 1906–1912, Assam and 
Eastern Bengal were administered together as a single province. 
Courtesy: Philip Stickler, Department of Geography, University of Cambridge. 
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Map 4.3: Assam provinces in 1936. The new administrative unit separated Assam  
from Bengal, retaining the Bengali-dominated district of Sylhet. 
Courtesy: Philip Stickler, Department of Geography, University of Cambridge. 
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Map 4.4: Current state boundaries in Northeast India. The state of Assam as in 1947 
contained the present states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. 
Courtesy: Philip Stickler, Department of Geography, University of Cambridge. 
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CHAPTER 5. TERRITORIALISED BELONGING: PLACE AND IDENTITY IN 
BODOLAND 
 
“To say that these tribesmen will be inimical … if this Sixth Schedule is introduced in these 
areas is rather surprising.”  
- Rev. J. J. M. Nichols-Roy, Constituent Assembly Debates, 1949 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Both in the early agitation of the Plains Tribals post India’s independence, and through the 
Bodoland movement in the 1980s and 1990s, territory has formed the moral and material 
basis on which autonomy and justice for Bodos has been sought, with land rights emerging as 
an important variable on which ideas of the movement are articulated. In parallel, land has 
also been the foremost tool of exclusion — by the state against tribal groups like the Bodos, 
and by both against non-tribal “outsiders” like Bengali Muslims. Territorial claims have been 
claims to power, and also rallying cries for more equal access to resources.  
 
Across the world, indigenous claims have been framed and understood through the lens of 
territorial and place-based claims (Castree 2004, Erazo 2013), often with claims of 
indigenous sovereignty being in opposition to the sovereignty of the nation state (Rifkin 
2009, Mountz 2013), though in other instances, such as Bolivia, becoming synonymous with 
it (Postero 2007, 2013). Other terms, like autochthonous, have also been used to describe 
territorialised identities (Geschiere 2011). In recent years, a greater understanding of the term 
indigeneity as de-linked from historic territories, and dispersed across urban centres and 
diasporas has also emerged in scholarship (Radcliffe 2017, Harris 2018).  
 
While notions of autochthonous, “born from the soil” identities are traced as far back as to 
Athens in the 5th century BC, historians have expressed doubts about the static nature of 
Athenians, arguing that history has always implied movement (Geschiere 2011). Instead, it is 
likely that the term autochthonous emerged in response to Athens’ success in attracting 
immigrants in large numbers, and the need for existing Athenians to deny the newcomers 
citizenship (Ibid., p. 328). Geschiere argues that increasing globalisation has seen renewed 
claims of autochthony in different parts of the world, although it is important to view this not 
just as a manipulative political tactic, but also drawing on deep emotional involvement (Ibid., 
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p. 335). Later in this chapter, a similar argument by Vandekerckhove (2009) regarding 
powerfully territorialised identities in Bodoland is examined. The historicity of indigenous 
tribes is also one of layered tales of migration — many of the so-called “Mongoloid” 
ancestors of the tribes of Northeast India are said to have migrated anywhere between 1000 
BC (making them as “native” as Aryan migrants in the west of the country) and the first 
century BC (Choudhury 2007, p. 10), to as recently as the 16th century in some parts of the 
Northeast (Xaxa 1999, p. 3592). Movement and migration have been constants in the history 
of Northeast India. As historians of the region have documented, over time, and following the 
colonial encounter in particular, fluidity and exchange gave way to more rigidly 
territorialised ethnic identities (Baruah 1999, Sharma 2011). 
 
In the following chapter, I look first at the historical trajectory of territoriality as central to the 
imagination of an ethnic homeland for indigenous Bodos — from its earliest iterations to its 
present form. This section looks at particular administrative arrangements, like the Sixth 
Schedule, which fused the idea of territory with justice for ethnic groups, building on older 
systems of territorial management. I also examine how these ideas are instrumentalised in the 
case of Bodoland in particular. In the next section, I consider how these ideas are 
operationalised through land regulations in particular, and how local practices respond to 
them, creating their own ideas of territory and authority.  
 
5.2 Autonomy, territory and the Indian state 
 
A sense of territory has been integral to Northeast Indian identity — Sanjib Baruah describes 
it as being primarily “landlocked” (Baruah 2004, p. 4), and being caught in a “territorial trap” 
because of its status as a border region (Ibid., p. 3). This has been attributed at least partially 
to territorial strategies of containment and management of its tribal citizens, who form a large 
section of its inhabitants, and in many areas, are in a majority. The roots of these territorial 
strategies are in colonial practices of drawing boundaries between previously integrated 
regions, creating areas of exclusion and inclusion. Regions with large populations, 
particularly “hill tribes” (present day Nagaland and Mizoram, for instance) were cordoned 
off, and allowed to govern themselves. Regions in the plains, including the areas inhabited by 
plains tribes were integrated into the system of colonial governance. Such measures were 
achieved with the help of multiple regulations designed to carve out territories of inclusion 
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and exclusion — the Inner Line Regulations of 1873, Backward Tracts Act of 1919, and the 
Partially Excluded and Excluded Areas Act of 1936 (Hausing 2007, Barbora 2008).  
 
The asymmetrical federalism (Tillin 2007) that characterises autonomy arrangements in 
Northeast India serves as a tool of internal conflict management, but also serves another 
important function — as a means of securing territorial integrity (Puri 1998, p. 20). 
Territorial management of ethnic claims in the Northeast, and in particular in areas of tribal 
majority, has served to make territory an important variable of politics in the region. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, many federal arrangements in this region, particularly the creation of 
new states in the Northeast in the late 1960s and early 1970s, were part of this strategy of 
territorial containment. In addition, autonomy arrangements, organised under the Sixth 
Schedule of the Indian Constitution, also created a system of granting a degree of autonomy 
to the dominant tribal group within a specific area.  
 
Such laws and regulations serve to reify the “natural” or “instinctive” nature of territory, 
which often forms the unwritten basis for many conceptualisations of society and space, as 
even some scientific disciplines like biology might have us believe (Sack 1986, p. 1). 
Territory emerges as a spatial strategy, a way of controlling resources and people, by 
controlling physical space (Ibid.). Strategies that reinforce ideas of territory include practices 
like cartography, the enforcement of land rights, and references to cultural and social norms, 
among others. The most familiar forms of territoriality, according to Sack, are political 
territory and private ownership of land, both of which I explore in this chapter.  
 
As Paasi (2003a) and others have theorised, territory is a social process rather than a fixed 
entity, and is actively contested and negotiated. Creating and maintaining territory requires 
effort, and boundaries or demarcation have emerged as the most effective means of achieving 
this (Sack 1983). Boundaries allow for control of access — to people, things and resources. 
Moreover, the communication of these boundaries, that constitute an effective demarcation of 
territory, involves everyday interactions with actors like politicians, the police, etc., who 
communicate these boundaries at different spatial scales, as well as through symbols (like 
flags, or coats of arms), and social practices (Paasi 2003a). Territories may be social 
constructs but are often conventionally understood as “natural”, and as a result, also evoke 
emotional responses and a sense of attachment for people. This emotional power is then 
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reinforced through symbols, but also memories and myths about the territory itself (Penrose 
2002).  
 
Complicating the notions of territory and political authority are important in helping us 
understand how they have formed the basis of Bodoland’s ideas of belonging and citizenship. 
Territorialised notions of identity, and their links to the state’s own interpretation of territory, 
have been at the core of many political developments in the region. Land, as the most 
affective dimension of this territorial expression of and demand for recognition, has formed 
the narrative thread across decades of political contest.  
 
5.2.1 Sixth Schedule  
 
Autonomy arrangements in Bodoland are administered under the Sixth Schedule of India’s 
constitution, which applies specifically to autonomous arrangements in India’s Northeast and 
its various indigenous groups.21 The genesis of this lies in the Constituent Assembly Debates’ 
“North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-Committee”,22 informally 
known as the “Bordoloi Sub-Committee” after its chairman, Gopinath Bordoloi, then Premier 
of Assam. The goal of the sub-committee was ostensibly to determine the administration of 
colonial-era tribal and excluded areas, and reconcile their demands for autonomy with the 
new Indian union. The report of this sub-committee and the provisions to be enacted under 
the Sixth Schedule were much debated in the Constituent Assembly, with the dominant 
perspectives in the debate being development (and whether demands for autonomy could be 
satisfied by economic development instead) and security (the overarching importance of the 
impacts of autonomy in “frontier” regions on national security) (Hausing 2007, p. 6).  
 
Vehement opposition to the Sixth Schedule when it was first drafted came from several 
quarters, including Assam’s Kuladhar Chaliha, who opposed the provision as being “been 
framed from a wrong background, that the Tribes think that we are their enemies. The British 
gave them this idea” (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949b, 159.22) and further went on to 
say the Schedule was an “old separatist tendency and you want to keep them away from us. 
You will thus be creating a Tribalstan just as you have created a Pakistan” (Constituent 
                                                
21 See Appendix C. 
22 At the time of these debates, “Assam” included most of the now tribal-majority states of Northeast India. 
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Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.11). Another member, Rohini Kumar Choudhury, worried that 
autonomous districts were a way to prevent the assimilation of tribals, and keep them 
“perpetually away from non-tribals” (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.53). Among 
his worries, however, was the threat that autonomous districts posed to the privileges of non-
tribals in Assam 
 
“I living in Shillong cannot purchase property from any Khasi [the tribal group that 
forms a majority in Shillong] except with the permission of the Chief of the State or 
with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. I have no right to purchase any 
property in the tribal areas. … If this Constitution is adopted, those disabilities still 
continue.” (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.50) 
 
Others who were sympathetic to tribal communities, like Rev. J. J. M. Nichols-Roy (who also 
served on the Bordoloi sub-committee) strongly supported the provision, stating it would be 
“charming if these autonomous districts are nurtured to develop themselves in their own 
way” (Constituent Assembly Debates 1948, 51.134). He objected that  
 
“To say that these tribesmen will be inimical or they would raid Assam or go over to 
Tibet if this Sixth Schedule is introduced in these areas is rather surprising. This idea 
is based on wrong understanding of facts … the laws and regulations to be made by 
the District Councils are subject to the control and assent of the Governor of Assam. 
What is more unifying than that?” (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.82)  
 
Similar optimism was expressed by the others like Jaipal Singh, who appealed to other 
members to be “generous in what they say about the tribal people … They seem to think that 
they are going to get out of India and join Burma or join the communists or something like 
that.” Instead he saw in the Sixth Schedule an opportunity to “unite Assam, which has in the 
past been kept in water-tight compartments.” (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.62)  
  
Some approaches, like Bordoloi’s, were more pragmatic in their reasoning, stressing that 
during the rule of the British government,  
 
“the then rulers and officers developed in the minds of these tribal people a sense of 
separation and isolation and gave them assurances that at the end of the war they will 
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be independent States managing their affairs in their own way. … You might possibly 
have read in the papers that plans were hatched in England in which the ex- 
Governors of Assam evidently took part, to create a sort of a Kingdom over there.” 
(Constituent Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.31) 
 
Given these circumstances, Bordoloi stressed that ideas of isolation had been long built in to 
the administration of excluded areas, and so the question was simple:  
 
“… whether for the purpose of integration the methods of force, the methods of the 
use of the Assam Rifles and the military forces, should be used, or a method should 
be used in which the willing co-operation of these people could be obtained for the 
purpose of governing these areas.” (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.32) 
 
For Bordoloi, the question of integration became the primary lens from which autonomy 
(which he saw as already entrenched through colonial systems of territorial management) 
needed to be approached. He was joined in this view by the Constitution’s chief architect, Dr 
B. R. Ambedkar, who contrasted the position of tribals in Assam with those in other parts of 
India, stressing they have “not adopted, mainly or in a large part, either the modes or the 
manners of the Hindus who surround them” (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.105). 
He compared their situation to those of Native Americans in the USA instead 
 
“the position of the tribals of Assam … is somewhat analogous to the position of the 
Red Indians [sic] in the United States as against the white emigrants there. Now, what 
did the United States do with regard to the Red Indians? So far as I am aware, what 
they did was to create what are called Reservations of Boundaries within which the 
Red Indians lived. They are a republic by themselves. No doubt, by the law of the 
United States they are citizens of the United States. But that is only a nominal 
allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. Factually they are a separate, 
independent people.” (Ibid.)  
 
Ambedkar stressed to the more sceptical members of the Constituent Assembly that while the 
situations were analogous, the solutions proposed in the Indian Constitution were different, 
retaining overall control of the Indian state 
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“we have provided that the executive authority of the Government of Assam shall 
extend not merely to non-tribal areas in Assam but also to the tribal areas, that is to 
say, the executive authority of the Assam Government will be exercised even in those 
areas which are covered by the autonomous districts. … They are not immune from 
the authority of Parliament in the matter of law-making, nor are they immune … from 
the jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court. This, I submit, is one binding 
influence.” (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949a, 133.107) 
 
In Ambedkar’s reassurances, as well as Bordoloi’s propositions, the key to the continuing 
territorial strategies of management in the Sixth Schedule was the territorial outcome: the 
territorial integrity of the Indian union. Chaliha’s panic about Tribalstan betrays a distinctly 
territorial anxiety, evident in his comparison of the Sixth Schedule to the breaking away of 
Pakistan, and thus the disintegration of Indian territory at the moment of independence, 
which also became the moment of the partitioning of territory.  
 
The Sixth Schedule was originally designed to accommodate the autonomy arrangements of 
hill tribes, meanwhile Plains Tribes like the Bodos were considered, in the words of the 
committee’s chairman, to have been “gradually absorbed into the folds and the culture of 
other plains people, to put more appropriately the Aryan culture” (Constituent Assembly 
Debates 1949a, 133.28). Nonetheless, Bodo demands for autonomy were accommodated 
under the same constitutional provision that had once deemed them too assimilated to need 
further protection. The Sixth Schedule was amended in 2003 to include the Bodoland 
Territorial Council as the newest autonomous arrangement to be regulated by the provision, 
complete with a total of 39 subject areas in which the Council would have the power to make 
laws, including land.  
 
In the decades since the Sixth Schedule was officially made part of the Constitution, and 
various tribal areas were brought under its remit, several flaws of its design and 
implementation have been pointed out. It is seen as perpetuating an “entrenched tradition of 
isolation”, as well as privileging paternalistic solutions where tribals emerge as Others who 
must be governed in a hierarchical manner by the state (Hausing 2007). The degrees of 
autonomy under the Sixth Schedule have also often been critiqued — many see these 
arrangements as lacking teeth and failing to provide genuine autonomy (Barbora 2008), 
especially as the passage of laws at the autonomous council level still requires the approval of 
	   111	  
Governor of the state, or the state government, to be implemented. The many bills in the 
Bodoland Council Assembly that have yet to be approved by the Governor, and therefore yet 
to take effect, are a testament to this point. It has also been argued that such arrangements 
eventually lead to the “entrapment” of the non-indigenous groups that inhabit these areas 
(Vandekerckhove and Suykens 2008). In the case of Bodoland, a group that is 
demographically in a minority was empowered, creating tensions with other, non-tribal 
groups, with territorial solutions exacerbating ethnic tensions instead of containing them 
(Bhattacharyya et al. 2017).  
 
Citing Bodoland specifically, Deka (2017) sees the autonomous council as a means of 
“political management”, suppressing dissent through distributing power and financial 
resources to some political leaders, and minimising the threat to the nation state (p. 186). 
Financial management in Autonomous District Councils remains “opaque”, with no clear 
system of fund distribution from the system, little external scrutiny, as well as the presence of 
state governments as an intermediary, which often disrupts the flow of money (Hausing, 
2007). While autonomous bodies are empowered to generate their own resources under the 
Sixth Schedule, they have largely failed to do so (Ibid.)  
 
5.3 Territorial claims in Bodoland 
 
In a vein similar to geographers writing about the discipline, Benbabaali (2018) contends that 
territoriality is under-theorised in studies about South Asian power (in her case, with 
reference to caste), where it is referred to in simplistic terms to contextualise a study, but not 
an analytical concept. The conceptual link between territory and India’s tribal communities, 
however, has been made far more explicit in government language. Keeping “primitives” 
bound to their “botanical space” and separating the “ungovernable” (tribal) hills separate 
from the plains was colonial state policy since the British began administering Assam in the 
1870s (Vandekerckhove 2009). This practice was carried over into post-independence India, 
where the creation of Scheduled Areas, and the policy of protectionism towards tribal groups 
continued to be understood along place-based lines. In 1952, a report written by an Assam 
Civil Services Officer from the North Cachar Hills places “geographical position” as the first 
“cause of backwardness” for tribal communities in Northeast India (Assam State Archives 
1952b). That they lived in “high hills amidst dark forests” prevented them from having 
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contact with “the more advanced people of the plains”. Even though the document cites the 
British policy of segregation between hills and plains as the cause of this backwardness, it 
nonetheless reinforces this causal link between geography and progress.  
 
A strand of literature about the “deterritorialisation” of the world suggests that the 
acceleration of global flows towards the end of the 20th century has meant that identity is 
increasingly less linked to territory in the era of globalisation. Appadurai cites the increasing 
influence of imagination, and decreasing relevance of territory in the formation of social and 
cultural identities, such as those of the diaspora (Appadurai 1990, 1996). These lead to new 
forms of fundamentalism, with identities becoming reified along dimensions like religion and 
ethnicity. Elden (2005) suggests that this falsely underplays the importance of territory in the 
contemporary world. Instead, it is important to think anew about what territory means as it is 
reshaped by globalisation, instead of taking it as a given. Vandekerckhove (2009) has 
specifically questioned the relevance of this approach in understanding the emergence and 
persistence of Bodo identity, arguing that it arises not from deterritorialisation, but from “too 
powerfully territorialised (ethnic) identities.” These identities coalesce around affirmation of 
“natural, geo-cultural links” (Ibid.) between ethnic groups (like the Bodos) and territory, 
drawing from aforementioned colonial notions of tying ethnicity to place.  
 
5.3.1 Territorial anxieties 
 
If identities are symbolically representative of territories, as Vandekerckhove asserts in 
Bodoland’s case, then land is the material element that furthers the social construct of 
territory (Paasi 2003). Soon after Indian independence in 1947, Plains Tribal groups (with 
Bodos being the largest group comprising this coalition) began to express worry, in both 
official correspondences, as well as through protest moves such as election boycotts (see 
Chapter 4), about their control over their own lands and resources. This was at least partially 
motivated by being left out of the remit of the Sixth Schedule, what former MP S.K. 
Basumatary terms “the first betrayal”. These protests were geared towards the ultimate goal 
of an ethnic homeland — first in the form of Udayachal, a separate territory for Plains Tribal 
groups, and after a political split in the 1980s, in the form of the demand for Bodoland.  
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From as early as 1952, even before they had coalesced into any formal organisations, Plains 
Tribal groups were writing memorandums to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru about giving 
first preference to Scheduled Tribes for land settlement, particularly given “the influx of 
refugees in our state” (Assam State Archives 1952c, p. 2). The Tribal Sangha, a pan-tribal 
organisation in Assam wrote to the Chief Minister of Assam in 1957 to “protect the tribal 
peoples of plains Assam” (Assam State Archives 1958, p. 1). The creation of Tribal Belts and 
Blocks, said the letter, contained many loopholes, allowing non-tribals to obtain land 
settlements in these areas, while “land hungry people coming from outside the state” were 
buying up land before the “ignorant tribal people could learn” (Ibid., p. 3). In 1965, the Tribal 
Sangha’s district unit in Kokrajhar expressed alarm at the government’s decision to 
“alienate” 4,037 bighas23 of cultivable land from a Tribal Block, and use it to accommodate 
refugees from East Pakistan (Choudhury 2007, p. 106).  
 
Alarm over incoming refugees was stated in no uncertain terms — a response to a question in 
the Lok Sabha24 in 1961 on conducting a census of Muslim immigrants in Assam states  
 
“The Bengali immigrants censused [sic] for the first time on the char lands of 
Goalpara in 1911 were merely the advance guard — or rather the scouts — of a huge 
army following closely at their heels.” (Assam State Archives 1962, p. 13) 
 
The same document goes on to make clear that land encroachment was the primary threat 
posed by the immigrants 
 
“While the annual patta [title] lands in Assam are non-transferable… the Muslim 
immigrants used to buy such lands irrespective of the fact whether the title is valid or 
not. But once they are in possession, I have never seen them being dispossessed of 
what they have and hold. … even the lands of the indigenous people are slowly 
passing into their hands.” (Ibid., pp. 14–15) 
 
A little over a decade later, the Plains Tribal Council of Assam wrote to the Assam Pradesh 
Congress Committee consolidating these grievances into a demand for a “fully autonomous 
                                                
23 In Assam, 1 bigha = 1,340 square metres. 
24 Lower house of the Indian parliament. 
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plains tribal region” under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution (Nehru Memorial Museum 
and Library 1969b, p. 17). This territorial framing of a resolution for Plains Tribal issues, in 
the form of a demand for an autonomous region of Udayachal, drew from the region’s ethno-
territorial colonial legacy, and formed a pre-cursor to the Bodoland movement, which would 
go on to do the same. Opposition to the idea from non-tribal groups also originated in the 
same period,25 and continues until today. 
 
For the Plains Tribal groups and subsequent Bodoland movement, the injustice was not the 
existence of the Sixth Schedule and the rigid connections of protectionism and place — it 
was that the plains tribals and Bodos were not included under its remit. S.K. Basumatary lists 
this as another “betrayal” suffered by the Bodos. The most unjust move, according to him, 
was the failure of the Simon Commission in 1930 when it came to Assam. The Plains Tribals, 
led by Kalicharan Brahma, submitted a memorandum requesting a separate administrative 
unit outside Assam for the administration of Plains Tribals, but this was not to be. The next 
betrayal, says Basumatary, was at the Constituent Assembly Debates, when the Sixth 
Schedule was being framed, and Assamese leader Gopinath Bordoloi left the Bodos outside 
of its jurisdiction. He does not mince words in describing this,  
 
“With a single sentence, Plains Tribals were merged with Assamese society, and told 
there was no need for a special status. It was diabolical, brutal and deadly. Just 
because some tribals, maybe Bodos in Upper Assam, had given up Bodo language 
and dress because they were in a minority.” 
 
In choosing to recognise some groups as connected to place, the British administration chose 
to de-root, or de-legitimise the presence of others (Vandekerckhove 2009). Much of how the 
Bodoland movement expressed Bodo identity drew from these territorial ideas about identity. 
“Divide Assam 50-50” is among the most popular slogans employed by the statehood 
movement until today, graffitied across public walls across the region, accompanied with an 
imagined territory represented through a proposed map of Bodoland state. Lund (2006) sees 
graffiti itself as a territorial marker of identity, while scholars of territoriality cite cartography 
as one of the earliest and most effective practices in delimiting territories.  
                                                
25 A letter written by a Koch Rajbongshi organisation in 1968 opposed the idea of an autonomous Plains Tribal 
area, and instead suggested abolishing all protections for plains tribals, claiming they were “no longer backward 
and capable of taking care of themselves” (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library 1969b, p. 13). 
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Territorialised expressions of identity among Bodos (also reflected in many narratives of 
tribal identities across India), and the emphasis on ethno-botanical links create ideas of 
belonging that also create simultaneous categories of exclusion. As Bodos become “natural” 
inhabitants of the land, non-tribals — and among them especially Muslims — are excluded 
from this imagination. For many Bodo representatives, like politicians and leaders of the 
continuing movement for statehood, the historical injustice done to the Bodos continues to be 
expressed in territorial terms, and importantly, in terms of being separated from land as a 
resource and as a tether of identity. While the movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
conceptualised this as agitation against Assamese domination, it has increasingly also joined 
chorus with Assam’s wider “anti-foreigner” agitation.  
 
The final resolution to the “Bodo problem” came with the creation of the curiously (and 
uniquely) named Bodoland Territorial Council. It is unclear why the term “territorial” council 
was chosen over autonomous council. This could either have been to separate it from its 
failed 1993 counterpart, or in fact to signal its uniqueness within the Sixth Schedule and set it 
apart from other autonomy arrangements. The resolution in 2003 did contain the insurgency 
to a great extent, but questions lingered about the impact of migration on land alienation 
among the Bodos. 
 
A top leader of the Bodoland Liberation Tigers, and now Deputy Chief of the Bodoland 
Council, Kampa Borgoyary, claims Bangladeshis were  
 
“imported” to the region in 1950 and 1971 [when Bangladesh was created], and our 
people were driven off the land. In fact, as far back as 1905, when Bengal was 
partitioned, the British wanted to make Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon [neighbouring district] 
all part of East Bengal, but because of Bodo leaders who fought back, it remained part 
of India. But to weaken us, we were divided and our land given to Bengal”.  
 
This process continues in what he sees as a constant flow of migrants from Bangladesh, who 
take shelter in Bodo villages. Shivram, who heads the local BJP unit in Kokrajhar, also 
echoes this sentiment, and gives it a further, divisive twist 
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“The Uzanpara area is beautiful, but there are too many Muslim migrants. Only 10 or 
12 of them have pattas [titles]. Environment NGOs should look at this, they are 
destroying forests. They are all on khas26 land there — maybe a few Bodos are 
encroachers as well, but it’s mainly the Muslims. They all have land in the char areas, 
why don’t they go back there?” 
 
The history of Muslim migration into Uzanpara is thus intimately tied up with questions of 
land and territory. Noorul, an elderly resident in Uzanpara, arrived with his family in 1979, 
and remembers only 5 or 6 Muslim houses in Uzanpara at the time. Like many others in the 
village, he migrated from the char areas adjoining the Brahmaputra river, which frequently 
get flooded in the monsoon as the river swells. He is descended from the early Charua 
Musalmans, Muslims from East Bengal who were settled in the low-lying char areas by the 
British administration in the early 1900s, to cultivate lands that local populations were 
reluctant to settle on. These settlers provided a source of cheap labour, engaging primarily in 
jute cultivation. They did not come into conflict with other Assamese groups until they 
started to move away from char areas in search of better lands, from the 1920s onwards 
(Sharma 2011, pp. 99–104).  
 
Many of these settlers from the Brahmaputra valley, like Noorul, travelled towards the 
forested areas of Uzanpara in the 1970s and 1980s, where they began to settle down and 
practice agriculture. This movement preceded the Bodoland agitation and creation of the 
BTC, and stories abound in the villages of district officials helping to find plots of land for 
the families, and clearing forested area to accommodate them. Before 1985, according to 
Noorul, you could buy land from local Bodos and register it and possess a land title, but after 
that date (likely coinciding with the creation of the tribal block in this area), this was no 
longer possible.  
 
Following the Assam movement and the Bodoland agitation, official hostility towards 
Muslims (especially Bengali-speaking ones) particularly expressed itself in terms of 
appropriation of territorial resources — such as land and forests. Milan Boro, a senior forest 
official in Kokrajhar district, while admiring Bengali Muslim cultivation skills (“they are 
very good agriculturalists”), nonetheless points to their immigration (although he specifies 
                                                
26 Government-owned public land. 
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this means from the char areas, not Bangladesh) and subsequent encroaching of forest land 
for paddy as being responsible for the destruction of the forest and surrounding water bodies 
in Uzanpara. During assembly hearings in the Bodoland Council, he admits that when the 
department is questioned about its annual survey detailing how much forest land has been 
encroached, they are also asked what language the encroachers speak, and what religion they 
belong to.  
 
This mistrust of Muslims also percolates into everyday relationships between Bodos and 
Muslims in Uzanpara, although they are more complex and cannot be categorised as simple 
reproductions of the official narrative (as the next two chapters will go on to show in more 
depth). During a government drive to appoint new gaon boora (headman) in the BTAD, 
Nerswn, an existing gaon boora in a hamlet of Uzanpara claimed that in a mixed village of 
Bodos and Muslims, the government would never nominate a Muslim gaon boora, “because 
part of the gaon boora’s responsibility is to assist the Circle Officer and mandal with issues 
of land settlements, I don’t think they would trust a Muslim with handling land pattas”.  
 
For postcolonial societies in particular, land rights and citizenship are connected. Belonging 
is defined through social identity, which is partly determined by land rights, and in turn, 
claims to land are also dependent on social identity (Lund 2011). Rules about land 
ownership, which are elaborated in the following section, also go a long way in firming up 
the link between these categories, emphasising Vandekerckhove’s “ethno-botanical” link. 
While the original set of land regulations in Assam were meant to further commercial 
interests in tea estates and extraction of forest resources by the colonial administration, 
leading to an “entrapment” of the tribal communities that relied on the land, the current set of 
regulations in the Bodoland Territorial Council has an “entrapment” effect on the non-tribal 
communities living there (Vandekerckhove and Suykens 2008). 
 
5.4 Land as a marker of identity 
 
In 1953, writing about the difficulties of Assamese Muslims in securing Indo-Pakistan 
passports27 to facilitate visits across the border to East Pakistan, Assam Pradesh Congress 
                                                
27 These passports, issued for a brief period after the partition of India and Pakistan, were meant to facilitate 
travel for residents who lived in borderlands, and had family and/or property claims on the other side of the 
border (Ministry of External Affairs 2019). 
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Committee Member Alaur Rahman wrote to the organisation’s president, complaining about 
too much insistence being placed on ownership of landed property, which should not form 
the basis of citizenship (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library 1955, p. 83). Nonetheless, 
land has emerged as a crucial determinant of belonging, as well as the sometimes violent 
conflicts that have occurred between different ethnic groups in the region (Vandekerckhove 
2010). In this process, tensions exist between a complex network of laws that seek to regulate 
land ownership and transfer, and the everyday practices that interpret these regulations in 
accordance with local realities, and subtler power dynamics not captured in the law.  
 
5.4.1 Laws to govern land  
 
As Vandenhelsken and Karlsson (2016, p. 332) observe, in Northeast India the key resource 
struggle relates to land, and ethnic membership determines whether a person is eligible to 
own it. The overarching law that governs land transfers is Assam is the Assam Land and 
Revenue Regulation Act (ALRR) of 1886. Like many other laws, post-independence India 
chose to retain the pre-independence acts in name and principle, adding amendments along 
the way to accommodate different interests. The amendment most relevant to the regulation 
of tribal land came in 1947, with the addition of Chapter X, concerning the protection of 
Backward Classes, such as the Scheduled Tribes. This notified the creation of tribal belts and 
blocks, to facilitate settlement of land in favour of Scheduled Tribes. The notification of 
various areas as falling within a tribal belt or block continued, with many being notified in 
1948, but some being notified later on, in the 1980s, for instance. An amendment to the act in 
1981 forbade anyone not a Scheduled Tribe from purchasing land in tribal belts and blocks 
(except with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner), unless they could prove (by 
means of a land title), that they were permanent residents of the block before its creation. In 
more recent times, the discretionary powers of the Deputy Commissioner have also been 
withdrawn, making this ban absolute. 
 
The creation of the Bodoland Territorial Council in 2003 introduced further restrictions on 
these principles. Although it is not explicitly specified in the Memorandum of Settlement 
how these are to be achieved, “preservation of land rights” is mentioned in the Memorandum 
of 2003. The amendment in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution that facilitated the creation 
of the Council gives power to the Bodoland Territorial Council to frame laws around land 
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settlement, and the eligibility criteria for these. For the BTC, the restriction has been further 
applied, in Chapter X, that no persons living outside the Bodoland Territorial Council are 
eligible to purchase land there. For non-tribals, land sale and purchase is limited to non-tribal 
areas (i.e., outside of tribal belts and blocks) within the BTC, but this too can only be 
achieved by proving residency in the BTC area prior to 2003. It is difficult to find a written 
copy of these laws and principles, although officials in charge of dealing with them are aware 
of them. Nonetheless, different officials also apply different interpretations of the laws and 
principles in everyday settings, leading to a complex web of regulations. 
 
The implementation of these laws on the ground depends on the multiple interpretations 
made by officials. For instance, Schedule X of the Indian constitution, prioritises many 
categories of protected classes, like Scheduled Tribes, Schedules Castes, and so on, regarding 
settlement of land. A further rule, explained by a Circle Officer (in charge of dealing with 
matters of land) in Kokrajhar district, prioritises vulnerable groups, who may be deemed 
more in need of land than others. One such category is of displaced persons — whether from 
man-made or natural disasters, such as floods, or riots. For the Circle Officer of the revenue 
circle28 that comprises Uzanpara, Rajeshwar Islary, however, this excludes Muslims 
displaced during the 2012 riots, because they are all “strictly treated as encroachers” and are 
“all migrants living on khas [government] land”. He refuses to comment on where they might 
be migrants from, but the subtext alludes to their suspected illegality as Bangladeshi 
Muslims. Indeed, land settlement policies in practice favoured Scheduled Tribe inhabitants, 
because they were, as Rajeshwar put it, “sons of the soil and masters of the land”. In theory, 
the residency principle applied to Scheduled Tribes within BTC too, but in practice, Bodos 
from outside of the Council area are not prevented from buying land in the BTAD.  
 
Being able to show titles of land ownership was crucial for Bengali Muslims such as those 
from Makrabari, to obtain compensation for destroyed homes post the 2012 riots. For many, 
who lived on khas land, this proved impossible. In October 2013, a controversial circular 
from the Deputy Commissioner’s office proposed that all families (even on khas land), would 
be eligible to 50,000 rupees in compensation, but could not afterwards return to the same 
khas land. This led to much panic in Makrabari (and other villages with displaced Muslim 
                                                
28 Typically, a district (like Kokrajhar) will have four or five revenue circles who deal with matters of land 
ownership, records, mapping for villages in their jurisdiction. 
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families), who refused to take the compensation for fear that it was a way to drive them out 
from the BTC. The circular was later withdrawn, after much protest from Muslim student 
groups like the AAMSU and ABMSU, and the compensation provided unconditionally. Even 
though the circular did not mention any religious or ethnic group by name, being Muslim 
“encroachers” proved a far greater challenge to basic rights like post-conflict compensation.  
 
Rwmwi Brahma is a mandal for Makrabari residents’ former revenue circle (from when they 
were in Dewalgaon). A mandal is an official lower down the hierarchy from a Circle Officer, 
but has more day-to-day contact with the field, and is in charge of measuring and recording 
land settlements and titles, how much government land is occupied by people, and making 
up-to-date maps that reflect these holdings. It is a job that requires much of the mandal’s time 
to be spent in the field, and Rwmwi is full of complaints about being overworked and grossly 
underpaid (he earns 5,200 rupees per month). He is aware of former Dewalgaon residents 
now in Makrabari, and says that since they are a “non-protected” class in a tribal belt or 
block, they cannot stay on khas land. This makes them, “non-eligible people” as far as their 
return is concerned. Contrary to what Makrabri residents say (that they have been present in 
Dewalgaon since 1931), Rwmwi believes that they were not present in 1947, when Tribal 
Belts and Blocks were notified (although the block under which Dewalgaon falls was only 
notified as a tribal block in 1983), and thus do not have the right to stay there. This again, sits 
alongside the BTC regulation that residents from before the creation of BTAD have the 
legitimate right to stay there. If occupying khas land is what bars them, it would be a rule 
evenly applied across villages and communities. Instead, it is almost only ever used in 
instances like with Makrabari residents, which prevents their return. Unsurprisingly, many 
Makrabari residents, like Jamal, believe that the 2012 riots were primarily intended to drive 
them out of their lands, particularly in Bodo-majority areas like Dewalgaon. “Why else” asks 
Jamal, “would there be so much destruction of property and displacement, and comparatively 
little loss of life?” 
 
For Makrabari residents who owned some land in Dewalgaon, retaining possession of these 
parcels proved a critical element in engaging with the bureaucracy of the National Register of 
Citizens. As Bengali-speaking Muslims, they were already vulnerable in the scrutiny of 
citizenship, but being displaced from a village they had inhabited since the 1930s made their 
position ever more precarious in proving their legitimacy. Buying land in Makrabari, or 
elsewhere in the BTAD (in the pockets where non-Bodos are eligible) might arouse suspicion 
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of their identities, even if the sale were legal. Instead, just as they continued to stay on the 
electoral rolls of Dewalgaon to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the state (see Chapter 6), 
the connection to land ownership also helped establish their credentials in the eyes of the 
state. Other such practices of dual membership existed as well, for instance in a community 
policing initiative in the state of Assam, which requires representatives to report to their local 
police station once a month at a meeting, and update the police on disputes and issues in their 
village. Makrabari’s representative often went to both meetings — both as a member in 
Dewalgaon for official representation, as well as to the one from Makrabari to provide actual 
reports of what went on in the makeshift village. These strategic moves around bureaucratic 
practices of registration, enumeration, and paperwork were tools of absolute survival against 
a state that at best systematically ignored or in the worst case actively encouraged their 
disenfranchisement.29  
 
5.4.2 Laws of the land  
 
As the network of laws and regulations make clear, selling land belonging to members of 
Scheduled Tribes in Tribal Belts and Blocks is illegal, except to other Scheduled Tribes. 
Additionally, in the BTAD, the law dictates that such land sales cannot be to persons living 
outside the BTAD. But formal land laws are only one framework that apply to land transfers, 
and as Vandekerckhove (2010, p. 8) has pointed out in the case of the BTAD, social practices 
are also important, whether the actors involved fall in the right administrative categories or 
not. Some of these practices channelise the agency of the rural powerless, who can subvert 
this powerlessness not just through overt rebellion, but also subtle “off-stage” and “on-stage” 
acts (Ibid., 14–15). 
 
Munthu (who is Bodo), is a former resident of Uzanpara, who has since moved away 
following the 2012 riots. While he now lives in a village further away, his two younger 
brothers and mother still live in Uzanpara. He still owns a total of 15 bigha of land, and sold 
3 bigha to his neighbour in Uzanpara, Shamshul (a Muslim) in July 2016. He acknowledges 
that this is against the rules, but he needed the money after his older brother died. He was 
acquainted with Shamshul, who needed the land, and could find no Bodos to sell the land to. 
                                                
29 Post-fieldwork enquiries I made revealed the residents of Makrabari did make it on to the first draft of the 
National Register of Citizens published in July 2018. 
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This was also what he told local representatives of the All Bodo Students Union, who are 
often alert to such sales, and try and discourage sellers from giving away Bodo land. While 
he and his mother faced some harassment at the hands of the ABSU, eventually Munthu 
persuaded them that he had no choice. Gwjwn, president of the local ABSU unit admitted 
that the organisation tries to discourage Bodos from selling their land to non-tribals, 
especially Muslims, and encourages them to look for tribal buyers, “if not Bodos, then Garos 
and Rabhas”. But he also admits that this can be a pointless endeavour from the point of view 
of practicality. “In a place like Uzanpara, and areas around it, where Bodos are not in a 
majority, what can we say to people? Sometimes the only buyers available are non-tribal, and 
people are in need of money”.   
 
Shamshul, on the other hand, did not face similar harassment from ABSU, although he 
remembers Munthu’s arguments with them. He revealed that Munthu borrowed 80,000 
rupees from him when his father was sick, and, unable to pay it back, sold Shamshul the land 
instead. Both Munthu and Shamshul admit that many such transactions have taken place 
between Bodos and Muslims, and none have ever been caught by officials yet. Others in the 
village are divided in their opinion of whether state officials are aware of these sales at all.   
While Munthu and Shamshul are convinced that the authorities do not know, Abbas, another 
resident of the village whose father bought land from a Bodo family, is convinced that the 
mandal, in particular, must know about these transactions, since the revenue or annual tax on 
the land is paid by the buyer, not the person whose name is on the original title. And yet, he 
claims, they have never had trouble from the Circle Officer about such transactions.  
 
While both are aware that the transaction is illegal, both seem relatively assured by the 
validity of the sale. This is largely due to the deed that was drawn up in the village, that 
legitimises the sale, and gives both parties a sense of security. While the land transfer is not 
formally registered in the Circle Office, as a “legal” one might be, it is conferred legitimacy 
by being written on 50-rupee non-judicial stamp paper (often used to endorse the authenticity 
of agreements). It details which plot of land is being sold (the direction and placement of the 
plot), for how much, and crucially, is witnessed by two Bodo and two Muslim (male) 
members of the village, symbolising the agreement of both communities in recognising the 
validity of the sale. In this case, it was dated and signed by the school teacher who drew it up. 
The sale is technically illegal, but both Munthu and Shamshul believe that if there is dispute 
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about the land, they can use this piece of paper in a court of law to resolve it. This is a belief 
held by others in the village who have participated in such transactions.  
 
Local conceptions of public authority that channel the “idea of the state” can be as effective 
(often more) as state institutions themselves. Vandekerckhove (2013) refers to continuing 
practices of “tax collection” by militant groups in the BTC as forms of “twilight institutions”, 
Christian Lund’s (2006) concept of institutions that are neither clearly formal or informal. 
Part of what gives these forms of authority legitimacy is the appropriation of “symbolic 
languages of governance” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001b, p. 8), where practical elements of 
governance like contracts, deeds and attestations are incorporated into non-state 
manifestations of public authority (Lund 2006, p. 690).   
 
In Fiona McConnell’s study of the Tibetan Government in Exile, the “mimicry” of state 
practices is employed by an entity that is essentially a non-state actor, which nonetheless 
performs “state-like” geopolitical functions (McConnell 2012). McConnell raises the 
important question — to what extent is governmentality exclusively a practice of the state, 
and can it also be exercised by non-state entities? These local practices in Uzanpara, 
legitimising land transactions that are neither recognised nor sanctioned by the state, suggest 
that legitimacy can be drawn through state-like practices, by non-state actors. It further lends 
credence to the idea of the state as an “effect” (Mitchell 1991) and creates a more nuanced 
portrayal of citizenship in looking towards relationships between citizens and state-like 
institutions (McConnell 2011). 
 
5.5 Conclusion: Territory, authority, and citizenship 
 
Questions of territory help understand the entrenched, place-centric notion of identity that is 
pervasive throughout Northeast India, and finds parallels with other colonial, ethnically 
divided societies such as Rwanda, where similar, place-centric notions of outsiders and 
insiders created new categories of belonging from relatively fluid ones (Mamdani 2001). It 
highlights the central importance of the state in the creation and maintenance of these 
identities. The language of state policy, the recognition of some groups as “tied” to particular 
places through codification in law, and establishing political representation in autonomous 
regions on this basis, are all state practices that are important in creating insider-outsider 
categories that appear fixed. With land as an important practical and symbolic resource in 
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channelling this identity, a complex network of laws and rules further reify these categories. 
In evoking a discourse on “foreigners”, land regulation practices act as techniques of 
displaced border management, where the idea of the border is performed away from the 
physical border itself (Amoore 2006). 
 
On the other hand, as the land transfer practices in Uzanpara show, these are not the only 
terms on which citizenship is understood. Political legitimacy is drawn from different sources 
in everyday life — the All Bodo Students Union, for instance, and the formalised practice of 
drawing up deeds and witnessing documents. Political authority in the village is not a simple 
hierarchical network of state actors — the boundaries are blurred between state and society 
(Migdal 2001) in actual practice. In these transactions, residents are redefining their 
citizenship not by flouting the law, but by re-interpreting its meaning for local context. Law 
itself is an iterative process, and can take on new meaning in local processes, and in the 
process create new citizen subjectivities (Eckert et al., 2012).  
 
As the next chapters will go on to show, this complicates the idea of citizenship — is it 
imposed by laws and recognition from the state, or enacted (often through subversive 
practices) by people and communities themselves? The idea of indigeneity as linked to 
territorial questions also re-emerges in Chapter 7, where Hindu nationalist outfits attempt to 
redefine indigeneity from a religious perspective, building on colonial traditions that did the 
same (Xaxa 2005).  
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CHAPTER 6. THE POLITICAL CITIZEN: ELECTIONS AND EVERYDAY 
POLITICS IN BODOLAND 
 
“Even though we had never seen him before, and even though he hasn’t … ever given us 
anything, I’m glad we voted for him.” 
- Anwar, voting in the 2014 parliamentary elections 
 
6.1 Vignette 
 
On a rainy morning in mid-March 2016, a group of party workers and members of the 
Bodoland Political Front (BPF) arrived in Makrabari village. With the help of some of the 
village’s male residents, they set up plastic tables and chairs to hold a meeting in one of the 
village’s two communal space structures (the other being a mosque) — a large tin shed that 
functions as the school building, the anganwadi centre,30 and community centre. The BPF 
workers were here to canvass for the vote for Pramila Rani Brahma, who was the Member of 
the Legislative Assembly from the constituency of Kokrajhar East, where Makrabari 
residents’ former home, Dewalgaon, is located.  
 
While the residents are no longer physically present in Dewalgaon, they remain on the 
electoral rolls in their former village. They are relatively new to Makrabari, having lived in a 
relief camp near Makrabari for about four years before this They had fled to the site of this 
relief camp after their homes were burnt down during riots between Bodos and Muslims in 
2012.  It is only in the last few months that they had moved and built temporary housing on a 
plot of agricultural land belonging to one of Makrabari’s permanent residents, having finally 
started to give up hope of ever returning to Dewalgaon. The decision to stay on Dewalgaon’s 
electoral rolls, though, was strategic. Having an established “official” status in a village is 
essential as a Bengali Muslim in Assam. While it is still easy to be classified a “doubtful 
voter”,31 it is more dangerous still to try and register oneself in a new place, like Makrabari, 
for fear of being seen as recently arrived Bangladeshi illegal immigrants, one of Assam’s hot 
                                                
30 Where early childhood care is provided through government programmes. 
31 ‘Doubtful voters’ or D-voters are a category of voter that emerged from the political history of Assam. During 
the Assam movement it was alleged that many voters on Assam’s rolls were illegal immigrants from 
Bangladesh, instead of of legitimate Indian citizens. Government tribunals were set up in an attempt to identify 
such voters, and certain (usually Bengali Hindu or Bengali Muslim) and pending proof of citizenship, such 
voters were disenfranchised by the Election Commission, labelled ‘doubtful voters’, and unable to cast votes 
during subsequent elections until the matter was decided by the tribunal (The Hindu 2014). 
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button political issues, both electoral and otherwise. Indeed, it was an issue that came up 
during the meeting that took place here. The residents of the camp were also uncertain about 
making Makrabari a permanent home, with some still harbouring hope of going back to 
Dewalgaon, while others were not completely sure of feeling accepted by the community of 
permanent residents of Makrabari, where they often felt like unwelcome guests. The fact of 
the campaign meeting being held there at all was a rare public acceptance of the existence of 
the resettled homes in Makrabari. The official policy has been to turn a blind eye to their 
precarious living situation, based on the fact that they are “on paper” in Dewalgaon, even if 
they actually inhabit Makrabari. By coming to Makrabari and holding a campaign meeting, 
the BPF had, in effect, legitimised this dual existence, by acknowledging their continued 
identity as voters of Kokrajhar East, despite the campaign meeting being outside the 
constituency. 
 
The meeting functioned as a conversation — the party workers presented an initial, standard 
pitch followed by the men and women present making demands of their own, as well as 
castigating the workers for failing on earlier promises. The women, particularly, were vocal 
in their demand for a proper, state-sponsored anganwadi centre, as well as a proper source of 
clean drinking water. The main BPF worker, a middle-aged Bodo man, agreed that this was 
important and needed to be seen to. While saying this, he simultaneously explained the 
reasons for the impossibility of it being carried out — they were “officially” from 
Dewalgaon, how could they demand anganwadis and drinking water here? They would have 
to submit an application, and the BPF would try to do what they could. An older man, Jamal, 
stood up and explained the facts of their displacement, and how they came to be situated 
here, although these facts were well known to all present.  
 
Following this, Jamal brought up an important issue: an organisation called the Tribal Sangha 
(which translates as “Tribal Forum”32) filed a case against the resettled village in Makrabari, 
alleging that they were illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, and needed to be deported. 
Using their precarious position as temporary residents who did not have formal status in 
Makrabari (and disregarding their much longer history in Dewalgaon), this case, lodged in 
Guwahati High Court two months before this meeting, caused much distress to the residents. 
                                                
32 In various parts of Assam, the Tribal Sangha represents different indigenous groups in the area — in the 
BTAD this is primarily the Bodos, who are the largest indigenous group in the region. 
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Despite the case being brought forward by an organisation that has a presence across Assam, 
it was seen as a direct attack by Bodos, or at least an organisation that represented Bodo 
interests in the BTAD. What was more upsetting than the case itself, Jamal continued, was 
that their MLA, the BPF’s Pramila Rani Brahma, refused to speak out in their defence. At 
this point another man, Rafiqul, also stood up, angry and repeating these claims, asking why 
they were being called Bangladeshis, despite living here since much before the Bodoland 
Territorial Council was created? The BPF worker, a Bodo man himself, was quick to be 
sympathetic, and reaffirm that 
 
“We know you are local people. You are our brothers, we don’t discriminate between 
Hindus, Christians or Muslims. The Tribal Sangha is an independent organisation, the 
BPF is not involved with this claim. And Hagrama Mohilary [chief of the Bodoland 
Territorial Council and leader of the BPF] said clearly in a statement that there are no 
Bangladeshis in the BTC. It’s in a press release. You can see. Obviously the word of 
Hagrama Mohilary is the final word of the BPF.” 
 
This temporarily placated the palpable anger in the meeting, although the issue did not go 
away, as further conversation with Jamal and Rafiqul showed. The meeting moved on to 
discuss more grievances from the residents, in particular a scam relating to ration cards that 
misrepresented the amount of food grains each family was entitled to. The BPF worker 
dismissed this as being outside his remit, and asked them to take it up with the supply officer. 
His colleague looked in my direction, aware of my presence, and leaned over to say, “oh it’s 
an anomaly, must be an anomaly”. As the meeting wrapped up, people rushed towards the 
workers, re-stating their grievances, many asking for money to undertake small expenses 
such as paying fees, buying medicine, and so on. 
 
This vignette is one illustration of the dynamics of local politics in the Bodoland Territorial 
Area Districts, in this case during a state-level election campaign. It covers many of the 
themes in this chapter examining how political practice informs ideas of citizenship — the 
multiple political identities ascribed to and held by citizens, political practice itself as a 
means of establishing citizenship, and the performances of politics that speak to these 
political identities.  
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The following sections examine local politics in the two field sites, and the bearing that 
campaigning, voting, and everyday political decision-making have on ideas of belonging and 
non-belonging. The first section looks at how structures of governance and politics in the 
BTAD are constituted. In particular, I look at the Village Council Development Committees, 
a feature of government unique to BTAD administratively, but with blurred lines between 
political party and administrative structures. Here, I use primarily the West Amguri VCDC, 
to which the Uzanpara village cluster belongs, as illustrative of its functioning. While the 
Makrabari residents too are formally part of a VCDC via their former village of Dewalgaon, 
they are unable to participate in its functioning, which in itself affects their political agency in 
constituting themselves as citizens.  
 
The next section, on multi-scalar political identities, looks at how ordinary citizens constitute 
their own political agency — through decision-making processes that express multiple 
aspects of their political being. When it comes to making political decisions, citizens often 
express identities that contradict conventional interpretations of their behaviour, instead 
showing a preference for their own mode of politics. The third section, drawing on ideas of 
patronage, looks to understand this equation from the point of view of those seeking power, 
and how power itself is constituted through interactions with the multi-faceted voter/citizen. 
The manner in which politicians campaign and position themselves reveals how they 
understand their role in the process of citizen-making, and what they make of the voters and 
citizens they address. Citizens’ responses to these acts further help understand how their own 
agency in constructing themselves as citizens is realised during political processes. While 
during elections, this is apprehended through conversation and rhetoric in campaigning, at 
other times, the manoeuvrings of local politicians and members of the VCDC, within the 
party system, are representative of their understandings of politics. Finally, in a concluding 
section I tie the insights from these different perspectives together, to examine what they 
mean for citizenship and everyday political life. 
 
6.2 Scales of politics and administration in the BTAD 
 
The BTAD has a three-tier governance system — the autonomous Bodoland Territorial 
Council, the state of Assam, and the Indian state. It usually sees three consecutive years of 
election campaigns — for the national, state and council levels — followed by two non-
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election years. Elections for different levels of government in the BTAD often churn out 
distinct, though interrelated responses. The different scales of elections and governance give 
rise to expressions of multiple political identities, and this is part of what I explore in this 
chapter, by looking at two consecutive elections in 2014 and 2015 — the national and the 
council, before turning to the third scale (which is the focus of much of this chapter), the 
state-level elections in 2016. Elections illustrate a particular, performative element of local 
politics, and highlight some of the dynamics that guide politics at an everyday level. In this 
chapter, such performances of politics are examined alongside other, everyday 
understandings of politics, in order to grasp how citizenship is constructed through political 
processes — both ordinary and extraordinary. 
 
While the state and national level governance structures follow a pattern similar to other parts 
of India, the Bodoland Territorial Council — a body specially created to facilitate the 
provision of autonomy to the region — contains unique structural and procedural 
mechanisms, giving it a semi-state character, while in other ways leaving it reliant on the 
state and central governments. The Council itself has 40 seats, 30 of which are reserved for 
Scheduled Tribes (effectively Bodos in this area), 5 are open for any group to contest, and 5 
are nominated. Apart from the nominated seats, the rest of the Members of Council 
Legislative Assembly (MCLAs) are elected every five years, as with other elections. Similar 
to other assemblies, the BTC has a secretariat that handles its administrative functioning. As 
with other states in India, the secretariat consists of various departments handling different 
aspects of governance — rural development, education, health, and so on. Civil servants are 
recruited in top official positions in these departments on deputation from the state-level 
Assam Civil Service, as well as the central-level Indian Administrative Service (though there 
are very few of these, generally one or two). The BTC has 4 districts. The departments at the 
BTC secretariat level co-exist alongside district-level offices, which report to the secretariat, 
and further down the ladder, Block-level administrative offices, which deal more directly 
with the implementation of schemes at the village level.  
 
The BTC has most departments that exist at the state level (39 in total), with two crucial 
absences that have made all the difference between statehood and non-statehood — law and 
order, and finance. A third department, relief and rehabilitation, has in theory been allowed to 
function under the BTC from 2012 onwards, but the actual transfer from the Assam 
government is yet to take place. The two missing departments represent the continuing tussle 
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for autonomy from the Assam state government. Law and order remains in the hands of the 
Assam governments, so that police personnel, as well as decisions about military and 
paramilitary personnel and their deployment, remains out of reach for the BTC, though it is a 
crucial part of governance in Northeast India (see for instance, “Generals as Governors” in 
Baruah 2005). 
 
Even more controversial is the lack of control over finances. While one of the conditions of 
the creation of the BTC was that it would get special funds from the central government to 
spend as it sees fit, the distribution of this fund is routed through the Assam government, and 
the withholding of money seems a crucial tactic to leveraging control and power.  As part of 
the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2003, the Council received an initial 500 crore 
(5 billion) rupees, and an additional package of 250 crore (2.5 billion) rupees in 2008.33 The 
initial starting grant, says Harish Sarma, a bureaucrat in the Planning and Development 
department of the Council secretariat, “is what enabled all this”, pointing to the secretariat 
building in which we are sitting, and the adjoining Council Assembly building. He claims 
that the BTC is entitled to a further portion of Assam’s state budget — 12.19 percent, based 
on BTC’s population share in Assam. This money, however, is never given in its entirety.  
 
In the Budget Assembly Session of the Bodoland Territorial Council, held over 21 and 22 
March 2017, the theme of Assam withholding funds as a way to control the BTC came up 
repeatedly.34 In response to questions by opposition MCLAs, Executive Members (the 
equivalent of Cabinet Members in the state) took the line that funds were delayed, sometimes 
up to a year, preventing them from implementing promised schemes. While some of these 
might be answers to deflect from personal responsibility, officials in the secretariat also 
confirmed that funds from the Assam government were often delayed. The flip side to this is 
accountability — the BTC is not obliged to spend the funds in any particular manner, and 
according to Harish, has submitted one utilisation certificate, i.e., a certificate for how the 
money has been spent so far, for the first instalment of 500 crore rupees. He admits that 
without submitting such a certificate, new grants are unlikely to be released by the central 
government.  
 
 
                                                
33 Figures from the Ministry of Development of North-East Region website (MDoNER 2019). 
34 I was able to attend the second day of this session as a visitor in the gallery. 
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6.2.1 Politics as governance: The Village Council Development Committee (VCDC) 
 
The one aspect of BTAD politics that remains formally untouched by electoral politics is 
village level governance, conducted through Village Council Development Committees 
(VCDCs). One VCDC is supposed to cover a population of roughly 4,000. These committees 
mimic, to some extent, the panchayat structure for village governance found across the rest of 
the India,35 with one key difference — representatives of these committees are not elected (as 
they are in other panchayats), but nominated by the ruling party in the Bodoland Territorial 
Council. Since the Council’s inception in 2005, only one party — the Bodoland Political 
Front or BPF — has been in power, resulting in the VCDC structure effectively becoming a 
network of party workers in different villages.  
 
One VCDC is typically constituted across 10-12 villages (varying according to the population 
in the villages), with there being one or two members in each village, and a chairman36, who 
heads the committee. Above the VCDC structure is the Tertiary Level Co-ordination 
Committee (TLCC), which corresponds with the electoral constituency (in the case of 
Uzanpara, that would be the part of East Bilasipara that falls within the BTAD). The TLCC 
leadership is also determined by the party, and the chairman of the TLCC is often a fairly 
powerful figure in the party structure, at least at the constituency level. The VCDC and its 
members are not just accountable to their party leadership, however, but also, simultaneously 
to the administrative block37 to which they belong, whose officials are non-political. In this 
sense, the VCDC mimics the panchayat (which is also answerable to block officials, and then 
further to district-level officials), but ultimately straddles the political-administrative divide. 
The terms governing its separate roles are not especially clear, largely due to the discretion 
granted to bodies like the Bodoland Territorial Council under the Sixth Schedule, and the 
exemption from having elected panchayats.  
 
Having elections in the VCDC is one of the major points of contention in the BTAD, with the 
ruling BPF, that has benefitted from the existing system, being largely against it. The main 
                                                
35 Panchayats are village level governance structures, where representatives are elected. This is operational 
across India, except in areas under the Sixth Schedule, which, under the provisions of autonomy, are free to 
devise their own methods of governance 
36 This term is used regardless of whether it is a man or a woman. 
37 Local governance works at multiple levels – from the state level (in this case Assam), governance is divided 
into district level (like Kokrajhar), and then further to a sub-district level which is known as a Block. 
Development Office, which then liaises with village governance structures. 
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opposition party in the Council, the United People’s Party (UPP) backed by the All Bodo 
Students Union, repeatedly raises this issue. In an interview, leader of the opposition in the 
Bodoland Assembly, Rangra Narzary, is quick to criticise what he terms a “politics of 
dominance”, where the absence of an election at the grassroots prevents a genuine 
representation of the welfare concerns of people at the village. Ramesh Kumar, officer at the 
the BTC secretariat in charge of rural development informs me that a new VCDC bill passed 
in the assembly aims to significantly reform this appointment structure and have elections for 
VCDC members as well. At present, he admits, the system is arbitrary, “If there is a 
complaint about a VCDC chairman, then overnight Hagrama [chief of the Council] signs the 
order and a new chairman is appointed. This is not a good system.” The new bill, like many 
other bills and resolutions in the BTC, is held up at the final stage, where it must be approved 
and ratified by the Assam state government.  
 
Despite not having elections, however, the architects of the BTC have chosen to retain the 
structure of the panchayat system, and also on occasion introduced other provisions found in 
panchayat structures. For instance, soon after the 2015 Council elections, the BPF introduced 
the policy of 30 percent reservation for women in VCDC bodies,38 leading to most VCDCs 
needing to have at least 2 or 3 women members. This is especially interesting in an area 
where women are not especially active in politics (although the election studied below is an 
anomaly). In some instances, this can become tokenistic, as in the case of a village 
neighbouring Uzanpara, whose woman VCDC member deferred to her husband to engage us 
in conversation about the functioning of the VCDC. When I asked her how she came to be 
appointed, it was her her husband who chimed in with a shrug “they needed a woman, and 
the villagers suggested her”. She often goes to VCDC-related meetings with her husband. 
This does not mean, however, that all women VCDC members are there as tokens — 
Damanti, a member of West Amguri VCDC (to which Uzanpara also belongs) has been a 
VCDC member for 10 years, and is widely regarded with respect in her position. Damanti 
recalls that until 2015, she was the only woman member in the West Amguri VCDC.  
 
Other studies around local governance in India, primarily in the panchayat context, have also 
found that while some women may end up functioning as “proxies” for male family 
                                                
38 The 73rd Amendment of the Indian constitution lays out the provisions for panchayat structures, including 33 
percent reservation for women. 
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members, their presence in local governance bodies can also potentially widen the range of 
issues to include more gendered ones (Banerjee 1998, Chhibber 2002). For instance, women 
from a hamlet that was split away from Damanti’s jurisdiction complained at a meeting that 
once she left, they ceased to receive the spinning yarn they earlier did under her 
“distribution” of materials. Spinning yarn, like sewing machines, are gendered items of 
distribution in the VCDC scheme. Equally, the presence of women in political structures 
alone does not automatically lead to more progressive, pro-women policies (Batliwala and 
Dhanraj 2004), as also reflected in Chapter 7, with the participation of women in anti-women 
right-wing activities. Other affiliations, of caste, religion, ethnicity, and so on, continue to 
have relevance for the political process. As most of the women VCDC members interviewed 
confirmed, apart from distribution of items like yarn or sewing machines, no women-specific 
projects are taken up by these members.   
 
While the VCDC has no formal rules regarding proportional ethnic representation (unlike, for 
instance the Council, where fixed numbers of seats are reserved for Bodos and other groups), 
political realities generally mean that members from the largest communities resident in the 
village are likely to represented, if not proportionally, then substantially, on the committees. 
In West Amguri, this means that of 18 members, 13 are non-Bodos (Muslims and 
Rajbongshis) and only 5 are Bodos, reflecting the mixed nature of the area. Indeed, the 
chairman of the committee is a Muslim resident from Uzanpara, Moinuddin, whose 
appointment in 2015 followed a 10-year stint by a Bodo resident. Diganta, the TLCC 
chairman, however, is Bodo, as are most of the influential leaders in the BPF party. In the 
election campaign studied below, however, having proportional representation from non-
Bodo communities was one of Diganta’s key pledges during meetings and rallies. As such, he 
is seen as treating both Bodo and non-Bodo members equally, as the case study below will 
also go on to reveal.  
 
6.2.2 “Bringing schemes”: the workings of the VCDC 
 
Like its structure, the functioning of VCDCs is nebulous, and not always transparent. Thus 
for instance, while the 18 members of West Amguri form a single VCDC, there is no 
schedule of meetings for the members to come together on a regular basis. Usually, if any 
member has a point of business, they go directly to Moinuddin and meet with him one-on-
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one, or in other cases, to Diganta, the TLCC chairman, or Amarjit, the Member of Council 
who represents their constituency. Both Diganta and Amarjit play a very hands-on role in the 
functioning of village-level politics. In the few instances where all the VCDC members do 
come together, it is through specially arranged meetings, which are often held in the form of 
picnics, near a lake, at an outdoor event, or in other open spaces. These are called by either 
Diganta or Amarjit, and attendance is organised by the chairman mobilising members to 
attend.39 At many of these meetings (often held for members from the entire constituency), it 
is not only VCDC members who are present, but also members from the village-level 
committee of the BPF, which exists as a separate structure in every village (called the 
primary committee). This further blurs the lines between politics and administration, as roles 
are not always clearly demarcated between the two. The co-existence is not always peaceful 
— at one joint “picnic” of the West Amguri and its neighbouring VCDC, VCDC members 
and primary committee members sparred in front of senior party workers (including Diganta 
and Amarjit), about whose prerogative it was to undertake welfare schemes.  
 
Further adding to the seemingly ad hoc nature of the appointment of VCDC members is the 
lack of a common or official space which members can claim as an office, or where meetings 
are held, official business conducted, or related paperwork stored. Instead, most of the VCDC 
members I met usually invited me to their homes to talk to them, and afterwards we would 
also meet at meetings, or tea stalls, or in Kokrajhar town while they were on business. As 
Akhil Gupta (1995) observed in his ethnography of bureaucracy in a North Indian village, 
local officials often converted a room in their house into “offices”, where they dealt with 
colleagues or those who came to meet them for official reasons. Uzanpara VCDC members 
also functioned out of such office-home hybrids, where one room functioned partially as an 
office, and often due to paucity of space also as a bedroom or living space in the house. 
Official documents pertaining to government business, ledgers and papers related to 
contracts, meetings, and deals, were also stored in these rooms.  
 
These irregular spaces and schedules of functioning complicate the idea of following the 
“everyday” state, and observing ordinary practices and interactions. On the other hand, 
observing the hybrid and ad-hoc nature of spaces and practices at the grassroots level shed 
                                                
39 “Mobilise” is a term used often by political operatives, referring to rounding up other members and urging 
them to attend a meeting, event, rally, etc. 
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light on the nature of the state in the village. Its sporadic and less-than-regular presence in 
rural life indicated that the state was not a reliable presence, and opened up spaces for 
improvisation on the part of citizens, as I show with land transactions in Chapter 5, and as the 
workings of the VCDC below also reveal. In a sense, “chasing the state” in Bodoland, while 
an improvisation in methodological terms, also helped better understand the meaning of the 
ordinary, everyday practices of the state in this region.  
 
If the operational mechanisms of the VCDC are not completely clear, its actual tasks are 
similarly opaque. During my initial meetings with Uzanpara’s VCDC members, I often began 
with asking them what they did, and was repeatedly told things like “undertake NREGA [sic] 
work”, “plantations [of trees]”, “constructing roads”, “distribution [of items like umbrellas or 
bicycles or yarn]”, covered under the broader concept of “schemes”, which seemed to drive 
such work in the villages. To undertake some work in one’s capacity as a VCDC member 
was to “bring a scheme”, which meant getting a project or work under an existing central or 
state government scheme. These projects are not necessarily planned in ways that follow a 
predictable structure or timeline, but rather are implemented as and when funds become 
available at the Council. As seen above, funds themselves are not predictable or tied to a 
schedule, leading to a cascading effect of ad-hoc decisions of governance. In theory, Rural 
Development official Ramesh Kumar suggests that welfare projects or schemes undertaken in 
villages should go through the process of being suggested in a gram sabha (a village-level 
meeting of residents, which in regular panchayats are generally scheduled to occur), then 
approved by VCDC members and chairmen, with inputs from the TLCC chairman. The 
resolutions should then be passed on to the Block Development Officer (BDO) (the 
administrative wing of government with which the VCDC is expected to work), who would 
then pass the files upwards through the layers of bureaucracy the BTC secretariat, for 
approval by the relevant departments. Once these are approved, they are again sent down to 
the blocks and BDO to implement.  
 
In reality, however, this is rarely how these schemes come to be, proving again that while the 
theory of the state as having regular mechanisms was in place, in practice it was far more 
sporadic. Gram sabhas are rare occurrences, and by no means regular (in my ten-month 
continuous stint there, none took place, bar a series of meetings towards the end which were 
the product of a new initiative of the Assam government, and not part of regular VCDC 
business). Instead, schemes are generally proposed by VCDC members, chairmen, and TLCC 
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chairmen unilaterally. In the Budget Assembly session of the Bodoland Territorial Council in 
March 2017, opposition leader Rangra Narzary repeatedly raised the issue of the process by 
which such schemes are allocated, arguing that the VCDC does not consult village members 
about work to undertake — even where there are gram sabhas, the resolutions agreed upon in 
these meetings are meaningless as members undertake whatever work they see as suitable. 
He reiterated this point in an interview, “even as an elected MCLA from Kajalgaon, I have no 
idea what schemes there are for the development of my constituency”. In Rangra’s case, as is 
also true with many of the constituencies in the BTC now (with almost half being represented 
by non-BPF parties), VCDC members, chairmen, and TLCC chairmen continue to be BPF 
party members, and having more power and funds at their disposal than the elected members 
of Council. In contrast, MCLAs have only 2,500,000 rupees at their disposal each year, a 
pittance compared to the amounts available to the BTC and its politicians.  
 
VCDC members, while expected to function like government officials, are nonetheless not 
paid for their work in these positions. Thus, it is commonly accepted and acknowledged that 
when they apply for funds to undertake “schemes” in the village, they take a portion of this 
money for their own expenditure. How much, is left to the discretion of VCDC members, the 
VCDC chairman, and the TLCC chairman, each of whom, in turn receive their own share of 
money from these projects. There is a moral blurriness to this mode of functioning, as 
practices mirror what is in other discourses of Indian politics termed “corruption” — that of 
politicians siphoning off money from welfare schemes. Diganta, however, shrugs and is 
matter of fact about the realities of the situation, “there are no salaries for VCDC or TLCC 
members, so how else are they supposed to make money? This is how they get by.” Other 
VCDC members in Uzanpara echoed this sentiment, claiming that their cuts from the funds 
were the only forms of compensation they received.   
 
Others in the BTAD are not so convinced by this hardship argument, as with Rangra Narzary 
and his “politics of dominance” statement. “Schemes in the BTAD operate through the 
channels of a contractor lobby — contractors petition departments in the secretariat to have 
certain funds released to undertake road building, tree plantation, and so on, and this is how 
schemes are sanctioned”. Rangra’s observation is largely corroborated by the functioning of 
the Uzanpara VCDC — members are effectively expected to function like contractors, and 
compete not just with each other, but also with other contractors in and around the village 
(many of whom are also BPF party workers). Noren, from Uzanpara, is one such contractor 
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(and also BPF party worker), and shows me an “engagement letter” that he received for the 
purposes of a contract he undertook to fill potholes in a road. The project is assigned to 
Noren, a VCDC member from Uzanpara named Mofidul, and their MCLA Amarjit. The 
contract is worth 300,000 rupees. When it is submitted to the Block-level office, the office 
will release this money to Amarjit. Of this, 50,000 rupees went to Amarjit, 125,000 rupees to 
Noren, 6,000 rupees to Mofidul, and the rest is for the actual work undertaken to repair the 
road. Mofidul’s presence on the document is strategic — it is easier to have money released 
when there is more than one person purportedly undertaking the work, and it also explains 
why his share is so paltry, as he is there in name alone. Noren says that the money allocated 
to MCLAs is the easiest to have released from the secretariat, while funds from central 
government schemes like those under the MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act) are harder. The best time to apply for contracts under funds like 
this, Noren advises, is about a year before the elections for the BTC are due, and the MCLAs 
are worrying about their prospects. Otherwise, the purse is tight. 
 
Noren is correct to point out that welfare schemes whose funds are managed by the central 
government from Delhi are harder to get a hold of. The National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act, for instance, a public works programme intended to generate work and 
income in rural areas, has over the years built in several safeguards to prevent its 
mishandling. So for instance, workers who undertake employment under this scheme have 
their wages paid directly into their own bank accounts, electronically. Similarly, only 
registered vendors can be used to provide materials related to the public works, and they are 
also paid directly in their bank accounts. Such public work can no longer be undertaken by 
contractors, and must be managed by the Block and District level offices of the Rural 
Development departments.  
 
Nonetheless, workarounds to these processes exist. Noren is a registered vendor, as is TLCC 
chairman Diganta, even though neither actually sells sand, gravel, or other material. Thus, 
they can benefit from public works programmes. Engineers at the block and district levels as 
well as block-level officers, all of whom are involved with the implementation of the 
programme, also receive their share of public works money. One area in which some 
discretion remains is in the handing out of job cards — documents that enable participation in 
the MGNREGA to begin with. These are supposed to be distributed to the poorest and most 
vulnerable people, most in need of public assistance. But often, these were distributed to 
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party supporters of the BPF. When a public works programme would be applied for, wages 
would be transferred to these job card holders, often without any work being undertaken, in 
league with with engineers, block-level officials, and VCDC members. The job holders then 
agree to transfer a portion of these wages to the VCDC members, chairman, and TLCC 
chairman, in return for being allowed to keep a portion of the money for themselves, without 
having undertaken any work. Others in the village who object to these practices, or are not 
BPF supporters, were simply excluded from the NREGA and obtained no benefits, their 
objections labelled as “anti-party” (supporters of the opposition parties) grumblings. 
 
6.3 Multi-scalar political identities 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, fieldwork during elections was conducted in the two electoral 
constituencies of Kokrajhar East (where the resettled village of Makrabari votes, but not 
where they currently reside) and Bilasipara East (where the cluster of villages in Uzanpara 
vote, and are also located). Kokrajhar East is the constituency that is at the very heart of the 
BTAD itself — consisting of the unofficial “capital”, Kokrajhar town, as well as being a 
visible contest between two of the main contenders in the election, the BPF and the UPP. It 
had the additional unique perspective of being the only constituency where two prominent 
women candidates engaged in a visible contest, in an area where women are rarely at the 
forefront in political life. Bilasipara East is unique in another sense — being on the border 
between Kokrajhar and Dhubri (i.e., the BTAD and the rest of Assam), it encompasses 
villages that are both inside and outside the BTAD. Thus, while the residents of Uzanpara are 
formally within the BTAD, in this Assembly constituency, they form a minority, and 
therefore can rarely independently impact a vote that finally falls largely in Dhubri, a Muslim 
majority district. In comparison to the other voters in the constituency, who are in Dhubri 
district, those within the BTAD form only a small proportion (about 30 percent) of the total 
voters in East Bilasipara. 
 
It is worth drawing attention to the candidacy of two women in an area where very few 
women are visible in local politics. Both the women in this constituency, however — Pramila 
Rani Brahma of the BPF, and Pratibha Narzary of the UPP, are well established, powerful 
women in their own right. Pramila was twice elected (and a third time, in this election as 
well) as MLA from the constituency, and is known as being close to the BPF leadership, 
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especially Hagrama. Meanwhile, Pratibha is well known in the NGO and Bodoland statehood 
movement circuits — most of her campaigning was done with ABSU leadership (and with 
ground support from cadres), including their well loved president, Pramod Boro. The contest 
represented a South Asian paradox, where there is overall very low participation of women in 
parliamentary democracy, and yet a few very powerful and popular women politicians 
(Omvedt 2005). Both women are also proof that barriers to politics are much higher for 
women in India — where there is no family support or background (in terms of belonging to 
political families), participation in social movements becomes an important factor in 
accessing political life (Rai 2012). 
 
While Pramila and Pratibha have both risen to prominence in their respective organisations 
(the BPF and the ABSU leadership), other women, at lower rungs of this party structure, have 
not had a similar experience with power. Rita Basumatary, a senior member of the Kokrajhar 
district BPF women’s wing, for instance, complained that the women’s wing did not get the 
same sort of access to schemes and contracts as the male members. The party structure is 
divided along gender lines, so that the women’s committee is entirely separate from the main 
leadership, where, save for Pramila, no other women feature. The UPP/ABSU structure is 
similarly divided, although women are arguably more vocal within the Bodoland movement. 
At a rally in Kokrajhar town,40 ABSU women campaigned for separate statehood, 
acknowledging the contribution of women in the movement, and the need for more women to 
come out of their homes and participate than in 1990s, during the militancy phase. There are 
more radical proposals too — such as appointing women as gaon booras (traditional village 
headmen). During Pratibha’s nomination and campaigns, similar gatherings of women were 
seen, and she herself addressed women’s issues specifically (more so than Pramila). But this 
election aside, the political representation of women remains low in Bodoland. 
 
6.3.1 The “disenchanted” voter 
 
The framing of the ideal voter has often emphasised the role of European liberal philosophy 
in facilitating the spread of electoral democracy throughout the world. And yet, this theory of 
diffusion is partial at best, as examples from India and other postcolonial contexts show 
(Gilmartin 2012). The practice of electoral democracy corresponds to the forms of popular 
                                                
40 On 24 March 2017, outside the Deputy Commissioner’s office in Kokrajhar town. 
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sovereignty embedded in specific political contexts. Using the example of the “secret ballot” 
as the now widely accepted norm for voting, Gilmartin illustrates how it rests on the idea of 
the “enchanted individual” at the core of democratic practice — an autonomous being that is 
both embedded within society and social structures, as well as capable of distancing herself 
or himself from this context, and making autonomous choices. Using the context of India, 
Gilmartin shows that this theoretical construct quickly dissolves in the face of patronage 
politics, along with caste, religion and ethnicity-based loyalties that are central to Indian 
politics (Ibid., p. 418). Abandoning certain strictures of Euro-centric liberal democracy, some 
of the examples from BTAD show that such deviations do not necessarily lead to an 
illegitimate form of politics, as work from Piliavsky (2014a) and others also show. 
Nonetheless, such politics is also fraught with its own complicated power struggles, often in 
ways that prove oppressive for voters, while in other instances offering them creative 
solutions.  
 
Wouters has further argued that much as vernacular ideas of democracy in the context of 
India are being gradually understood (see again Piliavsky’s work, discussed later in this 
chapter), this has been to the exclusion of India’s Northeast, reflecting an existing trend in 
academic studies about the Northeast (Wouters 2015, p. 127). In his research context of 
Nagaland, voting and elections are especially complex, given that contesting the legitimacy 
of the Indian state is a vital part of Naga politics (Ibid.). Separatism from the Indian state is 
not a major factor in the BTAD’s electoral politics, nonetheless, like other parts of the 
Northeast, it has a complicated relationship with India’s central government, which give local 
expressions of democracy different emphases from other parts of India 
 
National elections in 2014 marked a turning point in much of India — the Prime Minister’s 
eponymously titled “Modi” wave coursed through much of the country, to the jubilation of 
many and the disappointment of many others. It brought in a legitimisation of right-wing 
majoritarian politics in the country, and changed the course of many institutions in the 
country — its universities, academic bodies and bureaucratic structures like the Planning 
Commission, and the character of the national and state governments in many states. The 
wave reached Assam’s shores as well — 7 of its 14 seats in the national assembly, the Lok 
Sabha, were won by the BJP, and proved a turning point that culminated in its winning the 
state assembly two years later, despite having had minimal presence in the state’s politics 
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until that point. In the BTAD, however, an entirely different, distinctly local dynamic was at 
play, resulting in a unique election campaign and result. 
 
The Lok Sabha election of 2014 was the first time the Kokrajhar constituency (which covered 
most of the BTAD in this election) elected a non-Bodo Member of Parliament. A group of 18 
non-Bodo organisations, from across a range of ethnic communities, came together under a 
political party called the “Ekya Mancha” (which translates as “one platform”), to nominate 
and elect a former ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) militant, Hira Sarania.41 The 
constituency is a reserved Scheduled Tribe seat, i.e., only a Scheduled Tribe nominee may 
stand from this particular constituency, and the authenticity of the nominee Hira Sarania’s ST 
status was much debated both during and after his campaign, especially by prominent Bodo 
groups (The Telegraph 2014a). Further speculation existed, given his links with ULFA, about 
the role of the Assamese intellectual elite, threatened by rising Bodo political power, in 
mobilising this anti-Bodo sentiment. Sujit, one of Sarania’s aides, and also one of the key 
organisers of the Ekya Mancha, all but confirmed this, when in my interview with him, he 
revealed that the idea to form the Ekya Mancha and nominate Sarania germinated at a 
conference of other ULFA members, leaders and intellectuals of the Assam movement.  
 
Nonetheless, regardless of the external machinations that may have led to the new political 
formation, it clearly touched a chord, and was able to mobilise a strong undercurrent of 
insecurity and resentment among non-Bodo communities. It came up repeatedly during 
interviews and conversations with Muslim voters, in particular, who viewed the vote as a way 
of asserting themselves in the BTAD. One Muslim voter from Kokrajhar district admitted, 
“Sarania has never come back to our village since we voted for him, and he hasn’t done 
anything for us. But it was important for us to vote for him then, we needed to have our 
voices heard”. Undoubtedly, the violent conflict of 2012 played a part in heightening the 
insecurity of non-Bodo groups, particularly Muslims. The massacre of a village of Bengali 
Muslims soon after the 2014 vote served to confirm this fear, that they were being 
“punished” for protesting through their votes (The Telegraph 2014b). 
 
                                                
41 In the 1990s, ULFA was the militant wing of the Assam movement, to carve out a separate country of Assam, 
away from the Union of India. In the last decade it has been largely dormant in that almost no violent attacks are 
carried out, but its cadres and leadership structure remain. 
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Observers have linked the result to a referendum on the politics of ethnic homelands, pointing 
out that the election shows that politics in the region is designed to be a zero-sum game, 
where one ethnic group must lose for others to win (Saikia 2015). For others, the election 
represented the potential for dynamic expressions of ethnic identities among non-Bodo 
groups (Dutta 2016). The election was also unique in that it showed the split among various 
Bodo factions that struggled to outbid one another in an attempt to claim true political 
representation for the Bodos (Saikia 2015). Five different Bodo candidates, some 
independent and some with political backing, stood for the Kokrajhar constituency seat, 
ultimately dividing the Bodo vote, even as non-Bodo groups consolidated theirs towards Hira 
Sarania. Two main groups emerged within the Bodos — those supporting the current ruling 
Bodoland Political Front (formed of the former militants who signed the BTC agreement with 
the Indian government), who support the status quo of the Council structure, and second, 
supporters of a range of independent candidates and changing local parties backed by the All 
Bodo Students Union. As a result, electorally, Bodo loyalties became divided, with dramatic 
results.  
 
As a former militant, Sarania represents a certain strong-man, protector identity, which he is 
aware of, and embodies in his political persona. Given the former militant character of the 
ruling party in the Council, this militarised image provided an important counter-point to the 
aggressive politics of the region (Baruah 2014). On a trip he made to Kokrajhar district in 
early 2017, I conducted an interview with him, where it became evident that the protector 
image is one he emphasises and uses effectively in his own political discourse. For instance, 
this is what he says about why he in particular was chosen to represent the constituency: 
 
“It’s because they [leaders in ULFA] knew that I work for the public. And ULFA is 
very popular in the BTAD, all the enemies [sic] are afraid of me. People see me as a 
symbol, a messenger, they chose me because they wanted security.” 
 
It is clear that he sees his role as that of providing security. In addition, while he qualifies 
technically as a Scheduled Tribe, he had specific views on what it meant to be tribal: 
 
“Of course I’m also tribal, so I was chosen. But I’m also different, I’m more like men 
[sic]. The Bodos are mentally different, tribals have different brains. I’m not like 
them; I don’t believe in killing or extremism”. 
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He does not identify with what he sees as tribal “mentality”, in fact he uses crude stereotypes 
about tribal communities as savage and prone to violence to justify his own ascent to power 
and legitimacy in representing non-tribal communities. This aversion to violence sits 
alongside his somewhat contradictory desire to be seen as threatening, as also his background 
as one of the leaders of a militant outfit that was involved in violence. Even though he is able 
to represent the constituency because of legally being classified as tribal, he does not identify 
with the group as such.  
 
The 2015 elections in the Bodoland Territorial Council bore the after-effects of this electoral 
victory as well. The Bodoland Political Front, a party of former Bodo militants which has 
won comfortably in both previous elections, barely scraped through with just the one seat 
they needed to form a majority. The Ekya Mancha, fresh from its victory, secured 8 of 40 
seats, as did some independents, the AIUDF (a “Muslim” party in Assam), an ABSU-backed 
party (what eventually became the United People’s Party, or UPP, after many name changes) 
and a lone member from the BJP (not significant for the outcome, but interesting in itself, as 
this had never happened before). All in all, the increasing allegations of corruption against 
the BPF, as well as the newly empowered Ekya Mancha, changed the electoral composition 
of the Council dramatically for the first time since its creation. The United People’s Party, 
with the support of the ABSU, had always commanded a degree of popular support in their 
movement for Bodoland — in this instance, playing the electoral field also seemed to pay off 
partially. Their leader in the Bodoland Territorial Council, Rangra, was chosen as leader of 
the opposition, and the Council assembly allowed for a space where he could vocalise his 
discord with the BPF. Strategically, though, Rangra noted, they had deliberately chosen the 
UPP as an entity separate from ABSU, despite the vast overlap in membership. In the 
Council assembly, Rangra and his colleagues raised issues specific to governance and 
corruption, and did not explicitly bring up the issue of Bodoland and separate statehood.  
 
When the 2016 election campaign kicked off, the electoral calculus changed again. The local 
ruling party, the Bodoland Political Front (BPF), tied up with the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), 
which was in power at the centre, and had never before won an election in Assam, although 
its growing presence was being felt in recent elections. India’s other major party, the Indian 
National Congress (INC or the Congress), which was in power in Assam at the time (and had 
been the incumbent party for 15 years), tied up with the ABSU-backed United People’s 
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Party. A third major player was the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF), a party that 
claims to represent the interests of Assam’s marginalised Muslims, and in particular is 
associated with the Bengali Muslim demographic. A last, though more marginal player in this 
election (following their success in the previous two elections, the coalition split), was the 
Ekya Mancha, the collective of non-Bodo organisations that voted into Hira Sarania into 
power, but had few candidates in this election, though with less vigorous campaigning. 
Eventually, the BJP secured 60 of the total 126 assembly seats in Assam, and along with its 
allies, the AGP and the BPF, comfortably staked a claim to forming the state government 
(Election Commission of India 2016). The 12 constituencies that fall within the BTAD were 
all won by the BPF. The election seemed to serve both as a vindication for the BPF (after its 
very close win in the Council election the year before), and on a state and national level, a 
seeming vindication for the right-wing politics of the BJP (more on this in Chapter 7). It 
seemed to show the multiple, and sometimes contrary calculus at play in these different 
elections — the same party (BPF) had been roundly defeated in one election, barely scraped 
through in a second, and swept all the seats to a grand victory in a third.  
 
While the results themselves are fascinating and lend themselves to many analyses about why 
certain candidates and parties won or lost, what I look at here is the campaign itself, and the 
performances that constitute it. Banerjee’s (2014) work on Indian politics turns away from 
the issue of what drives people towards certain parties or candidates, and looks instead at the 
question of why people vote at all, and what it represents for political identity. Here I take a 
similar approach, looking at certain performative elements in the campaigns, both from 
candidates and voters, to try and understand what these performances mean to them. 
Choosing particular candidates and parties, while not the central focus, nonetheless shows us 
how people think about politics, elections, and their role as voters and citizens. Looking at 
these performances and the responses to them also shed some light on how the different 
political identities are channelled at various levels.  
 
6.4 Patrons, clients and citizens 
6.4.1 Gaali, dhamki and election campaigns 
 
After the meeting in Makrabari, Rafiqul was clear about where the real issues were talked 
about — not at the meeting, but after it, away from it, separately. The meeting was part 
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performance, but this did not mean it was a farce. On the contrary, it represented to some 
extent the surface of the problems, it allowed a platform for people to express frustration 
about the lack of government action but equally, it allowed for politicians to respond with 
platitudes, and for this to be seemingly resolved within the structure of the meeting. This 
performance was only part of the electoral transaction taking place. 
 
This act of complaining exemplified one of two performance tropes in particular that repeated 
themselves in different campaign meetings across constituencies — the dhamki (threat) and 
the gaali (curse/complaint). They act in relation with each other, and especially animated 
many of the less structured “pocket” election campaign meetings. The dhamki was frequently 
employed by politicians, especially at smaller, pocket-level meetings, as a means to coerce 
votes out of people. At a BPF pocket meeting in the Muslim neighbourhood of Anthaiguri 
village, Nazim, the head of the BPF block committee, warned voters: 
 
“It is very sad that Adaram [former MCLA from the BPF who lost the 2015 Council 
election to an Ekya Mancha candidate] lost. We [the party] can tell how many votes 
come from what area, we will feel very bad if we don’t get many votes from this area. 
If we get more votes, we will do more work. We know how many votes we got from 
this area in the MCLA election.” 
 
Similarly, Pramila Rani, the current MLA also did not mince words at a pocket meeting in a 
mixed village of Bodos and Adivasis: 
 
“If you don’t vote for us, we won’t give you anything — no cycles, no umbrellas. 
Those who are from the ‘anti party’ [supporting opposition parties] won’t get a single 
rupee.” 
 
Such threats were a routine part of the campaign trail in the BTAD, and marked both a 
continuity and rupture from the past. Voters were often quick to remember the early elections 
after the creation of the BTC, where areas were rigidly divided as being under the control of 
one militant group or another, and even attending the meeting of a rival party meant violence. 
The BPF, newly formed with former cadres of the Bodo Liberation Tigers, held elections at 
gunpoint, capturing booths and forcing people to vote and threatening violent consequences if 
they were found voting otherwise. The dhamki in 2016 represented to some degree a 
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continuity of this process — being threatened with withdrawal of services and support — and 
to some extent, also saw the consequences change dramatically. For many Muslims, 
however, the elections following the 2012 riots also represented a return to violent 
consequences, given the attack on Bengali Muslims after Sarania’s election.  
 
The underlying relationship of the dhamki with the election campaign also represents what 
has been studied as patronage politics — the idea of a politician promising to deliver 
something to a specific group of people in return for votes cast. Indeed, many prominent 
works on patronage politics emphasise that the relationship is instrumental — citizens cast 
votes in exchange for promised goods, schemes, employment, and even cash transactions 
(Chandra 2004, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). In this formulation, the patron-client 
relationship is a purely transactional one. It is not a view unheard of in the villages 
themselves either. Noren, a Bodo respondent from Uzanpara, shakes his head after my many 
questions about how people vote and why, and says,  
 
“Look, in the end it boils down to the night before the election. Everyone sits 
together, in the village, to decide who we will vote for. And then, workers from 
different parties come and give the villagers sums of money, and whoever gives the 
largest amount will win the election. In the past, only the BPF has really been able to 
do this.”  
 
In his formulation, the election is literally understood as an auction — the highest bidder 
wins the votes. More recent scholarship has contested this instrumentalist view, and talked 
about exchanges of money in particular, being representative not of mere transactional value, 
but as reproducing and creating social relationships between different actors in the election 
(Bjorkman 2014). The links of contemporary patronage to the land-owning patron-centred 
jajmani system also highlights its function not just as a pure economic relationship, but also a 
social one (Piliavsky 2014b). It is a moral form, where relationships of patronage also 
express what clients (in this case voters) expect from a patron, an expression of what a 
relationship with a political leader should be like, and what they represent (Ibid.).  
 
The value of what a leader symbolises is something Noren also acknowledges, when talking 
about Sarania’s win in the 2014 election. “Ekya Mancha didn’t have money to give, but still 
Hira Sarania won the election. People must have felt very strongly about him.” Anwar, from 
	   148	  
a nearby Muslim village, who also voted for Sarania, confirms that the reasons to vote 
transcended the calculations of give and take, “Even though we had never seen Sarania 
before, and even though he hasn’t once come to our village after he won, or ever given us 
anything, I’m glad we voted for him. We needed to send a message to the Bodos”. A similar 
sentiment is echoed in Makrabari, where it is acknowledged that it’s not Sarania’s ability to 
provide goods, cash, or even actual security, but what he represents symbolically for non-
Bodos in an unfair political system.   
 
If Gilmartin’s analysis of the ideal, “enchanted individual” voter falls short of explaining the 
multiplicity of decision-making processes in democracy, related literature has explored other 
political actions that deviate from liberal democratic ideas, but are not necessarily seen as 
illegitimate. While the idea of political representation is a ubiquitous one, the particular form 
that it takes, and what terms like “people” or “representation” may ultimately mean varies 
across different context, even when the language of statehood and politics might appear the 
same (Spencer 2007, p. 12). 
 
Kanchan Chandra’s work on patronage posits a link between patronage and ethnicity: in the 
absence of information, voters choose leaders and parties on the basis of ethnic “head 
counts”, being most likely to choose leaders from their own ethnic backgrounds, with the 
idea that they would be the most likely to deliver goods and services to their own groups 
(Chandra 2004, 2007). Studies on Northeast Indian electoral politics have often observed that 
ethnicity and ethnic cleavages are influential in determining electoral outcomes, unlike other 
parts of India where caste has emerged as an important factor (Baruah and Dev 2006). Even 
as patterns of clientelism similar to other parts of India emerge in the Northeast, a key 
difference is the way in which tribal and ethnic identities are employed in election campaigns 
(Guenauer 2017). 
 
This strategy is used by many politicians in BTAD as well, who appeal to voters on the 
grounds of ethnicity. The UPP, for instance, campaigned in Bodo villages on the platform of 
their support for Bodoland, and the need for separate statehood to advance the situation of 
Bodos. In Muslim villages, this was underplayed, and instead it was their alliance with the 
“secular” Indian National Congress party that was emphasised. The Bodoland Political Front 
also employed this strategy, not by talking explicitly about the creation of Bodoland in Bodo 
villages, but by stressing the need for increased emphasis on Bodo educational advancement, 
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housing allowances, and so on. In non-Bodo villages, some of the same talking points were 
employed regarding housing and welfare schemes, but an increased emphasis was placed on 
non-Bodo representation in the VCDC structure.  
 
Ethnicity as a reason to court votes was emphasised in unusual, roundabout ways. Chandan, a 
Bodo candidate of the AIUDF party, positioned his own ethnic affiliation to AIUDF’s 
Muslim base by way of association. With Kokrajhar East being a constituency reserved for 
candidates of Scheduled Tribe status, a party like the AIUDF, which is seen to cater to 
Muslim interests, has to field a non-Muslim, ST candidate. Wearing a kurta-pajama, a dress 
that in the BTAD, at least, is associated with Muslims, Chandan remained silent for much of 
the meeting in Durabari village, letting other (Muslim) representatives of the meeting talk for 
him instead. He stood up and only spoke briefly: “I’m Bodo, but I will work for everyone. 
Vote for me because I am with huzoor [AIUDF chief Badruddin Ajmal]. Trust him because 
you are Muslim, trust me because of him.” Other party workers from the AIUDF also repeat 
this point: vote for Chandan despite his ethnicity, because of huzoor (and his ties to 
Muslims). Even in seemingly circumventing the ethnic argument for casting a vote, it was 
ultimately the ethnic argument that he returned to. For some voters, the events of 2012 also 
provided a valid reason to vote along ethnic lines. In Besalguri, another Muslim village in 
Kokrajhar East that suffered a lot of damage during the 2012 riots, Mehrunisssa, an elderly 
Muslim voter assured us (only after ensuring that neither I nor my research assistant had any 
ties to Bodos) that everyone in the village would vote for AIUDF, very few would vote for 
either Bodo party. For them, she asserted, voting along religious lines was important, it was 
the Islamic organisation Jamaat-e-Islami that gave them houses and relief rations when their 
village burnt down during the riots. 
 
In other situations, however the relationship of gaali and dhamki to actual voting strategy is 
complex. In the vignette above, Rafiqul made a clear distinction between what happens in 
public campaign meetings (even small, village-specific ones), and where, as he says, “real 
demands are made”, in this case, separate from the performance of the public meeting. 
Despite Rafiqul’s excoriating remarks (gaali) against Pramila Rani and the BPF, however, 
both he and Jamal, another resident of Makrabari, see the BPF as the only viable choice in 
this election. This is primarily, in their view, to keep out the UPP, a party associated with 
Bodos, Bodoland, and in their mind, Bodo militants. “They are all the same”, Rafiqul says, 
shaking his head when I ask if there aren’t distinctions between ABSU, the student group that 
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now leads the Bodoland movement, and militant groups like the NDFB, who seek the 
overthrow of the Indian state itself, and are responsible for violence, kidnappings, shootings 
and so on. For Rafiqul, Jamal, and others in Makrabari who have experienced violence by 
Bodo militants first hand, the prospect of Bodoland, or the UPP in power as a party 
sympathetic to the cause, is far worse than the silence of their MLA while they were labelled 
Bangladeshi. As Rafiqul puts it: 
 
“At least with the BPF we know we will get something, at least they will speak to us 
with respect. Pramila Rani didn’t say anything in public, this is true, but she couldn’t. 
Behind closed doors she really supported us though. It’s not as if Ekya Mancha came 
out to support us either.” 
 
In private, then, quite different from their public anger against the BPF workers on the issue 
of Pramila Rani’s silence, they are more sympathetic of the political calculations she must 
make, and her need to stay loyal to the Bodo community as well as keep her Muslim voters 
happy. Nonetheless, they do not mistake this pragmatism for genuine concern, and are aware 
that just as she represents the least bad option for them, for her they too represent a necessity, 
given their numbers. The BPF also has a reputation for being corrupt, so much so that, 
Rafiqul admits, even many poor Bodos have not benefitted from their being in power. 
Nonetheless, Makrabari residents claim to vote for the BPF despite the presence of the 
AIUDF, a party that openly represents the interests of Muslims. In the BTAD, though, this 
calculus does not work: 
 
“To keep the UPP out, we would vote for the BPF even over the AIUDF. If we voted 
for the AIUDF, we would take a vote away from the BPF, which would make the 
UPP more likely to win. So even though it is ironic that Muslims are voting for a BJP 
ally, it is the safest option in the BTAD.” 
 
The group of 10 or 12 men who are sitting around us, with Rafiqul and Jamal, all nod their 
heads in agreement with this strategy. There is no question that the rise of the right-wing, 
minority-loathing BJP nationally has posed a threat for them, but they are also clear that 
whatever the level of the election — national, state or council-level — in the BTAD, it is 
local politics that primarily determines voting strategy. As also borne out by other studies 
focussing on the links between ethnicity and voting — voters do not simply choose the 
	   151	  
candidate that is of their own ethnicity, their choices are also informed by the likelihood of 
the candidate winning (Choi 2009, Heath et al. 2015).  
 
In Anthaiguri, another Muslim respondent, Abdul, outlines a different strategic reason to vote 
for the BPF, and one more closely related to the dhamki — fear. Abdul is a BPF worker at the 
time of this election, although he is openly critical of the party, and a few months after the 
election, he leaves, citing a lack of real opportunity for Muslims in the party leadership. Were 
the Muslims of a constituency to come together and vote for Muslim interests outright, say, 
by voting for the AIUDF, the ruling BPF, by analysing booth level data, would be able to tell 
how many votes they got from where, and in turn “punish” the concerned village. He is 
vague about the form of this punishment, unclear whether it refers to retaliatory violence or 
absence of spending. Given the attack on Bengali Muslims immediately after the 2014 
election, however, it is not an unfounded fear. This links back to the multiple meanings of 
patronage, the ability of voters to see the distinction between “good” and “bad” patronage, 
and ability of patronage to become, especially for the most vulnerable and marginalised 
groups, a coercive relationship instead of a mutually constitutive one (Piliavsky 2014b, pp. 
25-26). As Berenschot (2011c) observes, poorer or more marginalised citizens are more 
susceptible to being dependent on patronage relationships because of their dependence on 
political networks to provide access to state institutions; access that they cannot always gain 
independently. As the structure and functioning of the VCDC also shows, in the BTAD this 
has all but been institutionalised in the form of politics-as-governance.  
 
6.4.2 Votes without ballots — patronage, ethnicity and local politics 
 
If elections at national, state and council levels represent decision-making at electoral levels 
of governance, the VCDC structure shows how decision-making at the village level adds 
another dimension to understanding political identities. As with elections, and perhaps more 
so, Gilmartin’s deconstruction of idealised notions of secret ballot and individual voting as 
the basis of democratic functioning are challenged, as consensus-building often emerges as 
an alternative method of making decisions. 
 
In May 2017, The Assam government launched a programme called Amar Gaon Amar 
Achoni (AGAA, which translates to our village, our scheme). The basic principle is of 
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participatory citizen governance. Over the course of a month, between May and June 2017, 
village level meetings were to be held in villages across Assam, where village residents 
would specify what their welfare needs were in the areas of housing, food rations, 
infrastructure, livelihood generation, social security and so on. Monitoring committees would 
be formed at the VCDC level (in the case of the BTAD), to ensure that the four-year 
programmes that were devised were carried through.  
 
At the beginning of the month-long campaign to launch the programme, there was an initial 
meeting to explain the functioning of the programme, followed by another meeting to decide 
on which programmes were most appropriate to undertake for the village or hamlet 
concerned. Based on this, the committee would devise an action plan to operationalise these 
schemes. A junior engineer from the Block level would be involved in chairing and 
conducting the meetings, and would also document them (via pictures), which would then be 
shared on a WhatsApp group, monitored by the Rural Development department at the state 
level in Assam, to ensure that the meetings were being conducted in each village and with 
different VCDC members.  
 
In Uzanpara, the junior engineer assigned to accompany the meeting (and also one who often 
dealt with VCDC members with respect to other projects) was Sushanta, whose presence was 
essential to every meeting. Meetings were run by him and VCDC chairman Moinuddin, with 
the two first jointly explaining the purpose of the programme, usually at the first meeting. In 
this, as well as the follow-up meeting conducted a few weeks later, village residents would 
then collectively spell out their demands for the villages — some at an individual level (to do 
with pensions, or housing allotments), or a collective level (infrastructure such as roads, 
canals, wells, or boundary walls).  
 
Many of these meetings contained some of the performative elements of politics that 
Banerjee (2007) discusses with regard to elections. In a similar vein, many of the participants 
were sceptical about its outcomes, including Sushanta. For him, the AGAA was just a new 
iteration of previous similar government programmes.42 “People have been fooled many 
times, that’s why they don’t participate as enthusiastically”, he says. “But this is a way to end 
the contractor raj, now if any department gets new funds, it must consider these schemes 
                                                
42  For instance, the Raijor Padulit Raijor Sarkar (RPRS) programme (Government of Assam 2014). 
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[decided during the AGAA meetings] first.” Ironically, a few weeks after the AGAA 
meetings were completed, Sushanta was arrested in connection with corruption charges 
relating to his participation in exactly the kind of contractor raj that he was critiquing.  
 
While many at the meetings were also cynical, and expressed this cynicism in the form of 
complaints for previous failures (similar in some ways to gaalis in election campaigns), in 
other instances, the discussions and decision-making proceeded in earnest, and revealed 
underlying networks and tensions. One of Mukulika Banerjee’s central questions in her 2014 
book Why India Votes expands on the titular question — despite the corruption, inefficiencies 
and multiple failures of governance, why do Indians continue to come out and vote in droves 
in local, state or national elections (Banerjee 2014)? One might extend this question to 
political participation in general — as Sushanta says, people have been failed again and 
again, and yet, even at the AGAA meetings, an effort was made to come together, make 
demands, and attempt to claim one’s rights in whatever public forum was made available.  
 
When the second decision-making meeting for the AGAA came around, where residents had 
to select a few schemes or programmes on a priority basis (which, as Sushanta would explain 
to the assembled crowd in each meeting, would be implemented first), decisions were once 
again not parallel to the ethnic lines along which politicians often expressed political 
citizenship. Instead, concerns were framed around distinctively local understandings, 
reflecting an intuitive grasp of what the AGAA had the capacity to deliver, if anything. 
 
In one Uzanpara hamlet, one of the priorities was to build a new community hall, but in an 
area that was convenient, but also comfortable, to both Bodos and Muslims, with VCDC 
member Mofidul observing that the previous proposed venue was closer to the Muslim side, 
and since the 2012 riots, some Bodos were afraid of venturing there. In two separate hamlets, 
the issue of boundary walls emerged as critical — many buildings, such as schools, mosques 
or temples were able to raise money for the construction of the building itself, but 
constructing a boundary wall around them (often as much to prevent cattle from getting in as 
for safety) remained elusive for years afterwards. Thus, in AGAA meetings, boundary walls 
were a priority. This led to two interesting decisions involving boundary walls — in one case, 
the boundary wall between a mosque and the local primary school were to be shared, and in 
another, the Muslim graveyard and prayer ground (idgah) and the Bodo temple were given 
equal priority. In a subversive act of symbolism, walls, which often represent separation and 
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expulsion, became sites of compromise, consensus, and shared spaces. Similarly, when 
deciding which were the poorest who still needed to be included in the list to receive 
subsidised food, two Muslim and two Bodo names were put forward in each hamlet, with 
Muslim members often supporting the inclusion of a Bodo name, especially in the case of 
those who were elderly and disabled, and vice versa for Bodos with Muslim names. This 
became a routine practice in each meeting. 
 
Just as both elections and the AGAA programme showed contrasting ideas of how political 
decision-making is seen, even ideas of political patronage emerged as more complex than just 
falling strictly along the lines of ethnicity, as Abdul’s experience with the BPF showed. The 
appointment of VCDC members too depends on acts of patronage, but once again, these 
networks prove more complex than it would appear.  
 
Before Moinuddin was appointed chairman of the West Amguri VCDC in 2015, the 
chairman’s post had been occupied for the last ten years by Moniram Musahary, a Bodo BPF 
party worker. According to stories told by Uzanpara BPF workers and VCDC members, 
Moniram was not re-nominated in 2015, at least partly because cuts from different welfare 
schemes and contractor projects were overly ostentatious, perhaps also posing a threat to 
other party leadership in the region, such as Diganta and Amarjit. In light of this, and in line 
with promises made during the election, Moinuddin was the first Muslim VCDC chairman 
appointed in Uzanpara. But other Muslim VCDC members, such as Kader Ali and Mofidul, 
were not happy with this outcome. I bumped into Kader, along with BPF workers Abdul and 
Noren in Kokrajhar town, doing the rounds of the secretariat on “member business”, which 
usually meant trying to be reimbursed for projects they had already undertaken, and money 
they had already spent. Standing there, however, they began to express their dissatisfaction 
with Moinuddin as a chairman, “I don’t want a Muslim chairman next time!”, said Kader 
angrily, “He never gives anyone any schemes, keeps them all to himself. I’m going to 
complain to Diganta and Amarjit — I have already mentioned it to Diganta but he dismissed 
me”.  
 
A few days later, in his hybrid home-office space, Kader had calmed down, but continued to 
object to Moinuddin’s appointment. “He never gives us any schemes unless he feels like it. 
There was a housing project for which he chose a beneficiary who was not even poor, and not 
even a BPF supporter! Instead, he went and gave it to a BJP supporter. He should be helping 
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out BPF supporters first”. He mused whether he could have done something about it, “The 
VCDC chairman is selected with some consultation of the members, at the time I supported 
him, though others like Mofidul were already opposed to him, I should have listened to them, 
I’m a fool. If Moniram had been nominated again I would definitely have supported him 
instead.” 
 
Different aspects of patronage are at play here. Kader regrets the appointment of a Muslim 
chairman who is not favouring Muslims — while there is an expectation that ethnicity might 
play a role in how he conducts himself as chairman, Moinuddin has subverted the 
expectation, causing Kader to wish he could have sided with a different, non-Muslim 
candidate. Ethnicity is a factor (Moinuddin’s appointment is also to do with the BPF’s 
political calculations in continuing to be perceived as the “least harmful” Bodo party to 
Muslims), but is also not the only driving factor when it comes to distributing power in 
patronage systems. Having faced disappointment, Kader was now ready to re-calculate his 
strategy and team up with others like Noren (who, like many other Bodos in the Uzanpara 
BPF, also supported Moinuddin initially) to oust Moinuddin, to regain his own place in the 
patronage network. Others like Mofidul did not factor ethnicity in to begin with, instead 
petitioning for Moniram to get yet another term.  
 
Such findings could of course be romanticised to paint a picture of inter-ethnic relations that 
defy polarising efforts. This would neither be completely true, nor completely false. In the 
Uzanpara hamlet community centre, one of the concerns voiced at the meeting is of Bodos’ 
continuing fear of going over to “the Muslim side” of the village, painting a less-than-rosy 
picture of inter-group harmony. On the other hand, it is also clear that day-to-day politics is 
about getting along with your neighbours because this is the pragmatic thing to do, especially 
when there is economic interdependence. Everyday acts of decision-making are inherently 
political, even if they might appear purely technical (Anand 2017), and in making these 
choices, residents display a particular worldview of politics that does rely solely on simple 
categories of ethnic cleavage, even if they may at other times fit into these macro narratives. 
Along with the strategic decisions made about voting for candidates of one’s own ethnicity 
(by the likes of Rafiqul, Abdul and Jamal, for instance), this is in line with Piliavsky’s 
contention that patronage is essentially a flexible relationship, and not fixed by one criteria, 
or a singular political identity (Piliavsky 2014b). 
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In Makrabari, by contrast, everyday decision making at a collective, political level is all but 
absent, given the extraordinary circumstances of the residents. In being removed from what 
they consider their home in Dewalgaon, residents are unable to participate in local Makrabari 
politics, given the constant sense of living on borrowed land. In Dewalgaon, their 
involvement with their former VCDC is restricted only to receiving “distribution” materials 
from time to time — blankets, umbrellas, and so on, which are few in number and 
sporadically received. The other, more important function fulfilled by their VCDC is to 
provide certificates confirming that they are officially from Dewalgaon, a crucial document, 
like electoral rolls, that enables them to prove their legality in the BTAD. It forms yet another 
aspect of their survival strategy. 
 
Elections represent one of the few instances (as also seen in the opening vignette) where 
Makrabari residents are given an opportunity to express a political identity, make demands 
that are (at least performatively) legitimate in the eyes of the state, and counter the everyday 
invisiblisation that renders them to the very margins of political life in Bodoland. That is of 
course, not to say that Makrabari residents do not exercise agency or make choices on an 
everyday basis, but that the opportunity to make political choices of the everyday variety is 
often denied to them. Indeed, an important political act from their perspective has been to 
retain this dual, contradictory political voter identity of being physically resident in one place 
(Makrabari), and politically relevant in another by staying on the electoral rolls of 
Dewalgaon.  
 
6.5 Conclusion: Citizenship and political practice 
 
The performances and the decision-making that surrounded political acts — both by 
politicians and citizens — shed light on the ideas of citizenship that are held and practised in 
everyday political life. Both in moments of rupture and exception, political processes 
represent underlying, everyday political practices and the ongoing relationship between 
citizens and the state. Politics provides multiple lenses through which to approach the 
question of citizenship in the BTAD.  
 
For Muslims, for instance, as the opening vignette showed, the first and most visceral 
connection is through being considered a legal citizen in the first place. Makrabari’s residents 
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have experienced first hand the threat of being excluded from voting and exercising this 
citizenship right altogether, through being classified “Doubtful voters”. Their religious and 
linguistic profiles render them more vulnerable to bureaucratic expulsion by the state, 
although as the campaign meeting showed, this relationship is not without complexity, as 
agents of the state also legitimise their presence by campaigning there in the first place. 
 
Using ethnicity as a means of constructing a citizen is echoed in campaign speeches and 
addresses to different communities by multiple politicians and party workers at rallies and 
meetings of various sizes. Along with dhamki, their appeals to vote often fell into classic 
patronage-based ideas of how citizens respond to politics — through choosing members from 
their own ethnic groups, and through promises of material benefits. To some extent, these 
ideas also found resonance, as with Abdul, who took the threat literally, especially because of 
his own ethnic identity. For him, physical violence was not an unlikely outcome of being 
“punished” for voting along ethnic lines, along with material deprivation.  
 
Nonetheless, this passive construction of citizens provided only a one-dimensional picture of 
how votes were cast, and what performances citizens themselves undertook during the 
election. The gaali, frequently vocalised at smaller pocket meetings, represented a reclaiming 
of the space of the threat with vocal disgruntlement. In James Holston’s (2008, 2009) work 
on Brazil, urban citizens on the peripheries reclaim their sense of citizenship, despite being 
marginalised and excluded from Brazil’s citizenship regime. From their position of relative 
disempowerment, they nonetheless appropriate the language of rights, and reclaim spaces 
based on existing discourses seen as legitimate in the eyes of the state. In this vein, residents 
of the BTAD also exercise the citizenship rights that often exist as abstract concepts, by 
standing up at meetings and expressing their displeasure. Politicians listen to a range of 
grievances — wells that remain undug, bridges that remain unbuilt, fear that goes unchecked 
as insecurity continues (especially in the wake of the riots). Elections then become a rare 
moment of order being restored to the functioning of the Indian state (Banerjee 2014), in 
which it is possible for citizens to complain and politicians to listen. Ahuja and Chhibber 
(2012) make a similar observation when looking at why the poorest groups vote. Their study 
concludes that while partly motivated by patronage or material benefits, voting for the most 
marginalised groups is the primary mode of expressing citizenship. Since membership in 
civic and other associations is low among these groups, “political parties emerge as the most 
plausible agent responsible for transmitting the language of rights” (Ibid. p .408).  
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It is not just that the gaali represents a cathartic moment of venting one’s frustration, it is an 
important element of the election spectacle. If elections are like festivals and rituals (Banerjee 
2007, 2014), giving gaalis is an important and meaningful performance of that ritual. It is not 
simply delivered in the heat of the moment, it is planned, and anticipated. At a pocket 
meeting in Kokrajhar East, Amarjit, the current MCLA campaigning for his party said, “Now 
that I’m here, feel free to give me as many gaalis as you want. Tell me what’s working, and 
what is not.” Whether his intent is to respond genuinely to the grievances aired or not, he is 
nonetheless prepared for it to happen. One elderly Bodo man in Amarjit’s constituency said, 
much before he even attended any meetings, “even though I think the politicians are useless, I 
will go, and I will give gaalis about what they have not done for us.” Like a ritual, it is a form 
of performance that is anticipated before it has begun, despite also being and appearing 
spontaneous — in that the politician themselves may not always know exactly the form or 
content the gaali will take.  
 
The multiple scales at which political identities are expressed also make for a dynamic 
expression of one’s citizenship. By electing Hira Sarania, for instance, non-Bodo voters 
chose to use a national platform to express a more grounded and local need for the state to 
protect all its citizens, regardless of ethnicity. The same voters, however, at the Assembly 
elections, understood the value of sticking with one “Bodo party” over the other, because of 
greater perceived room to negotiate their rights to citizenship. The village level, particularly 
the hamlets within the larger village emerged as the primary site for the most theatrical 
performances of politics in the BTAD — the gaali, the dhamki, and the decision-making 
practices that surrounded the AGAA programme. This scale also proved useful for enacting 
different kinds of patronage politics — threats, promises, and offers of allegiance. Reigning 
political wisdom would suggest that the smaller the scale of governance, the greater the 
accountability, but equally, decentralisation of power also led to greater instances and 
opportunities for the exercise of patronage politics (Sadanandan 2012). While an instrumental 
view of patronage would mean this is detrimental for local politics, a more complex picture is 
painted when elements of accountability are seen as being built into patronage networks 
themselves, and both rights and patronage politics emerge as means of carving out spaces of 
citizenship.  
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7.  OUTSIDERS AT HOME 
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CHAPTER 7. OUTSIDERS AT HOME: NEW EXCLUSIONS AND THE HINDU 
RIGHT WING 
 
“Now they’re telling people what to wear. We don’t need their priests from Uttar Pradesh.” 
- Kampa Borgoyary, Deputy Chief of the BTC 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the process of creating Others in the construction of citizens in the 
BTAD and Assam, and examines how contemporary Indian politics may have an effect on 
the manner in which these categories are shaped, much as erstwhile political processes and 
structures have affected the way these categories were constructed. 
 
In Assam’s politics specifically, outsiders and their exclusion have been an explicit part of 
the vocabulary of citizenship, as reinforced by the Assam movement of the 1980s against 
immigration from Bangladesh. In the last two decades or so, this discourse has sharpened 
further, with the outsider being located now as both Bangladeshi and Muslim, thus turning 
every Bengali-speaking Muslim resident of Assam into a possible threat. 
 
In contemporary India, after the election of the Bhartiya Janata Party in 2014 to the national 
government, right-wing Hindu nationalism has seen a definite ascent across the country. The 
election of the BJP to Assam’s state government, for the first time in 2016, poses the 
question: will Assam (and the rest of Northeast India), with its mix of ethnicities and 
religions, follow the path of many other regions in the country? Are the notions of outsiders 
and exclusions to citizenship changing as Hindu nationalist groups, both political and 
societal, assert their presence in the region? Moreover, if that is so, what new sense of 
citizenship or belonging is being constructed in the process? In this chapter, I look at how 
ideas of inclusion and exclusion have been expressed at various moments, and how the 
growing Hindu fundamentalist movement could alter these, while also building on them.  
 
7.2 Hindu nationalism: Alternative ways of being Indian 
 
While present-day Hindu nationalism rose to mainstream prominence in the 1990s, its 
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historical origins go back further, to reformist movements within Hindu religion. In the first 
instance, Hindu mobilisation occurred in the form of resistance to European dominance in the 
19th century, through reformist movements within Hinduism such as the Brahma Samaj 
(originating in Bengal, and also the movement that initially converted many Bodos to 
Hinduism), and the Arya Samaj, first active in Punjab. These movements, along with others 
such as the Sanatan Dharma, coalesced to form the Hindu Mahasabha in 1915, although it 
gained proper momentum only in the 1920s, largely in response to insecurity over Muslim 
mobilisation in colonial India (Jaffrelot 2007, p. 12). While resisting British imperialism was 
one motive, these movements, led mainly by upper-caste (Brahmin) elites, were also 
mobilised against growing lower caste actions that were rejecting Hindu hierarchy — instead, 
Hindu consolidation was to serve as a force that brought these oppressed classes into their 
fold (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, pp. 181–82).  
 
While the Mahasabha initially worked as a movement within the Congress party, it became 
its own political party, under the leadership of V. D. Savarkar, in the late 1930s (Ibid., p. 14). 
According to Jaffrelot, Savarkar is credited with turning the mobilisation towards the idea of 
“Hindutva” — a Hindu nationalism, distinct from the secular nationalism promoted by 
Congress leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru — where Hindus were the original 
autochthonous people of India, with a distinct territorial, racial, and linguistic identity. As the 
literature from other parts of India and my own fieldwork below goes on to show, these ideas 
become crucial for tribal regions. The All India Hindu Mahasabha established an Assam 
chapter, which protested vehemently against the settlement of land to Muslims, berating the 
government of Assam for not taking note of “the interests of the indigenous people of all 
communities of Assam Valley” (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library 1944, p. 7). In 
addition, in the period immediately following Partition, it regularly campaigned on behalf of 
Hindu refugees from East Pakistan (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library n.d., p. 37).43  
 
Critical to the rise of Hindu nationalism was the formation of different social and political 
organisations, which eventually replaced the Mahasabha. Chief among them is the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh, set up in the mid-1920s in Nagpur, Maharashtra, with the aim of 
disciplining and training a Hindu nation from small village and neighbourhood level shakhas 
(branches) (Jaffrelot 2007, p. 16). Another important organisation in the present day is the 
                                                
43 Although the document is undated it indicates it is from the 1950s. 
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Vishwa Hindu Parishad, founded in Bombay in 1964, which focussed both on working in 
tribal areas, as well as the important consolidation of the Hindu diaspora abroad (Van der 
Veer 1994). These organisations reinforced ideas of the Hindu nation, and of the Hindu race 
as being especially “tolerant” and “weak”, and therefore susceptible to attacks by “foreign” 
religions, specifically Islam and Christianity (Van der Veer 1994). Such conceptions drew on 
orientalist ideas of Hindu civilisation, drawing on neatly partitioned “Hindu” and “Muslim” 
communities, categories that were reinforced in the colonial period through practices like 
separate electorates, for instance (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, p. 180). These were, 
ultimately, not different from categorisation practices in the Northeast, discussed in earlier 
chapters.  
 
The political wing of the Hindu nationalist movement has also played an important role in the 
spread of these ideas — beginning with the creation of the Jan Sangh, the political wing of 
the movement, in 1951, its allying with the Janata Party in 1971, and finally the break-up of 
this party, and the creation of the present-day Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980 (Jaffrelot 
2007). While there have been significant diversions at different periods of time, the BJP has 
allied itself closely with the VHP and RSS, and in contemporary India, particularly, there is 
an overlap of membership in the BJP and one or more of its allied outfits in the Hindu 
nationalist movements, even at the highest levels (including India’s Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi, and Assam’s Chief Minister, Sarbananda Sonowal).   
 
7.2.1 Hindu nationalism and the tribal question 
 
For the Hindu right wing, tribes were viewed as being “backward Hindus” (Xaxa 2005, p. 
1364), imperfectly integrated members of Hindu society. The introduction of separate 
electorates in colonial India in 1909 brought about a need to consolidate Hindu numbers, and 
thus tribes were mobilised by Hindu nationalist groups to enumerate themselves as “Hindu”, 
rather than practitioners of tribal religions, in the Indian census (Ibid., p. 1367). Post 
Independence census-taking made this absorption nearly complete. Bringing tribal and lower 
caste groups within the realm of Hindutva has been an explicit aim of the Hindu nationalist 
movement since the 1970s (Van der Veer 1994). For tribal areas, this was undertaken by the 
VHP in the form of Vanvasi Kalyan Ashrams set up to provide social welfare (such as 
scholarships and medical centres) to tribal communities, along with influencing religious 
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practices in line with mainstream Hindu practices (Hansen 1999).  Education has always been 
a key method for the inculcation of Hindu nationalist identities in tribal areas, through the 
setting up of schools and training camps, and even the creation of new textbooks that 
emphasise the “foreign-ness” of Muslims and Christians. In addition, education is a way to 
inculcate masculine ideas of discipline and morality (Sundar 2004, Froerer 2007). The 
Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram hostels are sites for right-wing groups to reclaim the politics of 
indigeneity (Sundar 2002). 
Baviskar notes in her study of encounters between Hindu nationalism and a tribal community 
in central India that for Hindu nationalist groups, the inclusion of tribal communities within 
the Hindu fold is considered to be by default, aided by the Indian census listing them as 
Hindu unless they explicitly state affiliation with indigenous religions or Christianity 
(Baviskar 2005). Discourses that fold tribal societies within a wider Hindu society often 
allude to these indigenous communities’ inherent rights to the natural resources they inhabit 
and are surrounded by — jal, jungle, zameen — water, forests, and land. Ideas of 
autochthonous virtue (Ibid, p. 5109) frame indigenous culture as inherently spatial, and 
linked to a fixed place, an idea that resonates with the way the colonial administration saw 
these communities, and finds continuity in the framework of Hindu nationalism. Baviskar 
further points out an inherent contradiction in this view — while there is a tendency to 
romanticise tribal connections to natural resources, at the same time, these very resources are 
constantly under threat of destruction by a developmental state. 
While Baviskar is referring to the larger discourse of the Indian state and its construction of 
indigeneity, the argument finds resonance within Hindu nationalism as well — it 
romanticises and essentialises tribal culture, while also supporting a neoliberal, market-
oriented developmentalist agenda that threatens those very links. Mawdsley (2006) has 
pointed out the susceptibility of certain environmental discourses to being appropriated by a 
neo-traditionalist Hindutva agenda, for political gain. The terms on which claims to 
indigeneity and right to resources are made by the Hindu right are different from the basis on 
which Adivasi struggles are fought, for example, on the issue of displacement because of 
large development projects. The idea of Hindu indigeneity is built on the exclusion, often 
violently, of other religious minorities (Baviskar 2005). 
The construction and vilification of an Other is central to the process of creating a sense of a 
Hindu community and a Hindu self. Depending on the context, either Christians or Muslims 
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(and in some cases, both) are the threatening Other to blame for a tribal community’s 
backwardness and poverty. In a study of the pogrom against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, 
Lobo notes that the communalisation of an Adivasi community that participated in the riots 
was partially brought about through right-wing groups painting Muslims as an exploitative 
group (Lobo 2002). Among other things, this helped break political alliances between 
Adivasi, Dalit and Muslim groups against upper-caste Hindu hegemony in the state. In 
Froerer’s study of another central Indian tribal community in Chhattisgarh, it was a Christian 
Other that was invoked by Hindu right-wing groups (Froerer 2006). Here, the rise and 
persistence of right-wing Hindu groups was also a response to the strong presence of the 
church in the area, an institution that is perceived to threaten the Hindutva agenda on a 
national scale.  
In accounts of both Chhattisgarh and Gujarat, there is great emphasis on the involvement of 
Hindutva groups in local affairs, and the role that this plays in the process of 
communalisation. This allows for a reframing of local practices or conflicts into 
confrontations between Hindus and Others. In Froerer’s study, a dispute about too much 
liquor being sold to, and bought by, Hindu men quickly descends into a tirade against 
“Christians” (not Oraons, the local indigenous group) corrupting Hindu society through 
liquor sales when a right-wing Hindu group gets involved. Thus a village level conflict, 
which had arisen in the past and been dealt with on local terms, between Oraons and Hindus, 
was re-appropriated by the Hindu group as a religious clash, and gained legitimacy as this 
interpretation was supported by the village headman. It is the conflation of “Oraon” and 
“Christian” in a public context (the meeting) that marks an important moment in the 
communalisation of relations in the village (Froerer 2006).  
The process of inclusion within the Hindutva fold through the creation of Muslim and 
Christian Others is accompanied by a process of influencing local religious and cultural 
practices. In Froerer’s case, this is through organised meetings and “trainings” conducted in 
the villages by Hindutva groups, introducing “proper” ways of Hindu worship, and 
inculcating the right “cultural ethos” in young people and children (Froerer 2006, p. 45). 
Similarly, Lobo details the propagation of Hindutva ideals through existing Hindu sects, 
building on existing religious networks, but using them to different ends. Enrolling villagers 
and young men in these revamped organisations, holding “anti-Christian” meetings (Lobo 
2002, p. 4846), and constructing new Hindu shrines are just some of the methods Hindutva 
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groups use in tribal societies. Baviskar’s piece also highlights the fluidity between 
Hinduisation and engagement with a more urban, affluent, “bazaaria” culture, so that 
becoming part of the Hindu fold also becomes synonymous with modernity and access to 
greater cultural and social capital (Baviskar 2005). 
Even as issues such as the influx of Bangladeshi immigrants in Assam have been 
instrumentalised by Hindu nationalist groups in their campaigns (Corbridge and Harriss 
2000, p. 187), Hindu nationalist groups had not wielded much influence in Northeast India 
until recently. Even so, organisations like the RSS and VHP have been present in the region 
since the 1960s (Longkumer 2011, p. 134). Key among the strategies used by Hindu 
nationalist groups in the region is that of allying themselves with ongoing indigenous 
religious movements or groups, especially those that are in opposition to other dominant 
religions in the region, such as Christianity. This is the case among Hindutva groups in 
Arunachal Pradesh, who allied themselves with the Donyi Polo movement among the Adi 
tribe, and used this as a vehicle to promote Hindutva ideology (Dawar 2008, Kanungo 2011). 
Among the Heraka (an indigenous religious movement in the North Cachar Hills of Assam, 
and parts of Nagaland), Hindu religious symbols and imagery have been used to appropriate 
Heraka within the umbrella of Hinduism (Dangmei 2013). In doing this, Hindu groups accord 
to the Heraka a romanticised indigenous identity under the term vanvasi (literally “forest 
dweller”), where tribal groups are patronised, and seen as needing guidance in the ways of 
civilisation by their more advanced Hindu brethren (Longkumer 2011, pp. 134-39). Such 
stereotypical ideas of indigeneity are also employed in viewing the Northeast as a region rich 
for resource extraction — pristine and covered in forests, representing ancient Hindu 
connections between humans and nature, which had been otherwise “lost” by modern Hindus 
(Longkumer 2018). These views are expressed in the context of Patanjali— a company set up 
by a Hindu god-man (Baba Ramdev) that promotes natural health products and lifestyle 
choices like yoga, but also serves as a vehicle of “neo-Hindutva” in the Northeast, where land 
has been allotted to Patanjali in BJP-controlled states especially (Ibid.). 
Longkumer’s study of Hindutva groups in Nagaland shows how the state provides a 
particularly difficult context in which to propagate Hindu religious majoritarianism, as 88 
percent of Nagaland’s population identifies as Christian (Census of India 2011, Table C1), 
and the church has always been resistant to such attempts (Longkumer 2017). Because of 
this, Longkumer argues, Hindutva groups have taken a different approach in Northeastern 
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India, working first through forming alliances with indigenous religions,44 and second, 
through adapting the discourse of what it means to be Hindu — culturally, religiously, and 
nationally. Hindutva groups in Nagaland use post-Enlightenment ideas of separating religion 
and culture to allow Nagas to be Christian and Hindu/Indian simultaneously. Being Christian 
is relegated to the realm of faith alone — it is only a spiritual belief — while being Hindu is a 
way of life and culture, its material reality is what defines the terms on which one is Hindu. 
In Hindutva ideology, to be Hindu is to inhabit Indian territory, a “way of life originated from 
the son of the soil” (Longkumer 2017, p. 213). To be Hindu in the Hindutva sense, then, is 
inherently territorial, even if one’s spiritual beliefs vary. As Longkumer rightly points out, 
however, this strategy may prove challenging in Nagaland, which has never seen itself as part 
of Indian territory, and whose very identity has been built upon emphasizing exactly such a 
separation. The task of Hindutva here is then twofold — to convince largely Christian 
Nagaland that they are also Hindu, as well as rooted in India (Ibid, p. 224). 
These strategies, particularly those of appropriating local level conflicts into a Hindutva 
discourse, are relevant to the discussion that follows about the spread of Hindutva in the 
BTAD. From the perspective of Hindu nationalist groups such as the RSS, these are tried and 
tested strategies applied to a new context. For the BTAD, however, it is a potential re-
framing of a decades-long conflict, and potentially a new understanding of how exclusion is 
constituted.  
Many of the issues mentioned here, such as those of illegal migration from Bangladesh, are 
reflected in the politics of the region, along with the demands for separate statehood, 
antagonism towards Assamese hegemony, and a multi-ethnic society that often pits the 
claims of one group against another. It is in this specific context that I look at the growth of 
the RSS and other right-wing organisations in the region, and how they can affect the way 
inclusion and exclusion are conceptualised. 
 
7.2.2 Bodoland: A case study in transformation? 
 
Until recently, the RSS has had a nominal presence in Assam and the Northeast. It has seen a 
greater expansion of influence across the country after the BJP won the national elections in 
                                                
44 In another piece, Longkumer explains how these efforts are supported by the state, when the Prime Minister, 
himself a member of the RSS, on a visit to Nagaland chose only to interact with state BJP leaders and an 
indigenous religious group with strong links to the RSS (Longkumer 2015). 
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2014, and in Assam particularly, after it formed the state government in 2016.  For Bodoland, 
the BJP has never been a significant force politically, having failed to win any seats at all in 
the Bodoland Territorial Council until the most recent elections in 2015, where it won only 
one seat out of a possible 40. That it made an alliance with the ruling Bodoland Political 
Front, in the state elections of 2016, however, has led to an increase in the numbers of its 
cadres on the ground (which still do not match the numbers of the BPF, or its main Bodo 
opposition, the United People’s Party), and the cross-over of some resentful BPF leaders 
(especially those denied candidacy tickets during elections) opportunistically to the BJP. The 
RSS, the right-wing organisation that has also, among other Hindu nationalist groups, seen a 
growing presence country-wide, has had a similar increase in membership in the BTAD. 
While their presence in the region is not as ubiquitous as in parts of northern and central 
India, and indeed even other parts of Assam, there is a marked shift in their presence and 
activities. The victory of the BJP in 2016 elections in the state is acknowledged as an 
important moment in accelerating this advance, both by its leaders and members, as well as 
by other informants. 
One of the first and most widely-known illustrations of the growing presence of the RSS in 
the BTAD was a long piece of investigative journalism by Neha Dixit (2016), who exposed 
the trafficking of 31 young girls by the RSS to RSS-affiliated schools in Gujarat and Punjab. 
The girls, belonging to Bodo and Adivasi communities, were taken from poor families from 
five districts of Assam on the pretext of being given an education, after which their families 
heard nothing from them for four years. It was only investigation and action on the part of 
child rights authorities in Assam that exposed the trafficking, although at the time of the 
article being written, they had still not retuned to their parents. The article, apart from 
exposing the trafficking, also pointed out other significant trends about the RSS in the region 
— the presence of their operatives for up to 20 years before this incident, the reliance of 
vulnerable families, especially those affected by violence, on the RSS for support, and the 
role of women RSS operatives.  
Dixit’s report looked at two Bodo women RSS members who were crucial to the process of 
sending the girls away, and whose own sense of threatened Bodo identity (“Bodo people are 
being fooled by Christians, killed by Muslims”, said one) found refuge in the security of a 
powerful Hindu identity. Dixit alleged that their dual status as Bodo insiders and women 
made access into the community easier, and their own experiences of RSS training camps 
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painted not just a trustworthy, but aspirational picture for the young girls being sent.  
Meanwhile, the trafficked girls, in their hostels in Gujarat and Assam, repeated instructions 
about protecting a “woman’s honour” from “outsiders” by committing acts like jauhar,45and 
protecting Hindus from Bangladeshis and Christian missionaries in Assam. The young girls 
also internalised ideas about Hindu girls not eating meat (despite all belonging to families 
and communities where eating meat and fish are a part of life). Nonetheless, for all the RSS 
operatives involved in the process of identifying and sending the girls away, a “return” to 
Bodo identity meant the abandonment of these cultural and social practices, and the adoption 
of “mainstream” Hindu concepts of the role of women and daughters, mothers and wives. 
Dixit’s findings resonate with other parts of India as well, where women voluntarily 
participate in Hindu nationalist organisations, even where they are involved in the oppression 
of other women, but in ways that allow them to re-fashion themselves as leaders and activists 
(Corbridge and Harriss 2007, p. 191). 
In addition to the growing number of RSS operatives and members in Bodoland, the 
emergence of Patanjali in the region also has the potential to affect the socio-political 
landscape. In 2016, close to 4,000 bighas of land was allotted to Patanjali in Chirang district, 
although the All Bodo Students Union alleged that ordinary Bodos were not consulted before 
this decision was taken by the Bodoland Territorial Council (The Tribune 2016). This has 
been developed into a large complex, with a school, a dairy farm, and a small office which so 
far has only a few employees, mostly from outside of Assam. During my fieldwork, it was 
rumoured that the Council leadership had promised a plot of land to Patanjali in every district 
of the BTAD, and at the time, a plot in Uzanpara was also being considered. Being near a 
forest, it was said to be resource-rich and ideal for Patanajli’s herbal products, although the 
Muslims in Uzanpara were nervous about what this meant for them, whether it was a base for 
the RSS, or a means to edge them out. Forest officials like Milan Boro were uncertain as to 
how land that was in theory designated under forest area could be allotted to a private 
company (this was against forest land regulations). Eventually, near the end of my fieldwork, 
the deal fell through, as confirmed at the Circle Office in Kokrajhar. When asked for the 
reason why, a revenue official said only this, “Patanjali decided to withdraw, saying there 
were too many Muslims in the area”. What this meant was never explained, either to him, or 
to me on follow-up questioning at the Chirang district Patanjali complex (where the comment 
                                                
45 A custom of mass suicide among women to prevent capture during war, said to have occurred between the 
14th and 16th century in present day Rajasthan. 
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was denied entirely).  
In the following sections, I look at how Hindutva groups propound these narratives, in both 
extraordinary and ordinary circumstances. I examine two kinds of contexts: first, the 2012 
Bodo-Muslim riots, and how violent events can provide the kind of environment for such 
groups to grow; and second, the everyday practices, narratives and activities of Hindutva 
groups and those affiliated with them, especially in the wake of the 2016 elections. In each of 
these, they employ strategies similar to those seen in the literature above, especially with 
regard to tribal communities, and tribal communities in the Northeast in particular, 
Simultaneously, I scrutinise how other actors, especially Muslims, make sense of these 
processes, and what it could mean for citizenship and belonging in the BTAD.  
 
7.3 Violence as a moment of othering 
 
The 2012 riots between Bodos and Muslims in the BTAD represent a watershed moment in 
ethnic relations between the two communities, as well as in shaping the perception of 
Muslims in BTAD and Assam. Such violent events present a moment of rupture, in which 
identifying the Other becomes important, and an opportunity to mould and re-shape these 
categories can emerge. This process is seen, for instance, in the reinforcing of neo-oriental 
categories of Otherness in the continuing crisis of migration and asylum-seeking in 
contemporary Europe (Barbero 2012b), and the transformation of ordinary Muslims into 
members of a “suspect community” after violent acts of terrorism (Hickman et al. 2011, 
Jarvis and Lister 2013).  
The dynamics of Bodo-Muslim violence in the BTAD are not the same as the dynamics of 
Hindu-Muslim violence in India (although there are efforts to subsume it within this 
discourse, which are discussed later). In Assam, for instance, the discourse of illegal 
immigration from Bangladesh, which became especially prominent during the Assam 
movement of the 1970s, plays a far greater role in defining the relationship between Muslims 
(especially Bengali-speaking ones) and other communities in the state, than do the themes of 
Hindu-Muslim communal discourse that are prevalent in other parts of India. Paul Brass 
(Brass 2003) identifies three major defining themes from Indian history — the Mughals, the 
British, and the partition of India and Pakistan — as central to the perpetuation of this 
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discourse in India. In the BTAD, the Bodo agitation of the 1990s, and the creation of the 
Council in 2003 are significant markers of ethnic violence locally, until the riots of 2012.  
There are many versions and narratives of what precipitated the riots in the BTAD in July 
2012. In one version, the violence began to escalate when two Muslim men were shot dead in 
Angthihara on 6th
 
July 2012, in the jurisdiction of the Dotma police station in Kokrajhar 
district. On 20th July, four Bodo men, members of the ruling Bodoland Political Front, were 
killed in retaliation. According to other commentators, it was this act of violence that sparked 
off the riots, and by the 21st, further retaliation by unidentified persons on a Muslim-inhabited 
village led to the a total death toll of 9 (The Sentinel 2012a). This cycle of violence took on a 
life of its own and for the next two months, nearly 500,000 people became displaced in the 
process of fleeing their homes (Mahanta 2013, p. 52). In many affected villages, people did 
not return for six months, and some displaced communities never returned at all. 
In interviews with the survivors of the violence, while attempting to understand what 
precipitated the violence, both temporal and local factors become relevant. Almost all of 
those affected reported a build up of tensions between the two groups several months before 
the two incidents mentioned above, precipitated by a spate of killings of non-Bodo residents 
by the militant outfit, the NDFB. 
Given the electoral incentives and gains to be made in post-riot situations, it is perhaps 
unremarkable that various political parties as well as social and political groups, including 
right-wing Hindu nationalist outfits, constructed their own narratives of the situation. India’s 
national-level Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, for instance, decided to send its own fact 
finding team to the BTAD, only three days after the violence began (Indian Express 2012). 
At this time, the BJP had a very small presence in Assam’s electoral politics, but as a party 
gaining ground politically at the national level, was still able to influence the discourse of 
violence in Assam. As the riots progressed, the BJP was able to capitalise on the growing 
distrust of Bengali Muslims, who are often labelled illegal Bangladeshi immigrants because 
of their religious and linguistic profile. Thus, on several occasions, senior members of the 
BJP alluded to the role of the central and state government in failing to check illegal 
immigration (Seven Sisters Post 2012a, 2012b, The Sentinel 2012b), and went as far as to 
call the BTAD “Bangladesh occupied Assam” (The Sentinel 2012c). Other right-wing 
groups, such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang Dal, similarly chimed 
into the immigration debate, demanding the deportation of Bangladeshi Muslims from the 
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country, alleging links to terrorist outfits, or demanding a ban on Muslim groups in the state 
(Assam Tribune 2012, The Sentinel 2012d), thus conflating local antagonism against illegal 
immigration with antagonism against Muslims more broadly. As RSS operatives in the 
BTAD confirmed, the emergence of relief camps and services also facilitated the entry of the 
RSS, which has historically conducted relief work in many areas of India after major 
disasters. As Dixit’s (2016) piece confirms, RSS operatives have been present in other parts 
of the BTAD since 2008, in particular, during riots in Udalguri district. This emphasis on 
“seva” (service) continues into their ongoing presence in the region, where they run medical 
camps, sewing training for young women, etc. 
The riots also saw the arrival of other groups in the region — international NGOs like Oxfam 
and MercyCorps, other NGOs from India assisting with the relief effort,46 and other religious 
and charitable organisations, such as Caritas, and pan-Indian groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami 
Hind and the Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind. The Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and the Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind 
conducted relief work (primarily in relief camps housing Muslims), but also issued public 
statements urging Muslims to lodge reports with the police, and offered legal assistance 
(Seven Sisters Post 2012c, The Telegraph 2012). Many of these groups stayed on in the relief 
camps and rehabilitated villages, establishing themselves as a presence in these areas, and 
also, according to several interview participants, affecting the practice of Islam locally. 
Hijabs and veils for women, for instance, virtually unknown among Muslim communities in 
Western Assam, began to make an appearance where they had not previously existed. One 
interviewee made the connection between the funding that these groups received from 
organisations like OPEC, and the particular, more standardised version of Islam that they 
seemed to propagate. The riots also served to coalesce Bengali Muslim identity around a 
political party, the AIUDF, which already had a presence in other parts of Assam, and 
consolidated a presence in the BTAD by setting up massive relief efforts and resettlement 
colonies for displaced Muslims who did not want to return to their villages. These “model 
villages”, named after their contentious but popular leader Badruddin Ajmal, served as 
examples among many field respondents that of all the political actors in Assam, he alone 
spoke up for Muslims.  
In different ways, right-wing Hindu groups as well as charitable Islamic organisations tried to 
subsume the specific lived experience of being a Muslim in Assam and the BTAD — or 
                                                
46 Including the NGO that I was a part of during my first visit to the region. 
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indeed even the events that led up to violence of the scale that the region saw in 2012 — 
within the wider experience of being Muslim in India. Right-wing groups like the VHP 
immediately invoked Assam’s favourite bogeyman — the Bangladeshi Muslim — by 
alleging that they were sneaking into India by way of refugee camps. The demonization of all 
Bengali-speaking Muslim victims in this fashion, allowed these pro-Hindutva groups to re-
position the conflict as one where the Muslim outsider (in this case, literally from outside 
Indian territory) was the threat. In contrast to this, many Assamese-speaking Muslims in the 
villages immediately surrounding my field area confirmed that they too were affected by 
violence, their houses burnt and families displaced, but these instances were ignored by 
media narratives. Such a framing allowed for all Muslim victims to be portrayed as outsiders 
and non-citizens, based on their religious and linguistic profiles.  
The idea of “outsiders” in the context of the 2012 violence appeared repeatedly through 
invocations of Bangladeshis and immigrants. These became a convenient way for those 
interested in appropriating this conflict in a Hindu-Muslim context to make Others out of 
Muslims, and for those in power, became a way to externalise blame. Local narratives of the 
violence employed the notion of “outsiders” too, but in different and much more locally 
grounded ways. In interviews, narratives of how the violence unfolded depended, above other 
things, on the dynamics between communities in the villages in question. Soon after the riots 
ended, political and insurgent groups representing the Bodos imposed an “economic boycott” 
of Muslims, who work as agricultural labourers on Bodo land. This meant that in many 
villages, for as many as two consecutive agricultural seasons, Muslims were not “allowed” to 
work on Bodo farms. This arrangement, initially imposed by the aforementioned groups, took 
on a validity of its own, as those living in more polarised villages continued the ban for a 
second consecutive year, despite economic losses to both.  
In the cluster of villages in Uzanpara, which have mixed populations of Bodos and Muslims, 
social and economic relations returned to normal to a certain extent by the end of the first 
year. In these villages, relations between the two communities have been more cordial and 
inter-dependent from the outset, perhaps as much of necessity than anything else. In these 
villages, when violence is discussed in public forums, the emphasis is always on the figure of 
the “outsider”, literally a resident of another place. “Outsiders from another village came and 
torched our homes, we were already in relief camps and have no idea who it was”, was a 
refrain e
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the violence, speaking to Bodo residents individually revealed a different story: “how could 
they have known which houses were Bodo, if they were from outside? It must have been the 
Muslims from the village”. Many Bodo residents even claimed to know who burnt down 
houses or looted property, but held back from filing police reports because “ultimately we 
have to stay together”. In a nearby village, it was the fear of these “outsiders” that prevented 
the Muslim families from returning to their homes. While their Bodo neighbours assured 
them that they have nothing to fear from them, they could not offer guarantees of protection 
should “others” from neighbouring villages attack. 
For both Bodos and Muslims, the spectre of the outsider also includes the figure of the 
militant, another unpredictable figure whose role in the violence is unclear, but a factor 
nonetheless. Militants from insurgent outfits such as the NDFB are also responsible for much 
of the regular, targeted violence against non-Bodo groups, as well as violent assertions of 
power when collecting “taxes”.47 In one village of Chirang district, local Muslims wondered 
whether it was their failure to pay tax in the previous year to the NDFB that precipitated the 
violence, thus linking a specific, local phenomenon to a larger-scale incident. Here the notion 
of “outsiders” is much more context-specific to the local. Unlike the grand narratives of 
Bangladeshi infiltrators, these narratives configure outsiders literally as those not from within 
the village — within this discourse are subsumed both ordinary residents of other villages, 
and militants.  
In other villages, both in Kokrajhar and Chirang districts, where the Bodo neighbourhoods 
were distinctly separate from the Muslims, relations have been much more distant from the 
outset. In Anthaiguri village in Kokrajhar, where all 37 Muslim houses in the Muslim basti 
were burnt down, Muslim residents were bitter and openly accused their Bodo neighbours of 
complicity. Similarly, another nearby village also saw its Bodo basti burnt to the ground, and 
residents were certain that their Muslim neighbours were responsible. In these cases, people 
were able to flee before the mobs reached their villages, either due to a tip-off (often from a 
member of the other community), or out of fear from having seen violence erupt in 
neighbouring villages. Thus, while they were not physically present to verify who was part of 
the mob, perceptions about the guilt of neighbours, sometimes corroborated by accounts from 
                                                
47 This group also has several factions within, some of which, like the NDFB (Songbijit), are active, and others, 
like the NDFB(Progressive) and the NDFB(Ranjan) have currently negotiated a ceasefire with the government. 
Much like other insurgent groups in Assam and the Northeast, insurgent groups like the National Democratic 
Front for Bodoland collect “taxes” from residents and owners of businesses, in return for protection and 
permission to operate in the area. 
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surrounding villages, were common. In contrast, after another riot scare in May 2014 
following an attack on Muslims in the neighbouring district of Baksa, Bodo and Muslim 
residents of Uzanpara were able to form a joint patrol group, that also played the role of 
keeping the flow of information open between the two groups, thus preventing a repeat of a 
2012-like situation. 
Seen in these local narratives about the riots and violence, is the idea of the outsider as a 
figure that is very much rooted in the local context. Even where the complicity of neighbours 
is suspected, it is hidden in the public narrative for the sake of preserving inter-ethnic 
relations in a village, the “outsider” that is invoked is still a relatively “local” one — someone 
from another village or a mob of people from surrounding villages, or Bodo militants that 
hide out in the jungle. These are not de-contextualised, threatening Muslims who pose a 
threat on a more abstract level — their “outsiderness” is still rooted within the context of 
Bodoland and its politics, and thus they are not from very far away, still from one of the 
villages nearby. The point here is not to point out that having a “local” outsider enemy is 
somehow better or worse, but that the construction of this figure, especially with regard to 
violent threats, is important to understanding the how the conflict itself is perceived by 
people. Bodo inhabitants are not at war with all of India’s Muslims or Islam as a whole, their 
understanding of the violence is framed in terms of their local context. This is where it 
becomes important to analyse the impact of the sort of narrative being propagated by the RSS 
in the region, which I go on to do in the next section. 
 
7.4 Everyday processes of Othering — Hindutva in daily life 
 
The alliance of the ruling Bodo party, the Bodoland Political Front, with the national-level 
BJP in the assembly elections of 2016 brought a new political dynamic— namely, the 
emergence and growing presence of a national-level party in Bodoland’s local constituency 
and village-level politics. While it was too early, during the fieldwork, to say what effect this 
might have on local political outcomes, the point of importance here is the recruiting of new 
cadres into the BJP’s grassroots structures, and the parallel growth of the RSS, which has 
long been the BJP’s key mobiliser of political bases. 
 
Of the many Hindutva groups that are present throughout the country (apart from the BJP, 
which is a formal political outfit) — the RSS, the VHP, Bajrang Dal, and so on — the one 
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that is most ubiquitously known, and is often the first such organisation to enter a new region, 
is the RSS. In this regard, BTAD is no different. One of my key informants was one of the 
RSS’s oldest and most senior operatives in BTAD, Dinanath, based in Chirang district, but in 
charge of many of the RSS’s activities across all four districts. When we first met, it was at a 
local office of the RSS, a modest house in the bylanes of a small town. He only properly 
joined the RSS in 1999, when his son was sent to study in an RSS-run school in Uttar 
Pradesh, although he claims to have been acquainted with some of its members in Kokrajhar 
since 1967. At present, he estimates there are between 15,000–16,000 RSS members in all 
four districts of the BTAD, though there is no formal count, with the oldest branch being in 
Kokrajhar district, and active since 1975.  
Membership of the RSS and the BJP is still a blurry concept in the BTAD. Interestingly, 
many in the villages who are now signed up as BJP members claim also to be members of the 
RSS. In some instances, this seems to arise from a confusion about the lack of distinction 
between the two (which is telling in itself), or a lack of awareness about what the RSS does, 
though the BJP’s anti-minority agenda is not unknown. (In a few cases, Muslims are 
knowingly and willingly members of the RSS, this is discussed below). Shivram, perhaps the 
most important BJP operative in the electoral constituency where my field site Uzanpara was 
located, is a telling example of this dual membership, and the close links between the two 
organisations. While he is the public face of the BJP (he ran as an Independent but with BJP 
backing for the state legislature), he also considers himself a member of the RSS, and a 
devout Hindu. His political journey involved leaving the BPF in favour of the BJP, largely 
because he wasn’t given a candidacy ticket during the state elections. However, opportunism 
alone does not drive his current political status. So, for instance, while he details a series of 
personal grievances with the BPF that led him to leave and join the BJP, he also adds  
“In our constituency, in the last 5 years Muslim population has increased by 3000, 
Hindus only 300. Within 10 years we’ll be a minority here. That’s why I left BPF — 
otherwise how will we have the next generation of proud Hindus?”.  
Strikingly, he talks not in terms of the decreasing population of Bodos, which has been and 
remains a constant theme with leaders of the Bodo political movement, but of Hindus, a 
group which encompasses many Bodos, but also various other ethnic groups, with whom 
Bodos are also often in conflict over resources and political power.  
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Blurry affiliations among the likes of Shivram and others point to the nexus between the 
state, and organisations like the RSS, which operate like elements of the “shadow state” 
(Trudeau 2008, 2012), relying on tacit or overt support from those in political power. It is 
hardly coincidental that many across the BTAD reported an increase in membership and RSS 
activities from the 2016 election onwards, even as the grassroots elements that expand these 
networks may have been in place for some time. In this way, such organisations slowly 
become part of the everyday practice of politics, inserting themselves in state and political 
discourses. Their dispersed grassroots networks often make them more present and accessible 
than official agents of the state, again telling of their ability to make an impact on the 
discourse of citizenship.  
7.4.1 A new indigeneity 
 
Between 1966 and 1993, Dinanath was a member of the All Bodo Students Union, and was 
an active participant in the struggle for a Bodo homeland. He is as vague about his reasons 
for leaving the movement as he is for joining the RSS (chalking it all up to “fate”). From his 
present position within the RSS, he now believes that the movement for a separate Bodoland 
is unnecessary, and that the problems have arisen because of a British legacy of divide and 
rule.  
“They divided us into Hindustan and Pakistan, and we need to reunite. We need 
Akhand Bharat… generate awareness about lifestyle, values. All these things were 
fine until they were ruined by the British and the Muslims”.  
This view would still be considered a minority one among the Bodos, nonetheless, among the 
growing numbers of the RSS cadres, it is something that is consistently repeated. In urging 
people to join the organisation, Dinanath talks about sacrifice, and the need to fix local 
problems. One of the examples he mentions is the need for a return to tribal customary law to 
resolve disputes in villages. But in this instance, he conflates tribal and Hindu law, and says 
explicitly that the RSS should be explaining how customary law should be followed. For him, 
the cultural and social differences that exist between different communities that are Hindu — 
for instance, Bodos and Adivasis — are immaterial so long as everyone is Hindu. 
Rajesh, another senior leader, from Kokrajhar district, is a former officer of the paramilitary 
force CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force), who now runs a general store in Kokrajhar town. 
We met him at this store, along with another government employee who is also in the RSS, 
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but not as senior in the ranks. Rajesh has travelled around the country as part of his 
paramilitary training (including being posted in Nagpur, the national headquarters of the 
RSS). Like Dinanath he is sceptical of the movement for Bodoland, taking the view that it 
will divide tribal society, while Hinduism will unite. For him, nationalism and patriotism are 
more important virtues, ones that he finds to be synonymous with Hinduism, and sees as his 
primary goal in the RSS. But while these overarching values must be common, different 
cultures too could be respected within it. “In the Sangh [he switches easily between this word 
and the RSS], there is no discrimination between communities. Every culture is respected — 
whether Bodo, Rabha, Adivasi. We will protect them all.” There is even, under some 
conditions, space for Christians and Muslims. “Christians and Muslims today, their 
forefathers were all Hindus. In Mughal and British rule, people were forcibly converted. 
They must be brought back to the mainstream”. In his construction, Kokrajhar town was “like 
a metro earlier”,48 in a Hinduised cosmopolitan existence where Adivasis, Bodos would all 
join together to celebrate Hindu festivals. The conversion of some of these communities to 
Christianity represents a rupture in this imaginary of unity to him, even though it is 
anachronistic in its imagination of when Christianity arrived in BTAD, with reference to the 
presence of different groups in the area.   
The rhetoric of exclusion (of Christians and Muslims) from Hinduism is accompanied by one 
of tolerance and cosmopolitanism with regard to other Hindu ethnic communities. These 
seemingly contradictory ideas — expulsion and peaceful cooperation — seem to co-exist in 
the narrative. Dwimalu, another RSS operative who accompanies Rajesh on one occasion 
says without irony, “there is no discrimination within the RSS — Bodo, Adivasi, Rajbongshi, 
Hindi-bhashi [Hindi speaking] and Marwari, are all welcome”. The RSS, he insists, does not 
recruit, but spreads information through social media — WhatsApp and Facebook primarily. 
Soon after we encounter the RSS operatives, a Bodo colleague who is helping me with my 
research, starts to receive messages on WhatsApp from an RSS member who takes his 
number (my own local number is not connected to WhatsApp). They are long texts, primarily 
in Hindi, sometimes in English, with many emojis of flags, swords, hands folded in a 
Namaste, plants and flowers. The content does not seem specifically tailored for a Bodo 
audience, but features some of the RSS’s standard tropes against Muslims. For instance, the 
translation of a part of a message read 
                                                
48 “Metro” is a term used to refer to a large, cosmopolitan city. 
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“If you want to attack Muslims, don’t use guns or swords, annihilate them 
economically. Buy fruits, vegetables, clothes and necessities only from Hindus, only 
go to Hindu doctors, stay in Hindu-owned hotels, sit in Hindus’ rickshaws, have your 
car repaired by Hindus, get your mobile credit topped up by Hindus, only get Hindu 
plumbers and carpenters. Explain this everyday to at least 10 Hindus, and soon this 
message with reach hundreds of Hindus.” 
Many of the ideas mentioned here are relevant only to a better-off and somewhat more urban 
audience — plumbers and car mechanics are few and far between in the BTAD, with most 
rural houses relying on wells or public transport to travel. A few may own motorbikes, but it 
would be very rare for someone to own a car. It would seem that generic messages about 
boycotting Muslims are being transposed into a new context, by focussing especially on the 
trades and occupations that are often common among Muslims (being carpenters, plumbers, 
and owning small businesses, for instance). The fact that they are usually in Hindi also shows 
that they are meant for a wider, more general audience, though the Devnagari script being 
common to both Hindi and Bodo languages perhaps contributes to a greater understanding 
and relatability of the messages. 
Many leaders of the Bodoland movement, and BTAD’s politicians, are sceptical that the RSS 
can completely rupture Bodo solidarity with its Hindu unity narrative. The deputy chief of the 
Council, a former leader of the insurgent outfit Bodo Liberation Tigers, while staunch on 
issues of Muslim encroachment of tribal and forest land, nonetheless does not conflate these 
with the RSS’s agenda 
“The RSS is doing nothing to uplift local culture. They only want to impose Hinduism. 
We write Hindu [on forms], but why do they need to interfere? Now they’re telling 
people what to wear. We don’t need their priests from Uttar Pradesh [a state in North 
India] and Rishikesh [a city in Uttar Pradesh]. They’re going to face a lot of resistance to 
this agenda in the Northeast.” 
Similarly, a Bodo elected representative of the BTC contends that while the RSS has formed 
committees in their area, the dent on politics is likely to be minimal, “Council politics is very 
different, the RSS doesn’t understand that”. Such opinions are often repeated, and forms of 
resistance exist as well. Bodo political identity remains strong and thus far not fractured by 
religion, despite occasional tensions in personal narratives. As Hemon, a district-level leader 
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in the Bodoland movement from the PJACBM (People’s Joint Action Committee for 
Bodoland Movement) says, “We tell Bodos — if you’re close to Ramdev of the RSS, use 
them to promote the idea of Bodoland. If you’re Christian, try and persuade Christian leaders. 
But in the end, unite.” 
Nonetheless, being part of the Hindutva narrative allows for an assertion of one’s indigeneity, 
with a sense of power that other expressions of indigeneity lack. As a tool of asserting 
political power, the strength of the RSS may well seem appealing. Indigeneity often builds 
upon exclusionary narratives, and such narratives may find troubling parallels with those of 
Hindu right-wing groups (Baviskar 2005). In the Bodoland movement, excluding Muslims 
and questioning their legitimacy, at least as inhabitants of Bodoland, has been built into the 
idea of BTAD, and the way its policies are structured (for instance, land, or political 
representation). Hemon may abhor the RSS, but nonetheless thinks 
“How have Bodos become only 20–25 percent of the population here? It’s because of 
illegal immigration. In Assam, 43 percent of the voters are Muslim. The largest 
mosque in the Northeast is in Shillong. If they capture [sic] Bodoland, then 
Bangladeshis will swallow a part of Northeast India. No RSS or BJP will be able to 
save us then.” 
Ideas of a new indigeneity built on allegiance to a Hindu religion draw on two other key ideas 
of the RSS movement in Bodoland. The first is the idea of an “authentic” religion to claim 
Bodo identity (and subsequent indigenous status). This notion rests on the concept of 
rejecting Bodos who are Christian by faith, as well as subsuming the indigenous Bodo 
practice of Bathou within the “umbrella” of Hinduism. Second is the idea of creating an 
outsider, the Muslim, whose exclusion also defines the “us”, the new autochthons. Drawing 
on my fieldwork, I argue that this “new” Othering draws on older forms of Othering Muslims 
in the BTAD, but gives it a distinctly new dimension, one that correlates with the new sense 
of indigeneity. In the following two sections, I elaborate on each of these themes. 
7.4.2 “Authentic” religions 
 
Rajesh is adamant about the threat that Christianity poses for Bodo unity, and adds the suffix 
“Christian” to the names of prominent Bodos who are Christians (such as a state minister, or 
an officer in the Council’s secretariat office), almost as an epithet. For instance, “Since 
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Pramila Rani (Christian) has been minister, there are now more than 20 churches in 
Kokrajhar town, earlier there were only two. But there are no new Bathou or Brahma 
temples”. Bathou is an indigenous animist practice specific to the Bodos, though many who 
practice Bathou identify officially (in the census and on various forms) as Hindu. Brahma is 
another sect of Hinduism followed by a significant number of Bodos — in Rajesh’s mind, it 
is equal to and interchangeable with Bathou, as he sees both as sects of Hinduism.  
In line with RSS ideology on this issue, both Rajesh and Dinanath are of the opinion that 
Bodos who practice Christianity aren’t true Bodos. Both emphasise the need for Bodo 
Christians to re-convert and return to their roots to the traditional Bodo religion Bathou. 
Shivram, similarly, defends the attempts at “reconversion” by the RSS, and particularly the 
BTC chief Hagrama’s condemnation of them. “Why does Hagrama have a problem if people 
want to reconnect to their roots? Those Christians were Hindus before. Why does he say the 
RSS has no business here?”.  
In this discourse, the true identity of a Bodo is when they practice Bathou, which essentially 
means, as Dinanath puts it neatly “Bathou is automatic [sic] Hindu”. In common parlance, 
Bathou and Hindu are sometimes used interchangeably — though the extent and the contexts 
in which this is done are varied, and hard to generalise or pin down. For instance, “Bathou 
puja” is a religious ritual that occurs at various points in the year, and conducted according to 
local customs, but often these days also coincide with Hindu festivals, such as Shivratri or 
Laxmi puja.  
This tension is visible in other Bodo leaders as well, who do not accept the “Hindu umbrella” 
theory easily. Gwjwn, president of the All Bodo Students Union unit that covers Uzanpara 
village (often involved in handling disputes and organizing events for Bodos in the area), 
disagrees with the interpretation of Bathou and Hindu being interchangeable.  In speaking of 
a friend of his, who has joined the RSS, he says,  
 “I asked him, what will happen to Bathou, or to the traditions of other ethnic groups? 
That he doesn’t know. He just carries out their [the RSS’s] orders. From Narabari 
village to Bansbari [Gwjwn’s jurisdiction], Bathou is strong. We may write Hindu in 
the census, or when we fill up a form, but our thinking is different.” 
When talking of religious practices and rituals, Bodos are more likely to identify these as 
Bathou, and to identify Bathou as their religion. However, socially and politically, they are 
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more likely to call themselves Hindu (where they do not identify as Christian). On the other 
hand, Bodo identity itself, certainly the more explicitly political Bodo identity that has 
emerged over the last three decades, is overarching and does not limit itself to Hinduism, 
Bathou, or Christianity, and has encompassed all three.   
Rajesh urges me to visit a member of the Bathou Samaj in Kokrajhar, asking me to “learn 
first hand what people are suffering through living with Christians”. The Bathou Samaj is a 
civil society organisation that sees itself as a protector of the Bathou religious traditions. 
Charan is the president of a small unit level committee of the organisation, and a member of 
the district-level committee. Soon after the 2012 violence, Charan met Rajesh at a BJP rally 
in Kokrajhar district. Later, he also travelled with him to the RSS headquarters in Nagpur in 
the same year, where he met several RSS members. This fact is striking enough in itself — 
the representative of an indigenous religious organisation traveling to the headquarters of the 
most influential Hindu right-wing organisation in the country. Charan’s reasons for traveling 
there are not clear, “because we’re all in the same country” he says vaguely, but perhaps he is 
being guarded about the links between the two organisations for pragmatic reasons. The 
extent of his connections with the RSS become clearer later on, however, when he relaxes 
and talks to me more freely, and shows me the many contacts in his phone of local RSS 
operatives. In Nagpur, he talked about how backward the BTAD is, to which the RSS 
operatives responded by promising to set up industries in Kokrajhar and improve the lives of 
Bodos, though he admits this hasn’t happened yet. While the links at the organisational level 
become clearer over time, he reveals that there are no formal RSS cadres in his area yet. 
In talking to him, this tension between Bathou and Hinduism comes to light — none of these 
boundaries are set or clearly interpreted in one way or another. For instance, while he 
repeatedly says Hinduism is an umbrella, under which Bathou also falls, he also emphasises 
that Bathou is older, and is unable to say when or how exactly it falls under the Hinduism 
umbrella. Practices in the Bathou faith worship nature, and not idols as in Hinduism, through 
the worship of different gods. “Our mantras invoke the river, the mountains, and the earth. 
We worship nature — so we are under Hinduism but we don’t pray to gods and goddesses”. 
Like Rajesh, he identifies Bathou as a distinct religion most clearly when talking about the 
practice — the different prayer rituals, the sacrifice of animals, like chickens (which is 
unusual for the sorts of standardised Hindu practices promoted by the RSS), and the seasonal 
festivals that occur throughout the year. Like Rajesh and Dinanath, however, he also believes 
	   182	  
strongly in the need for Bodo Christians to re-convert 
 “Almost half the Bodos have become Christian, they will eventually have to come 
back. How can they call themselves Bodo if they show no respect to Bathou? Just 
wearing a dokhona,49 and speaking the Bodo language doesn’t make you Bodo if you 
have an American or British [sic] first name.” 
Charan’s feelings about Christianity among Bodos are conflicted. On the one hand, he is 
angry about their conversion, and refers to practices akin to untouchability in Hinduism, 
where he claims houses are cleaned thoroughly if Christians (or Muslims) visit, a fact also 
confirmed by Rajesh, and respondents in the village. At the same time, he is concerned about 
their loss of identity as Bodos, and is eager for them to re-convert because “they are all our 
children finally”. For Charan, the discourse of indigeneity, or what it means to be Bodo, is 
tied up with being Bathou, and by extension, Hindu, a discourse similar to that seen 
elsewhere with tribal communities and Hindu right-wing groups.  
At a formal level, there is no connection between the Bathou Samaj and the RSS, but as 
Charan’s experience shows, informally there is already an alliance of these networks in some 
places. Dinanath is also quick to point this out. Apart from the Bathou Samaj, he claims that 
pan-tribal organisations like the Tribal Sangha are allied with the RSS, though representatives 
of the Tribal Sangha themselves do not confirm this, implying that the alliance is either very 
informal and localised, or perhaps is aspirational thinking on the part of Dinanath. He is 
dismissive of Bodos who see Bathou as distinct, and not part of Hinduism. Central to this 
approach trying to link different communities under a pan-Hindu organisation, is the setting 
up of sub-organisations of the RSS — one for Bodos, another for Adivasis, and so on. It is 
through these organisations that initial contact between the RSS and different ethnic groups is 
made. For Rajesh, coming together with other tribal groups under a pan-Hindu umbrella is a 
step towards tribal unity, something a movement like the one for Udayachal could never 
provide in the 1960s. Like Charan, for him the discourse of indigeneity is tied to being 
Hindu, while being allied to Hindu groups is also a means to power and influence for tribal 
groups. 
These sort of tactics link back to what the literature also reveals about right-wing groups 
involving themselves on local terms, and the narrative about the perceptions of the events 
                                                
49 Garment worn by Bodo women. 
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themselves changing as a result. An important part of this process is allying with village 
heads, such as Ganesh, the village head (gaon boora) of the Bodo village in Uzanpara. While 
he does not claim to be a member himself, an RSS meeting involving 10-15 men from the 
Bodo village was held at his house, led by Dinanath. The meeting primarily discussed the 
violence of 2012, in which RSS leaders promised to help rebuild the Bodo village and repair 
the damage. Most tellingly, they were told explicitly to keep the meeting secret, and not 
inform Muslims in Uzanpara of these plans. Other elders (or as they say, “intellectuals”) of 
the village also attended, lending an air of legitimacy and seriousness to the meeting. 
7.4.3 Creating new Others from old 
 
The discourse of Othering by the RSS and affiliated groups is perhaps most pronounced with 
regard to Muslims. In Assam, being Muslim, particularly a Bengali-speaking Muslim, is 
already charged with allegations of illegality and illegitimacy. As the case with the 2012 riots 
showed, such conflicts provide for an opportunity for Hindutva groups to become part of this 
discourse, by re-invoking and reinforcing prevailing notions of the illegitimacy of Bengali 
Muslims. In doing so, these groups align themselves with these existing ideas, while also 
appropriating them within the Hindutva narrative. This taps into an existing grievance against 
Muslims in particular for being encroachers of agricultural land and forests, but viewing this 
from the lens of Hindutva’s anti-Muslim rhetoric, as opposed to ideas of encroachment and 
resource scarcity among Bodos. Shivram, for instance, correlates the increasing population of 
Muslims and scarcity of land in his constituency. 
“The wildlife sanctuary there is only a sanctuary in name, there is no wildlife there. 
This is because 2,500 Muslims [sic] migrated there and all on forest khas land 
[common land]. There are too many Muslims, but now the BTC also supports them, 
for their votes. They all have land in Dhubri [a neighbouring, Muslim-majority 
district]. I know they vote in both areas.” 
Interestingly, he, like many others from his constituency and Uzanpara, also identifies 
Muslims as outsiders from within Assam — not, for instance, Bangladeshis. However, this 
observation is soon followed by 
“Now these Muslims are 30 percent of the population in Assam, highest population 
after Kashmir, that’s why we have all these problems. There’s a photograph on 
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Facebook of Hagrama [chief of the BTC, and leader of the BPF] and Rajib Brahma 
[another representative] wearing a skullcap and sitting down to prayers on Eid with 
Muslims. Why does he have to pray, sit for namaz? Even a Bodo farmer wouldn’t do 
it. Poor people have more sense of dharma.” 
Here, the generalised discontent about Muslims encroaching on land and forests also gives 
way to wider discontent about their religious practices, being “appeased” by politicians, and 
the conflation of the “Muslim problem” in Assam with that of Kashmir. His use of “dharma” 
also places the problem in a spiritual realm, beyond just the material deprivations of land use 
and forests, and closer to the faith-based narratives of the RSS.  
The post-violence use of these narratives in everyday life is as important, and perhaps more 
pervasive. Raju, a young Bodo man in Uzanpara is a recent member of the RSS, having 
attended a training of the outfit in Chirang the previous year. He became involved after a 
meeting held in their village by Dinanath drew him to the ideas of the RSS, and, post 
training, he repeats these with vigour. Being in the RSS is a form of protection from their 
Muslim neighbours — a safety net that seems important with the effects of 2012 still fresh 
for most.  
 “Muslims, they earn a lot, then take money from us, or we have to sell them our land. 
They talk behind our backs, and they are always after our women. If there’s violence, 
if these Bangladeshis [sic] make trouble, we’ll be able to protect ourselves.” 
The RSS training fresh in his mind, his perspective on his long-term Muslim neighbours has 
taken the form of fear and resentment, enmeshing, like many other Bodos involved with the 
RSS, themes of land alienation and resource losses with anger towards Muslims. While he 
acknowledges that he has Muslim friends in the village, he claims he is now more cautious 
around them, always vigilant. For him, RSS ideology means Muslims are to be targeted, and 
Christians to be re-converted and brought back. He uses the word “Bangladeshi” to describe 
his neighbours, although it is widely understood and acknowledged in the village that 
Muslims here settled there from the 1970s onwards, largely from the nearby char areas in 
Dhubri and Barpeta districts, not Bangladesh. Their status and access to entitlements in the 
BTAD may be in question, but their legitimacy as Indian nationals has not been, in local 
discourse, thus far.  
Just as Raju’s feelings towards his Muslim friends are ambivalent, so also is membership of 
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the RSS along with other identities. A few days after we met, I was surprised to see him at a 
rally of the local All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), for their campaign for Bodoland. When I 
asked him how he was able to be members of both organisations, he simply shrugged “ABSU 
is political, the RSS is for a Hindu education, they are different things”. I asked further about 
the ideological tensions between the two — the ABSU emphasises a strong Bodo identity 
(regardless of religion), while the RSS emphasises unity among Hindus, including other 
communities and tribal groups. He insisted again that the RSS was not political, and pivoted 
back to the point of Muslims being the main enemy, the criminal element in society, and that 
as long as the number of Hindus increase, “no police or army will be able to stop us, we are 
social workers”. In this, he sees no difference between tribals and non-tribals, Bodos and 
non-Bodos.  
Going to the RSS training instilled a sense of discipline in Raju, according to him, and gave 
him a sense of society and purpose. He is dismissive of what he sees as the Bodo tendency to 
drink and waste away. The trainings themselves focus on physical discipline, lectures from 
RSS swayamsevaks on Hindu culture, and enforced vegetarianism, which is not common 
among Bodos, who traditionally rear and eat pork. But, as Raju says, “in the training they tell 
you eating meat makes your head hot”. When I ask him if he is willing to give up meat and 
alcohol under direction from the RSS, he starts to laugh and says, “a Bodo will never leave 
gahori (pork) and jou (rice beer)”. 
Raju’s commitment to the RSS means he helps organise and conduct trainings for adolescent 
boys and girls in the village. One such student, who attended this training last year in 
summer, describes a regime of prayer, yoga, physical exercise, lectures on discipline, 
cleanliness, respecting your elders, and ideal behaviour for young people. While the training 
for younger people does not have the fiery communal overtones that Raju’s training did, 
subtle ideas persist. For instance, the student recalls being told that they could “go to a 
Muslim’s house, but never to a mosque”. More overt statements are made about being Hindu, 
through eating vegetarian food and saying Hindu prayers.  
The vilification of Bengali Muslims has also caused Assamese-speaking Muslims of Assam 
to distance themselves from this group, and assert their own indigeneity in Assam. The 
differences between khilonjiya or desi (indigenous) Muslims and “Bhatia” (a derogatory term 
for Bengali-speaking Muslims) is often made, and one the RSS also appears to have 
perceived. In Raju’s understanding, this hierarchy is valid — khilonjiya Muslims are better 
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than Bangladeshi ones, and the RSS knows this too, he asserts.   
Such a distinction is vehemently supported by Alamuddin, a khilonjiya Muslim gaon boora 
in a Muslim village neighbouring Uzanpara. He too, is a member of the RSS, a fact he has to 
repeat a few times when I naively ask him if he’s sure. The RSS has conducted “secret” 
meetings for khilonjiya Muslims, which he has attended, and which are only advertised by 
word of mouth so as to be exclusive. In these meetings, they discuss the problems posed by 
“Bhatia” Muslims, and Alamuddin repeats many times what he has heard at these meetings 
— that khilonjiya Muslims like himself have more in common with Chakravorty and 
Rajbongshi communities (Hindu communities in the region), than with “Bhatia” Muslims. 
“The Bhatias will overtake us. They have economic power so they will file cases against us, 
and then pay lawyers and to win the case. We have to fight.” While he alludes to a historical 
connection (also referred to earlier in this paper) between different Assamese-speaking 
communities regardless of religion, its inclusion in the RSS narrative is significant. 
Such an idea of a threatening sub-community of Muslims does two things — first, it moves 
along existing fault lines of tensions between different ethnic communities, and second, it 
still creates a sense of a threatening Other, both culturally and economically. According to 
census data, Muslims (Bengali Muslims included), are the least educated and well-off group 
in the region (Motiram and Sarma 2014). The perception of their dominance, however, is 
reinforced in Alamuddin’s mind by the sense that “his” community is that of Chakravorty 
and Rajbongshi, a sense of local affiliation that he feels based on their shared enmity of 
Bengali Muslims. For the RSS leaders however, this distinction is invalid on an ideological 
scale. Their concern is with Hindu unity as a means to tribal unity. In this formulation, 
neither Christianity nor Islam are included, no matter the local associations formed between 
Assamese Hindu and Assamese Muslim groups. To state it plainly, including Assamese 
Muslims in “secret” meetings seems only a temporary, possibly instrumental strategy, to 
prevent a consolidation in the Muslim community between different linguistic groups.  
Such narratives have not yet seeped into everyday conversation in Uzanpara, whether in 
perceptions about land or politics, or even the most recent elections. On the contrary, while 
the 2014 election saw a big win for Hindutva nationally, BTAD, via the Kokrajhar 
constituency, saw a coming together of non-Bodo groups electing a non-Bodo candidate as a 
way of sending a message to Bodo leaders, an election fought and won entirely on issues 
relevant to the Bodoland context. Similarly, for state-level elections in 2016, the campaigning 
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featured issues that were local and often quite specific to the context of the BTAD. 
Particularly at smaller, village- level campaign meetings, which were more intimate settings, 
the issues discussed became specific down to the village level. Thus, the promise of a 
particular road, bridge or well would be a key campaign pledge, or providing security in 
times of conflict (with the 2012 riots still fresh in voters’ minds). With the growing presence 
of the BJP in Bodoland, there is less certainty about the extent to which this will remain the 
case in future elections, but thus far, for Bodoland, even national and state level elections are 
framed through local issues.  
However, there is a perceptible shift in the sense of being excluded, and the terms of 
exclusion, in the displaced community of Bengali Muslims in Makrabari. In the five years 
since they were driven out of their homes and unable to return, there was always palpable 
helplessness, and anger. Anger towards the NDFB militants that made their return to the 
village impossible, anger against their Bodo neighbours who refused to do anything to help 
them return, and anger at the district and council-level governments, for failing to do 
anything to help them return or resettle elsewhere, save for a meagre compensation amount. 
The only organisation they could turn to, which did help, was the pan-Indian Jamiat-e-Ulema 
Hind, which helped them secure lands, build tin houses, a few toilets and wells for water. 
Over the years, the only substantial support they received was from charitable Islamic 
organisations. On the other hand, despite having lived in their village since the 1930s, their 
displacement and lack of a stable home allowed an opportunity for a tribal organisation to file 
a petition in the Guwahati High Court declaring them illegal Bangladeshis. To counter this in 
court, they, yet again, took the Jamiat-e-Ulema’s help, and the case was thrown out. 
After five years of neglect and being displaced, most families at the camp are starting to sell 
the lands in their village of origin to Bodo neighbours, expecting not to return. While they 
continued to be registered there formally (also to enable their enrolment in Assam’s National 
Register of Citizens, where a lack of formal documents could lead to one’s citizenship being 
in doubt), over the years they became de-rooted from the place, and yet unable to completely 
feel settled in their makeshift camp-like new home. Being located at the edge of another 
Muslim village, they were secure in their immediate environment, but far more insecure on a 
larger scale.  
In May 2017, a rumour of a vaccine being used to make Muslim children impotent under the 
guise of preventing Japanese encephalitis flew around Assam, soon after doing the rounds in 
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Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Haryana (Saikia 2017a). The video of a news broadcast about 
this, as well as several conspiracy theories, spread among Muslims in the Makrabari camp. 
For some, who dismissed it, it was just another rumour, if anything it evoked memories of 
medical malpractice rather than ethnic cleansing — a person having a bad reaction to a shot, 
another suffering because an injection had been unrefrigerated when instructions were to the 
contrary. For others, however, it confirmed their worst suspicions — like the rest of India’s 
Muslims, they too were going to be eliminated. 
“It is a bad period coming for Muslims in India, the next 100 years at least”, says Rafiqul. “In 
Assam and the country, the BJP looks set to rule.” Then he contemplates. “Actually, it’s 
going to be bad for Muslims everywhere, world-over”. Others have heard of riots, lynchings 
that have occurred in the state of Uttar Pradesh since the BJP came to power, and connect 
these to their own troubles. Shohidul, another resident, goes further, invoking the plight of 
the Rohingyas, and people drowning in boats trying to leave Syria.  Rafiqul’s brother Jamal 
still remembers the 2012 riots, and the BJP’s attempts to make it a Hindu-Muslim issue, and 
the insistence of everyone writing “Bengali Muslim” when referring to the violence, as if to 
signal some sense of doubt about their citizenship.  
These are the same people who, during the 2016 Assembly election, when confronted with 
the choice between a Bodo party that attempted to include minorities but allied with the BJP 
(the BPF), and one that excluded non-Bodos (in support of separate statehood for Bodoland) 
but allied with the Congress, chose the former over the latter. They’d rather have the BJP in 
power at some level, than deal with the immediate threat of a Bodoland-supporting group, 
whom they associate directly with the violence and insecurity that they have faced. This 
calculus is by no means unimportant. Most still maintain this is the case. Simultaneously, 
there is also a greater sense of alienation, not just for being a group of Muslims in an area 
dominated by Bodos, or a Muslim in Bodoland, or a Bengali Muslim in Assam, but for being 
an Indian Muslim, and a global Muslim citizen as well. With the threat of being excluded 
from the National Register of Citizens in Assam a real possibility, there is a sense of being 
excluded from the country as a whole, through the politics of Bodoland and Assam. 
 
It is exactly this sort of exclusionary narrative, often repeated with regard to Muslims, 
especially Bengali-speaking Muslims in BTAD and Assam, that has the potential to become a 
strand in the process of making Muslims outsiders in India as a whole. Issues of “love 
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jihad”50 for instance, which have polarised the rest of India, have the potential to take hold in 
the BTAD. Inter-marriage between Bodos and Muslims is already discouraged and the 
subject of village-level disputes — as with Hindutva, women are framed as markers of 
cultural boundaries among Bodos — but not yet framed in terms of the desecration of 
Hinduism (Hindu women) by Islam (Muslim men). For RSS operatives like Dinanath, 
however, “love jihad” is already the conceptual framework that he uses to see these inter-
faith marriages. Beef consumption is another issue that is so far negotiated on local terms 
within communities (Sharma 2017), but, should Hindutva become more influential, could 
also become framed in anti-Muslim and anti-Christian rhetoric. 
 
7.5 Conclusion: New exclusions for citizenship 
 
What might these new social and political dynamics mean for BTAD? On the one hand, the 
RSS aligns itself with existing ideas of belonging and exclusion, and on another, its own 
ideology has the potential to change these narratives. If Muslims in BTAD feel excluded not 
just in their own local contexts, but also have a sense of being a marginalised community 
nationally (and even globally), what might this mean for how local issues are interpreted and 
resolved? Could alliances such as the one between different non-Bodo groups, including 
Muslims, in the 2014 elections still be forged? It is, of course, too early to say that the entire 
narrative will change completely. Moreover, even if it remains strong, each place would also 
adapt to RSS ideology in its own way, much as the RSS would adapt its own process to local 
contexts.  
It remains to be seen what impact Hindutva will have on the BTAD and its politics, and how 
it could affect a sense of belonging in the BTAD. It is unclear how and whether it will impact 
relations between Bathou, Brahma and Christian Bodos, who do not currently recognise these 
differences as fundamental; or whether it will impact how groups that are already outsiders, 
like Muslims, could be further marginalised. It is clear, however, in observing Hindutva’s 
rapid ascent over the last few years, that it is not a phenomenon that can be easily dismissed 
or ignored.   
 
  
                                                
50 Inter-religious marriages, especially between Hindu women and Muslim men, have been framed under the 
narrative of “love jihad” by Hindu nationalist groups.  
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CHAPTER 8. BELONGING (AND NOT) IN BODOLAND: CITIZENSHIP AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE 
 
“All the communities supported the Bodoland Territorial Council — how else would it have 
been made?” 
- Rafiqul, Makrabari resident 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
What do these findings tell us about citizenship in Bodoland, and its position in Northeast 
India more generally? Citizenship and belonging are inherently exclusionary, and the 
construction of the figure of the outsider emerges as a crucial dimension along which the 
rights and privileges that come with citizenship are accorded (or are not) (Mouffe 2000, Isin 
2002, Román 2010). Northeast India makes for a particularly relevant context to understand 
the inherently spatial nature of citizenship, and in particular, the idea of territory as a 
powerful marker of citizen identity, which is seen as intrinsically linked to the nation state 
and the territorialised form of sovereignty that is associated with it (Hansen and Stepputat 
2005b, Rudolph 2005). 
 
The main contributions of this thesis look towards disaggregating the idea of citizenship 
beyond status (while continuing the acknowledge the continuing importance of formal 
citizenship status), through looking at practices of citizenship, as well as acts of citizenship 
that disrupt given norms. The first research question and subsequent contribution focusses on 
acts of citizenship — both through formal routes and informal tactics, and how they both 
reinforce and disrupt existing categories of citizenship. I employ the term “acts of 
citizenship” in an attempt to recognise disruption even in seemingly routine practices of 
citizenship, as well as in acts of patronage or clientelism that might otherwise appear as 
purely transactional, or as subversions of genuine democratic citizenship. My goal is to 
identify these acts, but also consider what they mean in the context in which they are enacted, 
especially as they come up against the constraining processes of formal citizenship status.  
 
The second contribution that I elaborate on here relates to the reinforcement of territorialised 
citizenship — not just through historical precedence and law, but also in ordinary practices at 
the level of the village and local officials. This territorialisation is not just an abstract 
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principle of policy, but a daily experience of lived reality. While the idea of territorialised 
identities as imposed by the state have been a recurring theme in Northeast Indian 
scholarship, one of the goals in this thesis was to examine how this is reproduced in everyday 
life, the ways in which it percolates from policy into practice. Equally, just as many political 
movements in the Northeast have appropriated these territorialised identities as a bargaining 
chip for autonomy, the idea has been re-interpreted in local contexts as well.  
 
A third research question derives from the context of Northeast Indian identity in relation to 
the rest of India. Citizenship in the Northeast has always been constructed in terms of 
difference, especially in how categories of the state reinforced these ideas of a “periphery” to 
the national imagination. What has rarely been expressed, however, is how Northeast Muslim 
identity has also emerged as a distinctive one. As the preceding chapters have shown, 
Muslims in Bodoland see their status in Assam as distinct from the rest of India, and many 
expressed worry at recent efforts that attempt to conflate the two, particularly by Hindu 
nationalists. I have also attempted to shed some light on this differentiated identity and its 
implications for citizenship, which have seen little expression in public or academic 
discourse.  
 
8.2 Acts of citizenship 
 
In the analysis of citizenship in Bodoland undertaken here, I have attempted to focus on acts 
of citizenship in the everyday, and acts of “insurgent citizenship”. What distinguishes acts of 
citizenship from ordinary, routine practices of citizenship, and what is their value? Following 
Isin (2008b), a key factor in identifying acts of citizenship is the notion of disruption, where a 
given order or habitus is broken. In the process, the definition of citizenship itself is 
expanded. While some of the examples of the routinisation of territorialised citizenship 
considered the reinforcing of existing norms, other practices attempted to subvert these ideas.  
 
The movement for Bodoland was in itself, and continues to be, a reclamation of citizen rights 
through the acts of protest and disruption, sometimes even in violent ways. But I also address 
whether “acts” could be read in certain practices of informal politics, which are not merely 
manifestations of instrumental patron-client relations. The attempt through this contribution 
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is to understand subtler modes of insurgency and subversion, often couched in less than ideal 
practices of patronage and uneven power dynamics.  
 
As observed in Chapter 6, the national elections of 2014 in Kokrajhar served as one example 
of a rupture — as elections often are (Banerjee 2014) — the historic win of a non-Bodo 
candidate in a constituency that has elected a Bodo Member of Parliament every year since 
India’s independence, much before the demand for Bodoland, or the formation of the 
autonomous council. Like the urban poor in Sao Paulo in Holston’s (2009) understanding of 
insurgent citizenship, non-Bodos (and Muslims among them) used the democratic process to 
to challenge the idea of politicised and territorialised ethnicities and express their indignation 
at the lack of political representation in the BTAD, as well as performing a form of patronage 
politics in electing the strongman Sarania in exchange for a sense of security.  
 
Tactical use of the national level elections rather than the council showed a level of strategy 
and symbolism that went beyond instrumental calculations of patronage, however. In doing 
this, citizen identity was negotiated at multiple scales, showing a sophisticated understanding 
of the lived, everyday consequences of different elections, and where the potential for 
disruption lay. The MP elected through the national election rarely does much on the ground 
work in the Kokrajhar constituency, and thus choosing symbolism here had greater value (in 
parliament, for instance). In contrast, in the BTC, state-level elections can also be irrelevant, 
as we saw with relative voter indifference in Uzanpara — due to being “caught” in a 
constituency outside of the BTC, they had learnt not to expect much from their state-level 
representative.  
 
In Makrabari, however, voters saw the state and council levels as intertwined — were the 
BPF to lose here, there would be consequences from the council-level representative as well, 
and few other parties were poised to effect much change from within the Council. Equally, 
not only did voters choose to negotiate multiple citizen identities, they also chose to vote the 
party of negotiation, i.e., the one that they saw themselves being able to bargain with even 
after the election, as Rafiqul put it. Just as with the elections, the AGAA programme showed 
that political decision-making is more complex than just falling along the lines of ethnicity-
based patron-client decision-making. It represented a more ordinary politics than the election, 
and brought into even sharper relief the practical value of inter-ethnic cooperation (Varshney 
2003). Adopting principles of equality and collaboration in the face of constant divisive 
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efforts from politicians and the state itself became a form of upending conventional principles 
of citizenship (Butler 2011). The “act” here was subtler than the shock value of electing 
Sarania, instead, it was to reclaim their identities as more than just citizens that voted along 
community cleavages, focussing on local issues and overall welfare, despite nudges from 
politicians to behave otherwise.  
 
Acts of citizenship were not confined to forms of patronage-based action alone, but also 
enacted in finding new spaces of legitimacy for otherwise “illegal” actions. In Chapter 5, the 
actual land registration and sale practices on the ground in both Makrabari and Uzanpara 
showed residents finding (or being forced to find) creative ways around the legislation to 
ensure their continued legitimacy in the eyes of the state. Makrabari residents retained their 
names on the voter lists of their former village of Dewalgaon, and resisted being formally 
associated with Makrabari at least till their status as genuine citizens was established. Their 
previous history notwithstanding, if they were seen as “new” migrants settling elsewhere, this 
would make them more likely to be considered suspect citizens, or as the official 
nomenclature puts it, “Doubtful Voters”.  
 
Uzanpara residents took to selling and buying land between Bodos and Muslims illegally, but 
using practices that legitimised them at the level of the village, and from their perspective, 
also in the eyes of the law. While subverting the law and undertaking illegal sales are not 
necessarily acts of citizenship in themselves, what gives them significance are the procedures 
surrounding them, to make them legitimate — the signed stamp paper, the witnesses from 
both communities, and the idea that it is backed by the law (even though at another level it is 
understood that the sale can’t be registered at the Circle office precisely because it is illegal). 
This local level practice works in contradiction to the intention of the policy itself — to 
restrict land ownership and transfer among Bodos — but in a way that recognises the non-
Bodo seller, also in the eyes of the Bodo community. The ABSU leaders who attempt to 
threaten or intervene to prevent these sales from taking place also respect the terms of this 
validation, and do not report such sales to the authorities, or take other legal routes through 
the state, perhaps in recognition of the interdependence between Bodos and other 
communities where they have lived together for several decades.  
 
These practices of “mimicking” the state (McConnell 2012) have the effect of nuancing the 
binary categories offered by the law. In the case of the Tibetan refugees whose experience 
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McConnell draws on, it is the binary between refugee and citizen that is blurred (McConnell 
2013); in Bodoland, it is the demarcation between legal and illegal sales as enshrined in the 
land laws. The complex relationship between Bodos and Muslims in a place like Uzanpara, 
while not finding resonance in the law, is nonetheless represented in the rules and norms of 
the community and village, as the practices in Chapter 5 showed. It also reframes the 
significance of territorialised citizenship, redefining the bounds of authority within the space 
of the village, providing a legitimate contrast to the authority of the state or Council 
government (Lund 2006).  
 
In looking at the negotiations surrounding citizenship, and focussing on acts of citizenship, 
the idea of Holston’s “insurgent citizenship”, and of the very idea of citizenship being 
defined from the peripheries, becomes especially interesting to consider (Holston 2008). 
While Holston’s empirical context of the marginalised urban poor in Sao Paulo is very 
different from the largely rural areas of Kokrajhar that I studied, the theme of the periphery, 
and of the Northeast being India’s periphery lends itself to interesting comparisons. The 
residents in Holston’s study find themselves using the language of rights and the idiom of 
democracy to claim legitimacy, forming new organisations that assert their rights to 
citizenship. While Holston recognizes that insurgent citizenship and the practices of jeitinhos 
(bending the law) sit uneasily together in the Brazilian context, he nonetheless separates 
insurgent citizenship and clientelistic processes (pp. 247-48), underlining the differences in 
the basis of the demands.  
 
In the Indian context (but one that he proposes to extend beyond India), Chatterjee (2004) 
sees the disadvantaged as belonging to the realm of political society, where they seek 
entitlements (which he sees as distinct from rights, pp. 68-69) as a population rather than a 
collective of citizens, mobilising politicians and the state. They do so using not the claims of 
law or constitutional provisions, but through categories of moral solidarity (p. 74), and on the 
basis of a category of population that the state recognises. For Chatterjee, this is separate 
from legitimate processes of citizenship, conceived of in the realm of civil society, and only 
enacted among India’s elite. Political society is not an illegitimate form of politics for 
Chatterjee, but is certainly not a form of citizenship. 
 
Holston distances himself from Chatterjee’s notion of political society (Holston 2009, p. 257, 
p. 264), suggesting that other works on the urban poor in India suggest a more complex 
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understanding of rights and citizenship than Chatterjee allows for. He questions the 
dichotomy between a citizen (in civil society) and a category of the state (in political society), 
suggesting instead that these categories are inhabited simultaneously. This is an important 
point that Holston raises, of citizens being both targets of policy and agents of rights.  
 
Equally, Holston is perhaps too quick to segregate the realms of jeitinhos from that of 
insurgent citizenship, even as he acknowledges their uncomfortable presence beside each 
other. In Holston’s formulation, clientelism is one form of making demands, but only the new 
associations making rights-based claims have the capacity to destabilise and change the 
meaning of citizenship. In Chatterjee’s formulation, these forms of bargaining, which are a 
part of the practice of political society, are in themselves what make political modernity 
dynamic, bringing “into the hallways and corridors of power some of the squalor, ugliness, 
and violence of popular life” (p. 74). Although they argue it in different ways (and in 
Holston’s case, in opposition to Chatterjee), both Holston and Chatterjee argue that the 
periphery, far from being marginal to or secondary to the way politics is conducted at the 
centre, is the driving force of dynamism in politics. Such an argument resonates with 
Northeast India, whose construction as a periphery in mainstream discourse has served to 
obscure the ways in which it is, to bring back Saikia and Baishya’s memorable phrase “the 
original locus of sovereign power… in the postcolonial Indian context” (Saikia and Baishya 
2017a, p. 8).  
 
In Bodoland, as the empirical work shows, entitlements predicated on rights, and those 
secured on the basis of clientelism, or political favours and patronage, are not in neatly 
distinct categories. Not only are both forms of negotiation and contestation used, in different 
situations, but the same act can be interpreted — using either Holston’s or Chatterjee’s 
formulation — as both an act of citizenship, and a form of patronage. Instead, they resonate 
more closely with the hybrid forms of claims-making encountered in Veena Das’s work (Das 
2011), where patronage-based claims are viewed as a legitimate means to secure rights. 
Holston describes rights-based movements as having the ability to shape law, but many of the 
legal provisions in Bodoland (such as around land rights or political representation) are 
immovable through such movements, precisely because they pit not a marginalised group 
against the wealthy or elite, but one vulnerable group against another protected class, leaving 
the law to take sides, at different points and in different spheres, with one group or another. 
In the end, the groups are pitted not against the might of the state, but against each other.  
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In such a framework, there are few avenues of rights-based “insurgency” left for those on the 
sidelines. In Bodoland, and in Northeast India more generally, Holston’s formulation of 
insurgent citizenship takes on an additional meaning — as an area that continues to 
experience militant insurgency, and where insurgency is also a form of reclaiming rights 
from the Indian state. Once again, while not in the context of the urban, it is from the 
periphery (of Northeast India) that the reframing of citizenship in the Indian context occurs. 
Examples include not just formal amendments to the Constitution, but also the potential of 
disruptive acts of citizenship to transform the experience of being a citizen. 
 
The actors in Bodoland use a variety of acts to upturn the status quo, using hybrid forms of 
rights-based or clientelistic and subversion-based methods. In Chapter 6, non-Bodos used the 
democratic act of voting to elect in Hira Sarania, but Sarania himself is a strongman, former 
militant with dubious credentials to being indigenous. His election is less a claiming of rights, 
and more a symbolic act, which does not fit neatly into the category of clientelism, but 
certainly has elements of political patronage embedded within it (security being offered as a 
service in lieu of votes). At the same time, it was the only democratic means of claiming 
political space that non-Bodos could exercise. In that sense, elections as an act of citizenship 
in Bodoland find parallels with Holston’s and Sundar’s (2011) observation of oppressed 
communities using provisions within the law to access substantive citizenship, but once again 
its relationship with patronage brings it closer to Das’s (2011) hybrid forms.  
 
The case of the land transfers between Bodos and Muslims in Chapter 5 is also similarly 
multi-layered. Using illegal practices of land transfer is a way of maintaining economic 
relations between Bodos and Muslims, and doing so in a way that the law does not allow for. 
Such informal practices and their legitimisation at the village level shows that they are seen 
as a claim to rights that are absent, rather than favours (Baghdasaryan 2017). Holston’s case 
study in Sao Paulo shows that the reasons that the urban “insurgents” end up in illegal 
settlements, on the peripheries of both the law and the city, are to do with unjust historic land 
regulations designed to keep land circulating within a few select elites, leaving the poor on 
the margins. In the present period, this class of poor citizens has fought its way back into the 
law once again.  
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The subversion of law encountered in Bodoland also tries to circumvent this existing 
historical legal structure, but as previously mentioned, this structure does not just pit the elite 
against the vulnerable, it (more often) also pits different vulnerable groups against each other. 
In this regard, groups are forced to find new, creative ways to get around the structures of the 
state. As can be seen with the trajectory of the region — the means are sometimes violent in 
character (like the Bodo insurgency of the 1990s), sometimes involve other forms of protest 
(like the continuing strikes and shutdowns imposed by different competing community 
groups), appeals to the law or government (the Plains Tribal agitation, demands for specific 
legal provisions like ST status), and in many instances, uses of existing state processes and 
structures to innovative ends. In doing so, a wide range of activities are encompassed in the 
“insurgency” of this citizenship, but among the less visible but as fascinating of these has 
been the everyday rebellions from ordinary citizens, on which I have tried to throw some 
light in this thesis.  
 
Acts of citizenship are not always inclusive or exclusive, positive or negative in meaning 
(Isin 2009). A challenge to the idea of acts as solely emancipatory or progressive comes from 
the disruptive potential of Hindu right-wing nationalism to reshape the terms of citizenship in 
Bodoland. Narratives from the RSS challenged complex categories of local citizenship, in 
turn imbuing them with hues of Hindu fundamentalism. During the riots, their spokespersons 
reinforced the equivalence between Bengali Muslims and Bangladeshis, regardless of proof. 
By equating indigeneity and tribal identity, RSS operatives emphasised a pan-Hindu identity, 
that stood in direct opposition to Muslims in particular, using practices akin to what Lobo 
(2002) described in Gujarat, and what Froerer (2006) observed in Chhattisgarh. 
 
Could this majoritarian challenge to the idea of (Indian and Assamese) citizenship be labelled 
“insurgent”? Holston’s “insurgents” are the marginalised urban poor, Chatterjee’s political 
society is formed of those living in informal settlements and outside what he calls “the 
corridors of power” — the RSS is a powerful group with a vast network of operatives, and 
reportedly large amounts of foreign funding from diasporic Hindus (Fernandes 2014). Their 
intervention reflects the other side of “active” citizenship as exercised by elite members of 
society (Fyfe and Milligan 2003), as well as a form of “shadow state” apparatus that does not 
merely supplement state services, like employment creation or resettlement and rehabilitation 
activities (Trudeau 2008), but also articulates new forms of citizenship (Trudeau 2012). 
While such forms of citizen acts can supplement important gaps, they can also act with a 
	   199	  
degree of social bias that makes their actions problematic (Yarwood and Edwards 1995). 
While Trudeau’s arguments about alternative constructions of citizenship in the shadow state 
concern non-governmental organisations contracted by the state to undertake a welfare role, it 
is an important intervention that showcases the importance of the local in alternative 
constructions of citizenship (Trudeau 2012). Moreover, the study illustrates that non-state 
actors of the shadow state do not construct alternative ideas of citizenship in isolation from 
the state, but work with existing state structures to articulate new forms of belonging (Ibid.). 
In this case, it is the the (now more overt than tacit) support that the RSS receives from the 
state apparatus, which willingly concedes certain spaces of citizenship to the Hindu 
nationalist agenda, that allow for it to become a more powerful and larger force than before. 
 
The RSS and other Hindu nationalist groups are hugely influential in the formation of India’s 
current government, led by the BJP, which is also in power in the state of Assam. At the same 
time, this prominent group is capitalising on the grievances of a beleaguered minority, the 
Bodos, whose leaders also try and use the RSS instrumentally (as seen in interviews with 
Council members and leaders of the All Bodo Students Union), in an attempt to reclaim what 
they see as their own shrinking spaces of citizenship — be it land ownership, political 
representation, or the future of their ethnic homeland. 
 
8.3 Territorialising identity 
 
Historical and present-day policies show the ways in which the Indian state (both colonial 
and post-colonial) has conceived of the Northeast primarily from the point of view of 
territory. In doing so, Northeastern identity has been constructed in territorial terms, as have 
terms of citizenship and inclusion in the Indian imaginary as a periphery. The point of this 
thesis has not been to imply that these historically constructed identities were simply imposed 
from above and never challenged or subverted, or re-appropriated for different ends. 
Negotiation and contestation have been crucial to these articulations of citizenship, and the 
empirical chapters show this — through land ownership and sale practices, election and 
political practices — both political actors and ordinary citizens have reinforced, and at other 
times, challenged these imposed categories in daily practice. 
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The movement for Bodoland, for instance, draws on these highly territorialised identities by 
demanding a political and physical recognition of this idea through the creation of a separate 
state, a genuine homeland for Bodos. The homeland replaced, in the late 1980s, what was a 
demand for greater recognition and economic advancement, with what Bodo leaders astutely 
observed was a more effective bargaining chip — territory. This ethnic homeland is 
repeatedly reproduced in public discourse, through regular bandhs, rallies, and events, and 
also through campaigning during elections, where the issue is played out in front of Bodo 
voters as a campaign promise, and in front of non-Bodo ones as a threat (Chapter 6). 
Significantly, these ideas of territory (at least in Bodoland) are articulated as carving out 
territorialised identities within the context of the Indian constitution, and not separately from 
it. The challenge to the idea emerges from those who do not feature in this spatial 
imagination of the ethnic homeland — non-Bodos, like Muslims and Adivasis. 
 
Localised history in the villages of Bodoland challenges these neat categories of 
administration. As observed in Chapter 7, when violence erupted in 2012, and entire villages 
were displaced or burnt down, local notions of which “outsiders” were perpetrators were 
more complex than the divisive rhetoric of “Bangladeshi Muslims” employed by political 
leaders. Similarly, in Uzanpara, Bodos recalled the migration trajectories of their Muslim 
neighbours as not being across national borders (from Bangladesh, as is often alleged in 
political rhetoric), but from neighbouring districts, the flood-prone char areas of the 
Brahmaputra river (Chapter 5). Muslims also corroborated these histories — many still have 
families (and in a few cases, land) in their erstwhile villages of the char. Most recall being 
settled here by former district officials, in what was then a relatively sparsely populated, 
forested area, before the agitation for Bodoland crystallised in 1987. Even their territorialised 
non-belonging was not without complexity — many Muslims, residents of the relief camp in 
Makrabari recalled, were supportive of the formation of Bodoland Territorial Council, seeing 
it as a resolution that would bring peace, and an end to the targeted attacks on Muslims. That 
the promise has not panned out for many of the people who supported the Council does not 
negate the complex nature of its origins. 
 
As seen in Chapter 7, right-wing groups like the RSS also served to capitalise on these 
territorialised ideas of belonging, and in the process, introduce new boundaries for territories 
to conform to. This is in line with the essentially spatial nature of right-wing Hindu 
nationalist ideology in India, which is carved on to the nation space (Oza 2007). Territorial 
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questions are at the heart of many right-wing nationalist ideologies (Mareš 2009), and 
territoriality has been central to the political debate in Northeast India since it was part of the 
British Empire. Territorial anxieties in Bodoland provide rich opportunities for the creation of 
Hindu nationalist “hetereotopias”, mediating the presence of an ideal utopia in a given space 
(Deshpande 1998). The imagined territory of Akhand Bharat (Greater India) is well known in 
Hindu nationalist propaganda (Indian Express 2016), and in the discourse of the RSS in 
Bodoland, imaginations of unified territory took on hues of pan-indigenous solidarity, 
reminiscent of but essentially separate from the idea of Udayachal.  
 
In replacing the ethnonationalist formation of Bodoland with a Hindu nation, the RSS is both 
re-appropriating the idea of territorialised identity, as well as reinforcing it. Such grand ideas 
appear in subtler discourses about “encroachment” of land by Muslims, which capitalise on 
existing anxieties about tribal land alienation. Localised territorial practices in villages are 
one aspect of how territory enters everyday vernacular politics, and the subversion of 
territorial ideas by right-wing ideology is another. While territory has historically been used 
in Northeast India as a means to fix people to place, its basic characteristic as a social process 
rather than a pre-defined entity (Paasi 2003a) means it is constantly evolving in meaning. 
Right-wing politics in India, more emboldened than ever, has the potential to build on, and in 
the process radically transform the meaning of territory in Northeast India. In turn, such a 
transformation, even if partially successful, could shift the very basis of exclusion from 
citizenship, as well as the point from which re-interpretations of local citizenship occur. One 
of the most striking examples of this, in my field research, were the conversations with Raju, 
the young Bodo man who had been attending RSS camps regularly for the last few years. His 
re-interpretation of his Muslim neighbours, around whom he grew up and had friends, as 
“Bangladeshi” stood in stark contrast to other local interpretations of their outsider status. 
While his political affiliations were clearly still multiple, as his relationship with the local 
ABSU unit showed, the subtle shift in his perception of local village identity showed that 
even if such an understanding was not absolute, it had the potential to enter everyday 
expression.  
 
Just as acts of citizenship did not always prove to be emancipatory in nature, local re-
interpretations of territorialised identity also could not be easily classified as solely 
progressive.  These experiences support the complexity of local citizenship norms, as noted 
in multiple reflections on the multiple scales of citizenship, and the potential for citizenship 
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to be redefined from the grassroots. Local expressions of citizenship can be emancipatory 
(Spiro 2010, Villazor 2010), but given the fluid and shifting dynamics, can also shift in the 
ways that they align (or not) with other citizenship identities. Citizenship enacted “from 
below” need not necessarily mean it is produced by the actions of ordinary people (Ibid., p. 
283). Equally, the ideas produced in these local contexts may not always be progressive ones.  
 
In this instance, the RSS’s categories of local citizenship, by re-aligning along national 
norms, subverted local identities that were themselves differentiated from prevailing norms 
of ethno-territorial citizenship. Nonetheless, these multiple expressions of territorial 
citizenship co-existed with one another, with different expressions being put to use at 
different moments.  
 
8.4 Northeast Indian Muslim citizenship 
 
While scholars of Northeast India have reflected on the spaces and practices of exception that 
constitute Northeast Indian citizenship (Baruah 2003b, 2009), there is less understanding of 
the specific connotations of citizenship for Northeast India’s Muslims. Just as other 
Northeastern inhabitants (particularly those from states that have large populations of 
Schedules Tribes) experience racialised, differentiated citizenship in the rest of India, so too 
do the region’s Muslims (and in this context, especially Assam’s Muslims) experience 
discriminatory citizenship in the Northeast. I argue here that while discriminatory citizenship 
for Muslims is increasingly becoming the norm in India, its particular context in the 
Northeast leads to not just differentiated Muslim citizenship, but differentiated Northeastern 
Muslim citizenship, or in this specific instance, a distinctly Bodoland Muslim citizenship. 
 
In popular discourse, Muslims are the Other that construct Northeast Indian identity. As 
Ahmed (2014) notes specifically for Assam, vilifying Bengali Muslims is essential to nation 
building in Assam. Widespread use of terms like “illegal”, but also “plague”, “malady”, 
“infiltrator”, “encroacher” and “invader” in the context of migration address Bengali-
speaking Muslims as essentially the opposite of “indigenous” (in this case not just tribal) 
Assamese identity. The language used to describe them has not moved much further from 
terms like “advance guard”, “army” used in the early and mid-20th century (Chapter 5). These 
constructions lie essentially in imaginative geographies where “a landscape can be easily 
	   203	  
sealed off” (Ahmed 2014, p. 58), and anxiety around the border (in this case, the India–
Bangladesh border) are at the heart of creating this category of non-belonging for Bengali 
Muslims. The NRC process has brought this in particularly stark light, as the controversy 
around documentation and “D” voter labels, coupled with an increasingly intolerant and anti-
Muslim political climate has rendered Muslim citizens in Assam (and in particular, Bengali-
speaking ones) in constant citizenship limbo (Singh 2018, Siddique 2019). 
 
In the wider concept of citizenship in India too, Muslim citizenship has been a differentiated 
experience (Gayer and Jaffrelot 2012, Jaffrelot 2019). Shani (2010) looks at the question of 
Muslim citizenship from the inception of independent India, focussing on co-existing notions 
of liberal, republican and ethno-nationalist, and non-statist ideas of citizenship, and how 
Muslim groups have aligned themselves with these ideas over time. While the early decades 
of independence, until the 1970s, saw Muslims aligning with liberal and republican notions 
of citizenship, in an effort to carve a space as loyal minority citizens in an otherwise majority 
Hindu nation, the 1980s onwards have seen a revival of the demand for an ethno-nationalist 
nation from Hindu nationalist groups (Ibid.). Moreover, Muslim demands for greater political 
representation, access to educational opportunities, or linguistic recognition (in the form of a 
greater emphasis on the Urdu language) were always charged with accusations of Muslim 
appeasement, or specifically “Muslim grievances”, even where these demands were 
employed by Muslim groups in service of greater integration of Muslims within notions of 
republican and liberal Indian citizenship (Ibid.). In contemporary India, Muslims continue to 
create their own organisations and networks to compensate for the absence of the state, and 
attempt to carve out these institutions as secular, inclusive ones, and not simply attending to 
Muslim concerns (Williams 2015). In Bodoland, the Kokrajhar district committee of the 
Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind, an Islamic charitable organisation, also encouraged me to travel to 
nearby villages and observe the post-conflict reconstruction that they undertook in Bodo 
villages, and not just Muslim ones.  
 
As Shani (2010) observes, Hindu nationalist imaginations of India were directed at quelling 
the uprising of oppressed groups within the Hindu fold (lower and backward castes) aimed at 
the powerful upper castes who continue to be at the helm of Hindu nationalist groups. The 
“Muslim question” is retained as an issue of integrity, so that more critical threats to the 
integrity of India, from the lower and backward classes, could be contained (Ibid., p. 171). 
What Ahmed (2014) observes in Assam for Bengali Muslims holds true in the Indian context 
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for Muslims in general in an ethno-nationalist context — their Otherness is produced to 
construct boundaries around a unified “Hindu” nation (Shani 2010). Akhand Bharat then 
emerges as the territorialised aspiration of this imagined country.  
 
While cultural and religious protections may have existed for Muslim citizens by virtue of the 
liberal construction of citizenship in postcolonial India, the lack of socio-economic protection 
(as for other categories like Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes), has left much to be done 
in the substantive realisation of citizenship for Muslims. In 2006, the influential Sachar 
Committee (named after its chairperson, Justice Rajinder Sachar), commissioned by the 
Prime Minister’s Office, released a detailed and scathing report on the status of Muslims 
across India (Prime Minister’s High Level Committee 2006). The report considers 13 states, 
including Assam. While it does not specifically disaggregate findings in the context of 
Assam, one notable point is that Assam, and its neighbouring state, West Bengal, stand out as 
exceptions in that poverty among Muslims is higher in rural than urban areas, whereas the 
rest of India sees the opposite trend (Ibid., p. 158). In Assam this is especially telling, given 
the migration of Muslim peasants from East Bengal in the pre-Independence period. 
 
One of the contributions of this thesis has been to show that while the Northeast remains a 
category of Others against which mainstream Indian citizenship is constructed, very little is 
understood about the dynamics of Northeast Muslim identity. Instead, Muslims, often framed 
in the discourse of migration, are a category of exclusion against which 
Assamese/Northeastern identity (and its sub-categories of indigenous, khilonjiya, or sons-of-
the-soil) is reified. In Chapter 4, I looked at how this came to be during the Assam movement 
in the 1980s, as well as the movement for Bodoland in the 1990s, and into the present day. 
Both movements began as anti-state, and to a large extent retained this character, but both 
also gravitated towards “anti-foreigner” positions, which were the issues the Indian state 
chose to address and validate. As much as forms of asymmetrical federalism that reinforced 
ideas of difference about the Northeast were tools of conflict management for the Indian 
state, so too was recognition and amplification of anti-migrant rhetoric. This rhetoric is 
translated into action by ordinary practices — such as those of Rajeshwar Islary in Chapter 5, 
the circle officer who has unilaterally interpreted Muslims as being excluded from post-
disaster land allocation, because in his understanding of the law, they are all “strictly treated 
as encroachers”.  
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The RSS project also made use of Muslims in the BTAD in an instrumental way — 
capitalising on a lingering resentment from Assamese Muslims towards Bengali Muslims. 
Yasmin Saikia (2017) demonstrated the erasure of Assamese Muslims from Assamese 
history, and this sub-section of the Assamese population has been unduly vilified by the 
conflation of this group with their Bengali-speaking counterparts. As a result, Assamese 
Muslims have sought to separate themselves as a community, and the RSS has offered 
another space for this cleavage to solidify. In the process, the RSS has also created the 
category of a new kind of Muslim outsider in Bodoland — one that is an outsider by way of 
being a Muslim subject of the Indian state, rather than through the historical context of 
Assam.  
 
Much of this has placed Northeast India’s Muslims, and Assam’s Muslims more specifically, 
in a particularly vulnerable position. Residents of the precariously housed Makrabari were 
increasingly excluded by the state, and forced to craft different ways of proving their 
legitimacy. They were also under threat from being not just “encroachers” or “D” voters (and 
thereby threats to Bodo or Assamese identity), but in the context of the RSS, even enemies of 
the nation (and thus threats to Indian identity overall). This leads to a double bind — being 
excluded as Muslims (encroachers/migrants) in the historical context of Assam, as well as in 
the newly hatred-fuelled environment of India. This is expressed best by Rafiqul who says, at 
different times, that Indian Muslims will suffer for the next 100 years, but also that he refuses 
to move away and buy land outside of BTAD area, elsewhere in Assam or India, because this 
is where he belongs. He spends a few months of the year in the southern Indian state of 
Kerala as a migrant worker (as do many other young Muslim men from the region), and is 
struck by what he sees as a greater sense of tolerance and inclusiveness towards Muslims 
there. Despite feeling that he is treated better, he continues to return to Bodoland, and insists 
he will bring up his family there, even if it is in a makeshift relief camp like space for now. 
Though there is no such category, he expresses himself as a distinctly Bodoland Muslim, a 
local identity that finds no articulation in rhetoric or administrative categories (save for 
perhaps the existence of All BTAD Minority Students Union), but is constructed through 
practice, like those of land transfer and ownership, voter registration, and subtler practices of 
dress, language, culinary habits, and so on. While his attachment to place is as strong as those 
considered autochthonous (Geschiere 2011), Muslim identity rarely finds the space to assert 
belonging in Bodoland, focussed as the narrative is on countering claims of being “foreign” 
or “Doubtful”.  
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Regional and place-based identities are constructed in multiple ways, through rituals, 
discourses, ideas of nature and built environment, as well as stereotypical images of what a 
people or community are that make up a region (Paasi 2003b, p. 477). The recognition of 
group-based citizenship, which responds to demands “from below”, might in itself contain 
exclusionary processes that do not represent the interests of all, privileging specific ideas of 
“community” over others (Kyed and Buur 2006). Saikia (2017) speaks of the erasure of an 
Assamese Muslim identity, referring specifically to Assamese speaking Muslims, but other 
particular and local Muslim identities are also erased in the broad sweep of generalisations 
about Muslims as victims or villains, as being framed only through the threat they pose to law 
and order in Assam.  
 
In fact, Muslims in Bodoland have particular relationships to belonging that no others in 
Assam, the Northeast, or India do, as would be the case for Muslims elsewhere, in particular 
places. In Uzanpara, many Muslims speak fluent Bodo, as they do in Makrabari (and other 
parts of Bodoland), a fact that is never captured in the census or other administrative or 
scholarly understandings about them. Inter-marriages between Bodos and Muslims are 
controversial but do exist (Jamal is married to a Bodo woman, but his children do not 
officially have Scheduled Tribe status, though they are eligible). I also had the opportunity to 
meet with and interview a former cadre of the insurgent outfit, the Bodoland Liberation 
Tigers, who was Muslim. That may sound like a paradox today, but for him, living among 
other Bodos in his Kokrajhar town neighbourhood, was at the time a natural choice. While he 
is candid about the fact that he never “moved up the ranks” in the leadership because of his 
Muslim identity, he claims never to have been treated differently as a cadre, and retains 
connections with the members of the outfit until today. His story may not be a common one, 
but he was far from the only non-Bodo in Bodo insurgent outfits. As Muslims and those from 
other non-Bodo groups emphasised repeatedly, there would have been no BTAD agreement 
without the tacit support of non-Bodo groups, who make up a majority of the population. 
That this remains unacknowledged allows for the persistence of the single narrative that 
BTAD, or even a future separate state if it ever emerges, is a singularly Bodo project. What it 
renders invisible, in the process, is the local, Bodoland-specific identity of those who are not 
Bodos, beyond being impediments to an ethnonationalist project.  
 
	   207	  
8.5 Conclusion 
 
The findings from the thesis consistently show that citizenship is reinterpreted and re-enacted 
by citizens at multiple levels. Political agency and claims on the state are often made through 
informal channels, or insurgent re-appropriation of existing practices like elections. Equally, 
practices at the local level confer different forms of legitimacy than those granted by the 
state, and express forms of cooperation between communities. Such actions are especially 
important to highlight in Bodoland, where popular perception in the form of media and even 
many academic discourses constantly pit different communities as inherently in opposition. 
 
Nonetheless, all these acts and the expanding meaning of citizenship take place in the context 
of the formal status of citizenship, one which is only conferred by the state. What has been 
argued in the context of increasing global flows is also true for acts of citizenship that expand 
its practice — “the state remains” (Diener 2017, p. 52). Territorial forms of national 
citizenship are still crucial to claim rights, still embedded in ideas of national community 
(Ibid.). Current political events across the globe are evidence of the enduring appeal of 
nationalism, and India is not immune. In Assam, this has been made firmly, and sometimes 
brutally evident in the National Register of Citizens process. In August 2019, the Assamese 
state conducted a series of “re-verifications” of some people already included in the existing 
draft of the register, against whom “objections” had been filed, sometimes by unknown 
others. In contravention to existing due process, some applicants were asked to travel across 
the state for last-minute hearings held at 48 hours (and in some cases 24 hours) notice (Saikia 
2019b). This led many to sell land, cattle, and possessions to undertake expensive journeys at 
short notice, and caused panic and worry. The idea of exclusion as the basis of this 
citizenship found crude expression in the ruling party’s refusal to accept the final draft of the 
NRC because it was “too inclusive”, and not enough people were excluded from the register 
(Daniyal 2019).   
 
While daily life is full of examples of ways in which ideas of citizenship are expanded, none 
are immune from the formal process of proving one’s legality as a citizen, where it is only the 
categories of the state, rather than local ones, that are important. It is unclear what the fate of 
those left off the register of citizens will be, or what the final desired outcome of the process 
is even for those in charge of undertaking it. Nonetheless, the NRC makes clear that 
citizenship as status, especially when combined with the might of state power, still remains a 
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primary, and in some cases, the most important measure of citizenship. In this thesis, I have 
attempted to complicate this picture by showing how the space of citizenship can be 
reclaimed through local practice and disruptive acts, but it remains to be seen whether the 
effects of these reclamations can be sustained in the face of the might of the state.  
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9.  CONCLUSION 
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS: REFLECTIONS ON CITIZENSHIP IN BODOLAND 
 
 
In this final chapter, I will reiterate some of the main contributions of this thesis, add an 
Epilogue outlining events that transpired in Bodoland after the completion of my own 
primary field research, and conclude with suggesting future directions for research. The 
overarching narrative throughout this thesis has been a concern with inclusion and exclusion 
from citizenship, and the practices that serve to construct these categories. Bodoland as an 
empirical context provides for particularly visceral aspects of this debate, given both its 
history of insurgency and demand for an ethnic homeland, and its participation in the current 
process of updating of the National Register of Citizens.  
 
9.1 Main contributions 
 
Each of the contributions respond to the focus on forms of citizenship, inclusion and 
exclusion, and the practices of citizenship in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts. The 
thesis locates the findings from Bodoland within a wider context of literature on citizenship 
practices, particularly as these pertain to spatial understandings of citizenship, and as they 
become manifested through the everyday practices of the state. In doing so, I situate the 
findings at the intersection of scholarship in political geography and the anthropology of the 
state, as well as within the emergent field of regional studies that engages seriously with 
Northeast India.  
 
Political scientist Sanjib Baruah spoke of structures of autonomy in the Northeast, like the 
Bodoland Territorial Council, creating two classes of citizens — “citizens and denizens” 
(Baruah 2003b), resulting in differential access for different categories of citizens in an ethnic 
homeland. In many ways, this has been borne out by experience in Bodoland, emerging 
largely from what Vandekerckhove (2009) called “too powerfully territorialised identities”. 
As the empirical material in this thesis showed, land ownership and political representation 
are two very visible manifestations of these principles. Equally, as was shown in this 
analysis, citizens are capable of exercising “acts” of citizenship, whether through subverting 
formal processes of law (in the case of land) or through using the law (in the case of 
elections). However, engaging analytically with these practices shows that both instances are 
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more complex than simply breaking or strategic use of laws. Each instance is shaped and 
guided by the options made available by the historical structure of the law, and its particular 
evolution in the specific place-based context of Bodoland.  
 
The first major contribution of this thesis has been to show how territorialised identities in 
Bodoland are manifested in everyday practice. This has been done by looking at the larger 
historical picture, particularly looking at debates about the Sixth Schedule, agitations by the 
Plains Tribal Council of Assam, and the ways in which state responses have encouraged 
territorially-based ethnicity demands in Northeast India. This engages with theories of 
territoriality in political geography, and the notion of territory being essentially a process 
rather than a fixed idea. I have examined how everyday practices, like those of land 
management, and broader political processes, like federalism, both serve to constantly 
reproduce the idea of Bodoland as a territory, a model that has been replicated across 
Northeast India, and served to exacerbate the sense of difference in the region.  
 
The second major contribution has been to show how everyday practices can also be used to 
subvert or reorient these expressions of territoriality with regard to citizenship. I show how 
land transactions create new institutions and practices of legitimacy, and how political 
practices challenge existing categories of state practices through using political processes like 
elections or local government in new ways. I locate these findings within the fields of 
political geography, and also the anthropology of the state, focussing on specific practices 
and focussing on the meaning and legitimacy ascribed to these. In doing so, I locate the 
findings within a wider literature in citizenship studies on acts of citizenship, insurgent 
citizenship, citizenship as claimed from below, and de jure and de facto citizenship.  
 
A third contribution has been to examine the use of acts of citizenship by more powerful 
elements of the “shadow state” (Trudeau 2008, 2012), like Hindu nationalist groups, in 
creating new categories of inclusion and exclusion for citizenship. Given the pace at which 
right wing nationalism has spread in India in the last few years, and its more recent hold in 
the Northeast, I believe this is an important phenomenon to document. Using existing 
categories of inclusion and exclusion, Hindu nationalism has built up a careful narrative 
tailored to the Northeast, and in this case, specific to Bodoland. These specific strategies 
mean that these are still differentiated terms of citizenship for Northeast India, marking both 
continuity and a break from the status quo. The radicalisation of young Bodo men like Raju, 
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or even more seasoned leaders like Charan, who consider themselves caretakers of Bodo 
culture, has the potential to sow seeds for further polarisation, and even violence. While these 
may not be the acts of “insurgent” citizenship claimed from below, they are claims on 
citizenship made from outside the state, but in this case, with its tacit sanction.  
 
A final contribution is to look more closely at the dynamics of citizenship for Muslims in 
Bodoland, and what this might mean for a wider Northeast Indian Muslim identity. These 
findings are only an initial look at this issue, and capture some place-specific aspects which 
might nonetheless have implications for the wider region. While territorialised belonging in 
Northeast India is more widely accepted and studied (and also explored here through looking 
at material practices), the categories of (non)belonging constructed around Muslims also 
draw from territorialised ideas. Tensions between internal divides among Muslims (in this 
case between Assamese and Bengali speaking Muslims, for instance), as well as the sweeping 
derogatory narratives under which one or both groups are clubbed, are all contributing factors 
shaping these identities. Despite having strong attachments to place, similar to Bodos, 
Muslims’ sense of belonging in the BTAD or in Northeast India is always a challenge to 
recognise in the emergent nationalist political discourse, which benefits from treating them as 
outsiders. Nonetheless, to some extent local practices continue to recognise this attachment to 
place, and create new categories of legitimacy, which sit uneasily alongside wider categories 
of exclusion. As observed above, Hindu nationalist narratives have the potential to shake up 
this balance at the local level, although it is hard to predict how this will ultimately unfold 
more widely across the region.   
 
Both contributions on territorialised identities and their subversion aim to engage the 
conversation about Northeast India and the forms of citizenship experienced by its 
inhabitants, the internal diversity within, as well as the forms that the exclusions can take. 
Within the wider scope of Northeast Indian studies, there has been a trend away from 
focussing on violence, conflict and security as themes (although these still remain crucial to 
understanding the region), and towards an understanding of everyday politics as rejecting 
binary notions of belonging and exclusion (Pachuau 2014, Saikia and Baishya 2017b, 
Vandenhelsken et al. 2017). I locate my own research within this wider trend, adding more 
detailed ethnographic texture from Bodoland, in particular. 
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9.2 Epilogue 
 
Though the findings from the NRC process were referred to at various points in the thesis, the 
actual publication of the first draft occurred after I had left Assam. I attempted to make 
enquiries by phone about the status of various respondents and participants in getting their 
names in the draft. Much to their relief, all the residents of Makrabari were able to find their 
names in the first draft (which excluded 4 million), largely as a result of staying on the 
electoral rolls of their former village, Dewalgaon, and for some residents, through finding 
lineage data in the NRC of 1951. In Uzanpara, results were more mixed, some residents had 
made their way into the first draft, while others had been left off. These included both Bodos 
and Muslims, from what I could gauge, and people were hopeful of finding their way on to 
the document in a later phase. The NRC process in Assam has also inspired a similar project 
in the neighbouring state of Mizoram, which aims to create a register of “citizen residents” 
and “non-citizen residents” (Saikia 2019a). 
 
The discourse around the NRC and migration, however, remained as toxic as ever, especially 
with the growing hold of the BJP in the Northeast. As noted in Chapter 8, the final NRC draft 
published in August 2019 left out nearly 2 million of Assam’s residents, a result that the BJP 
was not happy with, as it was at odds with the vastly greater numbers suggested earlier 
(Daniyal 2019). In addition, many of those left off the register were Bengali Hindus, rather 
than Muslims, against the sort of divisive political rhetoric employed by the BJP and RSS.  
 
While 2016 marked an important entry point of Hindu nationalist politics via the BJP in 
Assam (as well as in Sikkim, in alliance with a regional party), state elections across the 
Northeast in the following years saw many more states come under its rule. In Arunachal 
Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura, the BJP now leads the state government, while in Meghalaya, 
Mizoram and Nagaland, it supports allies in the formation of the government. All of these 
alliances are grouped under the umbrella of the North East Democratic Alliance (NEDA) 
(Hindustan Times 2016), signalling a greater push made by the BJP towards Northeast India. 
The national elections in May 2019 demonstrated the durability of these alliances, showing 
that a Hindu nationalist agenda has the potential to reshape politics around ethnicity in 
Northeast India. These alliances were briefly threatened by the BJP’s renewed effort to push 
through the Citizenship Amendment Bill, causing many of its allies to openly participate in 
	   214	  
protests and threatening to sever ties (BBC 2019). This led to the amendment being quietly 
shelved (Ibid.), and alliances were renewed for the national elections.  
 
Bodoland has seen its fair share of major events in the last two years — to start with, Pramila 
Rani Brahma, the candidate who won the 2016 state elections discussed here, was nominated 
to fight the national elections from Kokrajhar. This was likely an attempt by the ruling 
Bodoland Political Front to counter the impact of incumbent Hira Sarania, whose anti-Bodo 
message has been disruptive to the movement for separate statehood. But the issues that 
propelled Sarania’s rise in the first place — the insecurity of non-Bodo groups of their fate in 
a future Bodoland state — remain as entrenched as ever, and he won the election yet again. In 
August 2017, an All BTC Minority Students Union (ABMSU) leader, representative of 
Muslims in the BTAD area, was shot dead in a busy marketplace (The Telegraph 2017b), 
increasing the sense of fear and uncertainty for Muslims in particular. A few months later, 
non-Bodos were further moved to calling a bandh across the BTAD when rumours indicated 
that the central government was planning to bestow “Union Territorial Council” status on the 
BTC (The Telegraph 2018b), which thus far has no official meaning in the Indian state. The 
rumours were quickly dispelled.  
 
9.3 Moving forward 
 
Recent events show that citizenship, territoriality, Hindu nationalism, all remain important 
themes in the discourse about Bodoland. Citizenship in Northeast India continues to be 
differentiated, and contestations of that differentiation also persist alongside attempts to 
formalise categories of inclusion and exclusion, using instruments such as the NRC.  
 
One gap in this research has been a relatively less detailed understanding of the role of 
women in BTAD politics. While this was briefly explored with regard to elections, and the 
stark absence of women in decision-making roles, there is a need for greater exploration of 
this topic in this context. As I have noted at different points, women are used in many 
different narratives — to signify cultural purity and ethnic markers for Bodos (and the cause 
of Bodoland), and as upholders of honour for Hindu nationalists. But the agency of women 
themselves in constructing the narrative of Bodoland is a crucial aspect of understanding its 
conception. Some recent work on women’s roles in militant outfits in the BTAD highlights 
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their status not just as “links” but as key elements of the organisations (Dutta 2018). A 
growing body of research in other areas of Northeast looks at this complex casting of women 
as victims and agents in the politics of cultural nationalism (Bora 2017, Haripriya 2017, 
Kikon 2017c).  
 
Further research in the BTAD could highlight other practices of contestation and claims to 
citizenship. In particular, the work of the Hindu right wing in this region is important to 
document further. This is true for the Northeast more widely, where territorialised ethnicities 
are assumed by default, but in fact, are actively produced and reproduced. An important 
future direction of research in this regard, particularly given Hindu nationalism’s use of 
social media, is in understanding how the digital world contributes to reinforcing these 
identities, building on methods of digital ethnography (Horst and Miller 2012) along with on-
the-ground participant observation. Some research into Bodo digital identity based on 
existing networks and uses of online platforms has already begun to adopt this perspective 
(Bhuyan 2016).  
 
Just as understanding the everyday reifications of territorialised identities in the Northeast is 
important, so too is further exploration of the specific, territorialised aspects of Northeast 
Indian Muslim identity, which remains understudied except in the context of migration or 
violence. Saikia (2017) makes an important intervention in speaking of the relative absence 
of Assamese Muslims in the construction of Assamese history, and Ahmed (2014) makes 
another relevant argument about the vilification of Bengali-speaking Muslims as being 
essential to the construction of Assamese nationalism. Both point towards an erasure of 
Muslims from the narration of Assamese society, through either being made invisible, or 
discussed only in pre-set binary categories. The same could be extended, I would argue, to 
other parts of the Northeast, where most scholarship focusses on (admittedly crucial) 
questions of tribal autonomy, the politics of ethnicity, the exception of militarisation, and 
more recently, migration from the Northeast towards other parts of India, pan-Northeastern 
solidarity, and its place in a wider Southeast Asian imagination. There is a greater need in 
these narratives to consider the lived experience of being a Muslim in this region, and this 
also becomes more crucial to understand as the polarising rhetoric of right wing nationalism 
intensifies across the region.    
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9.4 Questions of belonging 
 
The findings and contributions of this thesis have been built on a long period of fieldwork, as 
well as through engaging with scholarship in the relevant academic fields. The state here has 
been looked at through the prism of citizenship, a concept that has enduring relevance 
everywhere in the world. By focussing on strongly territorialised expressions of citizenship in 
particular, I have attempted to examine how these territorialised identities are reproduced, 
and equally, how they are challenged. While my empirical data drew on insights from 
Northeast India, seemingly a specific context where the idea of deeply rooted identities is 
central to politics, I wrote the final drafts of this project in Cambridge, UK, in the midst of 
intensifying debates about Brexit, what it means to be British or European, and what the true 
nature of sovereignty is. I could not have created a more relevant backdrop for the writing 
process if I had tried. These struggles continue to exemplify the contradictions of state 
practice, and serve as a reminder that ideas of belonging and citizenship are never a settled 
debate.   
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APPENDIX A: Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) 
1. The Government of India and the Government of Assam have been making concerted efforts 
to fulfil the aspirations of the Bodo people relating to their cultural identity, language, 
education and economic development. Towards this end, a series of talks were held between 
Government of India, Government of Assam and Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) since March, 
2000. As a result, it is agreed to create a self-governing body for the Bodo Areas in the State 
of Assam as follows: 
2. Objectives 
The objectives of the agreement are: to create an Autonomous self governing body to be known 
as Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) within the State of Assam and to provide constitutional 
protection under Sixth Schedule to the said Autonomous Body; to fulfil economic, educational 
and linguistic aspirations and the preservation of land-rights, socio-cultural and ethnic identity 
of the Bodos; and speed up the infrastructure development in BTC area. 
3. Area 
3.1. The area of proposed BTC shall comprise all the 3082 villages and areas to be so notified 
by the State Government. The above mentioned villages and areas shall be divided into 4 
contiguous districts after reorganisation of the existing districts of Assam within a period of 6 
months of the signing of the agreement on the lines of the proposal given by BLT subject to 
clearance of the Delimitation Commission. 
3.2 A committee comprising one representative each from Governments of India & Assam and 
BLT will decide by consensus on the inclusion of additional villages and areas in the BTC from 
out of 95 villages and areas on the basis of the criteria of tribal population being not less than 
50%, contiguity or any other agreed relevant criteria within a period of three months of signing 
of this MoS. 
4. Status of Bodoland Territorial Council 
The provision of the Sixth schedule and other relevant Articles of the Constitution of India will 
apply to BTC, mutatis mutandis in terms of this agreement. The safeguards/modifications for 
the non-tribals in BTC area, inter-alia, will include the following: 
4.1. Provision of para1(2) of Sixth Schedule regarding Autonomous Regions will not be 
applicable to BTC. 
4.2. A provision will be made in para 2(1) of the Sixth Schedule for increasing the number of 
members for BTC up to 46 out of which 30 will be reserved for Scheduled Tribes, 5 for non-
tribal communities, 5 open for all communities and 6 to be nominated by Governor of Assam 
from the unrepresented communities for BTC area of which atleast two should be women. 
Nominated members will have the same rights and privileges as other members, including 
voting rights. Election from the 40 constituencies of BTC shall be on the basis of adult 
franchise. The term of the elected members of BTC shall be for 5 years. 
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4.3. Safeguards for the settlement rights, transfer and inheritance of property etc. of non-tribals 
will be suitably incorporated in para 3 of the Sixth Schedule. Any such law as may be made by 
the BTC in this regard will not, in particular: 
(a) Extinguish the rights and privileges enjoyed by an citizen of India in respect of their land 
at the commencement of BTC, and 
(b) Bar any citizen from acquiring land either by way of inheritance, allotment, settlement or 
by way of transfer if such citizens were eligible for such bonafide acquisition of land within 
the BTC area. 
4.4. Provision will be added in para 6 of Sixth Schedule that in BTC area, language and medium 
of instruction in educational institutions will not be changed without approval of the State 
Government. 
4.5. Provision of para 8 of Sixth Schedule regarding power to assess and collect land revenue 
and impose taxes shall be applicable to BTC. 
4.6. Para 10 of the Sixth Schedule will not be applicable to BTC area. 
4.7. Provision of Article 332(6) of the Constitution will be so modified that the existing status 
of representation of BTC area in the State Assembly is kept intact. After the creation of BTC, 
the Parliamentary & Assembly Constituencies shall be delimited by the Delimitation 
Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
4.8. In the event, Panchayati Raj system ceases to be in force in the council area, the powers 
of the Panchayati Raj Institutions in such matters shall be vested with the Council. 
The Amendments to the Sixth Schedule shall include provisions in such a manner that non-
tribals are not disadvantaged in relation to the rights enjoyed by them at the commencement of 
BTC and their rights and privileges including land rights are fully protected. 
5. Power and Functions 
5.1. The Council shall have legislative powers in respect to subjects transferred to it as 
enumerated below. All laws made under this paragraph shall be submitted forthwith to the 
Governor and until assented to by him, shall have no effect. The BTC shall have executive, 
administrative and financial powers in respect of subjects transferred to it. 
Subjects to be entrusted to BTC by Assam Government 
1. Small, Cottage and Rural Industry; 2. Animal Husbandry & Veterinary; 3. Forest; 4. 
Agriculture; 5. PWD; 6. Sericulture; 7. Education (Primary Education, Higher Secondary 
Including vocational training, Adult Education, College Education (General); 8. Cultural 
Affairs; 9. Soil Conservation; 10. Co-operation; 11. Fisheries; 12. Panchayat and Rural 
Development; 13. Handloom and Textile; 14. Health & Family Welfare; 15. Public Health 
Engineering; 16. Irrigation; 17. Social Welfare; 18. Flood Control; 19. Sports & Youth 
Welfare; 20. Weights and Measures; 21. Library Services; 22. Museum & Archaeology; 23. 
Urban Development – Town and Country Planning; 24. Tribal Research Institute; 25. Land & 
Revenue; 26. Publicity/Public Relations; 27. Printing & Stationery; 28. Tourism; 29. Transport; 
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30. Planning and Development; 31. Municipal Corporation, Improvement Trust, District 
Boards and other local authorities; 32. Welfare of Plan Tribes and Backward Classes; 33. 
Markets and fairs; 34. Lotteries, Theatres, Dramatic performance and cinema; 35. Statistics; 
36. Food and Civil supply; 37. Intoxicating liquors, opium and derivatives etc.; 38. Labour and 
employment; 39. Relief and Rehabilitation; 40. Registration of Births and Deaths. 
5.2. There shall be an Executive Council comprising of not more than 12 Executive Members, 
one of whom shall be the Chief and another one the Deputy Chief of the said Executive 
Council. There shall be adequate representation for the non-tribal members in the Executive 
Council. The Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Council shall have the status equivalent to the 
Cabinet Minister and the other Executive Members equivalent to the Minister of the State of 
Assam for protocol purposes in BTC area. 
5.3. The BTC shall have the full control over the officers and staff connected with the delegated 
subjects working in the BTC area and shall be competent to transfer officers and staff within 
the BTC area. ACRs of these officers shall also be written by the appropriated BTC authority. 
5.4. BTC shall also be competent to make appointments for all posts under its control in 
accordance with the rules of appointment followed by the Government of Assam. However, 
the posts, where recruitment is made on the recommendation of APSC, shall not be covered 
under this provision. The Council may constitute a Selection Board for appointments to be 
made by it and may also make rules, with the approval of the Governor of Assam to regulate 
appointments and to ensure adequate representation for all communities living in the Council 
area. 
5.5. No posts shall be created by BTC without concurrence of the Government of Assam and 
it shall also abide by the decision of the Government of Assam in respect of abolition 
of/temporarily keeping vacant any post. 
5.6. Development functions and bodies within the competence of BTC shall be transferred to 
BTC. In respect of DRDA, concurrence of Government of India will be obtained. 
5.7. The offices of the Dy. Commissioner and Superintendent of Police will be outside the 
superintendence and control of BTC. 
5.8. The State Government would provide an amount, to be decided every year on population 
ratio basis, as grants-in-aid in two equal instalments to the BTC for executing development 
works. The proportionate share for the BTC shall be calculated on the basis of the plan funds 
available after setting aside the funds required for earmarked sectors and the salary. This 
amount may be reduced proportionately if the state plan allocation is reduced or there is plan 
cut due to resource problem. In addition, the Council will be paid a suitable amount of plan 
funds and non-plan funds to cover the office expenses and the salaries of the staff working 
under their control. The BTC shall disburse the salaries of the staff under their control and 
would ensure strict economy in the matter. 
5.9. BTC authority shall prepare a plan with the amounts likely to be available for development 
works, both under State share and Central share, covering any or all the activities of the 
departments under their control. The Council shall have full discretion in selecting the activities 
and choosing the amount for the investment under the same in any year covering all groups of 
people in a fair and equitable manner. This plan will be a sub set of the State plan and would 
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be treated as its integral part. Once the plan of the State, including BTC plan, gets the approval 
of the Planning Commission the BTC authority will start execution of their plan in the BTC 
area. Modifications, if any, made by the Planning Commission in the BTC proposal, shall be 
binding on the BTC authority. The State Government shall not divert the funds allocated to the 
BTC to other heads and also ensure its timely release. BTC may have Planning Department to 
prepare the plans for BTC area to be submitted to Planning Commission through the 
Government of Assam. 
5.10. The executive functions of the BTC shall be exercised through its Principal Secretary 
who shall be an officer of the rank not below of Commissioner/Secretary to Government of 
Assam. The sanctioning powers of the Government of Assam shall be vested with the Principal 
Secretary of BTC and sanctioning powers of head(s) of the Department(s) including for 
technical sanction shall be conferred on the senor most officer of that Department preferably 
not below the rank of Additional Director, who may be designated as Director of BTC for that 
department. The Principal Secretary and other officers shall exercise their powers under the 
overall guidance and supervision of BTC. 
6. Law and Order 
To strengthen the Police Administration, Government of Assam shall appoint an IGP for 4 
districts of BTC and the jurisdiction of the DIG Kokrajhar shall also be modified to cover these 
4 districts. 
7. Revision of list of ST 
Consequent to the inclusion of BTC area into the Sixth Schedule, the list of ST for the State of 
Assam shall be so modified so as to ensure that the tribal status of Bodos and other tribals 
living outside the BTC are does not get affected adversely. 
8. Grant of ST status of Bodo Kacharis of Karbi Anglong and NC Hills districts 
The Government of India agrees to consider sympathetically the inclusion of the Bodo 
Kacharis living in Karbi Anglong and NC Hills Autonomous Council area in the ST (Hill) List 
of State of Assam. 
9. Development of Bodo Language 
9.1. The Government of India agrees to consider favourably the inclusion of Bodo Language 
in Devnagri Script in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. 
9.2. Bodo language shall be the official language of BTC subject to the condition that Assamese 
and English shall also continue to be used for official purpose. 
10. Additional Development Package for BTC 
10.1. The State Government, within the limitation of financial and other constraints, may offer 
or allow the Council to offer, possible and sustainable additional incentives for attracting 
private investment in the Council area and would also support projects for external funding. 
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10.2. In order to accelerate the development of the region and to meet the aspirations of the 
people, the Government of India will provide financial assistance of Rs 100 crores per annum 
for 5 years for projects to develop the socio-economic infrastructure in BTC areas over and 
above the normal plan assistance to the State of Assam. The size of the Corpus will be reviewed 
after a period of 5 years. Suitable mechanism will be built in the system to ensure that the funds 
are transferred to BTC in time and at regular intervals. An illustrative list of projects which 
may be considered to be taken up in BTC given below: 
List of projects: 
1. To establish a centre for development and research of Bodo language; 2. Upgradation of 
existing educational infrastructure by way of renovation/addition of buildings, providing 
modern facilities for teaching such as computers, science laboratories etc. from primary level 
to college level in BTC area; 3. A cultural complex to be established at Kokrajhar to promote 
and develop Bodo tradition and cultural heritage; 4. To establish a super-speciality hospital 
with all modern facilities at Kokrajhar Government Hospitals shall be established in all district, 
sub-divisional and block headquarter; 5. To establish sports complexes in all the district 
headquarters; 6. Food processing plants and clod storage facilities at Kokrajhar, Kajolgaon, 
Udalguri and Tamulpur; 7. Construction of a bridge over river Aai to connect Koilamoila, 
Amguri etc. with the rest of the district; 8. To build a Bodoland Bhawan in Delhi; 9. To set up 
integrated agro-processing park and textile-cum-apparel park; 10. Revitalisation of Kokilabari 
Agricultural Farm; 11. To develop adequate infrastructure to promote Manas sanctuary as an 
international tourist spot; 12. To complete Champa, Suklai and Dhansiri irrigation projects; 13. 
To construct a highway on the Indo-Bhutan border from Jamduar to Bhairabkunda to connect 
remote places located adjacent to the border; 14. To set up model dairy, fishery, horticulture 
and poultry farms/training centres at different places in all the 4 districts to encourage youth 
for self-employment; 15. To enhance the existing facilities in veterinary hospitals in BTC area. 
10.3. Government of India will provide necessary one time financial assistance required for 
development of administrative infrastructure in the newly created district headquarters, sub-
divisional headquarters and book headquarters, besides the BTC Secretariat Complex at 
Kokrajhar 
11. Centrally funded University 
11.1. A centrally funded Central Institute of Technology (CIT) will be set up to impact 
education in various technological/vocational disciplines such as Information Technology, 
Bio-Technology, Food Processing, Rural Industries, Business Management, etc. 
11.2. The CIT will be subsequently upgraded to a Centrally funded State University with 
technical and non-technical disciplines to be run by the BTC. 
12. Relief & Rehabilitation 
12.1. The BLT would join the national mainstream and shun the path of violence in the interest 
of peace and development. After the formation of the interim council of BTC, BLT will 
dissolve itself as an organisation and surrender with arms within a week of swearing-in of the 
interim council. The State Government would provide full support to relief and rehabilitation 
of the members of BLT who would surrender with arms in this process in accordance with the 
existing policy of the State. Financial support in such cases, however shall be limited to be 
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provisions of the scheme prepared and funded by the Government of India. Withdrawal of 
cases against such persons and those related to overground Bodo movement since 1987 shall 
be considered according to the existing policy of the State of Assam. 
12.2. The Government of India will initiate steps for review of action against the Bodo 
employees of Government of India and subordinate officers as well as in respect of Central 
Government Undertakings. Similar action would be taken by the Government of Assam. 
12.3. Bodo youth will be considered for recruitment in Police, Army and Paramilitary forces 
to increase their representation in these forces. 
13. Special Rehabilitation Programme for the people affected by ethnic disturbances: 
The Special Rehabilitation Programme (SRP) for the people affected by ethnic disturbances in 
Assam, who are at present living at relief camps in Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon etc. shall be 
completed by the Government of Assam with active support of BTC. Necessary funds for their 
rehabilitation shall be provided by the Government of India and lands which are free from all 
encumbrances required for such rehabilitation shall be made available by the BTC. 
14. Interim Council 
Immediately after signing of the agreement, Interim Executive Council for BTC shall be 
formed by Governor of Assam from amongst the leaders of the present Bodo movement, 
including the signatories to this settlement, and shall include adequate representation to the 
non-tribal communities in BTC area. The Interim Council shall not continue for a period 
beyond 6 months during which period election to the Council shall be held. Government of 
Assam shall dissolve the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) and repeal the BAC Act. 
15. Government of Assam will consider inclusion of all tribals including Bodos in 
RHAC/MAC/LAC in consultation with leaders of these Councils. 
16. The Implementation of the provision of the Memorandum of Settlement shall be 
periodically reviewed by a Committee comprising representatives of Government of India, 
Government of Assam and BTC. 
Signed on 10th February, 2003 at New Delhi in the presence of Shri L.K. Advani, Hon’ble 
Deputy Prime Minister of India and Shri Tarun Gogoi, Chief Minister of Assam. 
(Hagrama Basumatary) 
Chairman 
Bodo Liberation Tigers 
(P K Dutta) 
Chief Secretary 
Govt. of Assam 
(R C A Jain) 
Secretary (BM) 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
Government of India 
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APPENDIX B: The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950 
Be it enacted by Parliament as follows: 
1. (1) This Act may be called the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India. 
2. If the Central Government is of opinion that any person or class of persons, having been 
ordinarily resident in any place outside India, has or have, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, come into Assam and that the stay of such person or class of 
persons in Assam is detrimental to the interests of the general public or any section thereof or 
of any Scheduled Tribe in Assam, the Central Government may by order - 
(a) direct such persons or class of persons to remove himself or themselves from India or Assam 
within such time and by such route as may be specified in the order; and 
(b) give such further directions in regard to his or their removal from India or Assam as it my 
consider necessary or expedient: 
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any person who on account of civil 
disturbances or the fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of Pakistan has been 
displaced from or has left his place of residence in such area and who has been subsequently 
residing in Assam. 
3. The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that the powers 
and duties conferred or imposed on it by Section 2 shall, subject to such conditions, if any, as 
may be specified in the notification, be exercised or discharged also by - 
(a) any officer subordinate to the Central Government; 
(b) the Government of Assam, Meghalaya or any officer subordinate to that Government. 
4. Any authority empowered by or in pursuance of the provisions of this Act to exercise any 
power may, in addition to any other action expressly provided for in this Act, take or cause to 
be taken such steps, and use or cause to be used such force, as may in its opinion be reasonably 
necessary for the effective exercise of such power. 
5. Any person who- 
(a) contravenes or attempts to contravene or abets the contravention of any other made under 
section 2, or 
(b) fails to comply with any direction given by any such order, or 
(c) harbours any person who has contravened any order made under section 2 or has failed to 
comply with any direction given by any such order 
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shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years and shall also be liable 
to fine. 
6. No. suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything 
which in good faith is done or intended to be done under this Act. 
7. In this Act, except in section 3, references to Assam shall be construed as including also a 
reference to the State of Meghalaya and Nagaland and the Union territories of Arunachal 
Pradesh and Mizoram. 
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APPENDIX C: Section 3 of the Sixth Schedule [Articles 244(2) and 275(1)] of the 
Constitution of India 
 
3. Powers of the District Councils and Regional Councils to make laws 
 
(1) The Regional Council for an autonomous region in respect of all areas within such region 
and the District Council for an autonomous district in respect of all areas within the district 
except those which are under the authority of Regional Councils, if any, within the district shall 
have power to make laws with respect to—  
(a) the allotment, occupation or use, or the setting apart, of land, other than any land which is 
a reserved forest for the purposes of agriculture or grazing or for residential or other non-
agricultural purposes or for any other purpose likely to promote the interests of the inhabitants 
of any village or town:  
Provided that nothing in such laws shall prevent the compulsory acquisition of any land, 
whether occupied or unoccupied, for public purposes 1[by the Government of the State 
concerned] in accordance with the law for the time being in force authorising such acquisition;  
(b) the management of any forest not being a reserved forest;  
(c) the use of any canal or water-course for the purpose of agriculture;  
(d) the regulation of the practice of jhum or other forms of shifting cultivation;  
(e) the establishment of village or town committees or councils and their powers;  
(f) any other matter relating to village or town administration, including village or town police 
and public health and sanitation;  
(g) the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen; (h) the inheritance of property; 2[(i) 
marriage and divorce;]  
(j) social customs.  
(2) In this paragraph, a “reserved forest” means any area which is a reserved forest under the 
Assam Forest Regulation, 1891, or under any other law for the time being in force in the area 
in question.  
(3) All laws made under this paragraph shall be submitted forthwith to the Governor and, until 
assented to by him, shall have no effect.  
3B. Additional powers of the Bodoland Territorial Council to make laws 
 
(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 3, the Bodoland Territorial Council within 
its areas shall have power to make laws with respect to:—(i) agriculture, including agricultural 
education and research, protection against pests and prevention of plant diseases; (ii) animal 
husbandry and veterinary, that is to say, preservation, protection and improvement of stock and 
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prevention of animal diseases, veterinary training and practice, cattle pounds; (iii) co-
operation; (iv) cultural affairs; (v) education, that is to say, primary education, higher secondary 
including vocational training, adult education, college education (general); (vi) fisheries; (vii) 
flood control for protection of village, paddy fields, markets and towns (not of technical 
nature); (viii) Food and civil supply; (ix) forests (other than reserved forests); (x) handloom 
and textile; (xi) health and family welfare; (xii) intoxicating liquors, opium and derivatives, 
subject to the provisions of entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule; (xiii) irrigation; (xiv) 
labour and employment; (xv) land and revenue; (xvi) library services (financed and controlled 
by the State Government); (xvii) lotteries (subject to the provisions of entry 40 of List I of the 
Seventh Schedule), theatres, dramatic performances and cinemas (subject to the provisions of 
entry 60 of List I of the Seventh Schedule); (xviii) markets and fairs; (xix) municipal 
corporation, improvement trust, district boards and other local authorities; (xx) museum and 
archaeology institutions controlled or financed by the State, ancient and historical monuments 
and records other than those declared by or under any law made by Parliament to be of national 
importance; (xxi) panchayat and rural development; (xxii) planning and development; (xxiii) 
printing and stationery; (xxiv) pubic health engineering; (xxv) public works department; (xxvi) 
publicity and public relations; (xxvii) registration of births and deaths; (xxviii) relief and 
rehabilitation; (xxix) sericulture; (xxx) small, cottage and rural industry subject to the 
provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule; (xxxi) Social Welfare; (xxxii) 
soil conservation; (xxxiii) sports and youth welfare; (xxxiv) statistics; (xxxv) tourism; (xxxvi) 
transport (roads, bridges, ferries and other means of communications not specified in List I of 
the Seventh Schedule, municipal tramways, ropeways, inland waterways and traffic thereon 
subject to the provision of List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule with regard to such 
waterways, vehicles other than mechanically propelled vehicles); (xxxvii) tribal research 
institute controlled and financed by the State Government; (xxxviii) urban development—town 
and country planning; (xxxix) weights and measures subject to the provisions of entry 50 of 
List I of the Seventh Schedule; and (xl) Welfare of plain tribes and backward classes:  
Provided that nothing in such laws shall— (a) extinguish or modify the existing rights and 
privileges of any citizen in respect of his land at the date of commencement of this Act; and (b) 
disallow any citizen from acquiring land either by way of inheritance, allotment, settlement or 
by any other way of transfer if such citizen is otherwise eligible for such acquisition of land 
within the Bodoland Territorial Areas District. 	 
(2) All laws made under paragraph 3 or under this paragraph shall in so far as they relate to 
matters specified in List III of the Seventh Schedule, be submitted forthwith to the Governor 
who shall reserve the same for the consideration of the President.  
(3) When a law is reserved for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare 
either that he assents to the said law or that he withholds assent therefrom:  
Provided that the President may direct the Governor to return the law to the Bodoland 
Territorial Council, together with the message requesting that the said Council will reconsider 
the law or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of 
introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when the law is 
so returned, the said Council shall consider the law accordingly within a period of six month 
from the date of receipt of such message and, if the law is again passéd by the said Council 
with or without amendments it shall be presented again to the President for his consideration.” 
